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Work of USSR Deputies, U.S. Congressmen Compared

USSR People's Deputies' Privileges, Problems

90UN0971A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 5, 29 Jan 89 - 4 Feb 90 pp 12-13

[Article by Marat Abullayev: "Deputies and Congressmen"]

[Text] The conversation with Stanislav Seleznev was undertaken with a secret purpose—an attempt to compile a proper picture of the personal capabilities, privileges, troubles, and problems of our deputies. The former stereotypes still holding sway, I—just as many of us—could not at first understand why our deputy, who has a small red booklet that gives him the right to enter through any door and to demand what has been authorized by law, is complaining about his lot. I completely shared the complaints of the electors who had observed the deputies' discussions about the Law on Status, first, during the session and, later, during the congress: See how they are trying to do for themselves, how much valuable time they are wasting instead of being concerned about the country!... The meeting with Seleznev was held on the very eve of the adoption of the draft law on the status of people's deputies in the USSR, which was approved by the session, when—one can say—the copy had finally been sharpened for the coming debate and it seemed that passions were simmering here far from artlessly.

Seleznev said: "My rival during the election struggle was a deputy minister. You can imagine what capabilities he had at his disposal and what I, a simple economist, had. He went to the voters in a black limousine accompanied by an escort of Volgas; I and all our company—in a decrepit Zhigulenka. Of course, he was able to get to meetings in the most remote corners of the okrug since he had a helicopter at his disposal; I was always late.... True, all of these "advantages" did not help the deputy minister; however, when I became a deputy, I did not become rich with respect to personal resources like, however, many of us."

Of course, Seleznev did not reveal to me anything peculiar to America. One could clearly distinguish with the naked eye which of the deputies was a "chief" and which was not; who seriously suffered from a deep-felt sense of powerlessness and who was completely happy and confident of the future. However, I would not say that this "official" difference between deputies has seemingly separated and "demarcated" them. On the contrary, the majority understand that it is still necessary to struggle for each one's right to effective state activity and to struggle together. It is probably no accident that many deputies, having earned their first parliamentary experience, preferred to form up—so to speak—in battle order, having divided themselves, on the one hand, into "interest" groups—agrarians, economists, ecologists, etc., and, on the other hand, into opposition-type groups such as the interregional or Baltic ones. The powder was

not spent in vain on the discussions about the Law on the Status of People's Deputies in the USSR. You see, there did not exist many normative acts available to our parliamentarians on their rights and duties until recently—and those for the most part began with the word "temporary".

I recall how I once dropped in on a deputy. The angry individual was sitting down. Piles of letters sat on his desk, chairs and on the floor. The telephone was constantly ringing—the voters were attacking. The deputy only made a hopeless gesture: "They deliberately put us into such a position—no place for a reception area, no typewriters, no secretary. The bureaucrats smile at our attempts to make an inquiry. Everyone expects us to drown in complaints and is inciting the voters against us!..." There was no way to console him. Both he and I well understood that the bureaucracy, which had been somewhat squeezed by the new principles for forming a parliament, would try to take revenge without fail, since, as Marx pointed out, its essence is to display special activity when civil society is maturing. Just as air, a deputy needs independence—even if it is only relative—in the form of a law in order to oppose the bureaucracy.

It is difficult to say whether he will manage to provide for everything and whether he will be satisfied with everything.

First, he has received firm guarantees that he will not have to languish in line at the microphone—the floor will be given to him if, of course, the deputy sends a note to the presidium. True, we're a bit short of time—from three to ten minutes; however, even this is something. The lack of order in this matter, as we recall, was a subject of particular dissatisfaction among the parliamentarians—at times "the same people spoke" and at times the "presidium gave the floor as it liked." Seemingly, this has now been ended: The presidium must observe the order of priority and restrictions have been introduced for those wishing to use the podium frequently: A deputy cannot speak more than two times on the same question. Another, no less acute problem that has at times forced deputies to summon patience and courtesy in speaking, has been settled. Now, a penalty—a warning or the depriving of a deputy of the podium—can follow a courtesy. All of these procedural "details" are very important for a deputy and for the parliament as a whole: On the one hand, the opportunities for more productive polemics are expanding as was not the case before and, on the other hand, a wider circle of persons is being involved in the polemics.

Second, our deputy has received an unconditional right to a place to work and receive voters. If the need arises, he must be provided motor transport, receive lodgings in a hotel out of turn, and be provided all necessary information. A deputy's mutual relations with the bureaucracy can now take shape differently—he has the right to demand that violations of the law be eliminated. One must think that a deputy will not be slow to use this

right if someone suddenly takes it into his head to put obstacles in his path or avoids fulfilling the rather impressive list of guarantees which the new law provides a deputy.

Most likely, we were not completely fair to our deputy when we reproached him for "working for himself" when questions connected with supporting a deputy's activity were being debated. Essentially, none of them mentioned any personal benefits although, we agree, the work of our parliamentarian, which takes a lot of effort, requires the necessary compensation. Expressed in material terms, this compensation is as follows.

The "ordinary" deputy, that is, one who has still not been elected to the Supreme Soviet or one of its agencies, receives 200 rubles a month—of course, this is over and above his wages at his primary place of work. A salary of 500 rubles has been set for a member of the Supreme Soviet besides the 200 "deputy" one. This is subject to income tax. Since working in the Supreme Soviet frees a deputy from his previous work, he does not retain his pay at his "old" place. The time, which is spent in parliament or in the congress, is included in his total and continuous length of service. He keeps all his privileges if the deputy's main profession provides for them. As soon as the term of service for a deputy, who has been elected to the Supreme Soviet, expires, he returns to his previous place of work and to his previous position or one equivalent to it if his previous position is occupied for some reason or other. Incidentally, this provision has been extended to a deputy's wife or husband who wishes to live with him in Moscow while the parliamentarian is working in the Supreme Soviet.

A member of the Supreme Soviet can himself select where he will live—in a hotel or in an official apartment. As a rule, deputies live here and there. If in a hotel, there is the Moscow Hotel. He pays no more than 6.30 rubles a day for his stay there. The stay of a wife or husband in the hotel is also paid for during the time the session is working. An official apartment is allocated without charge but the deputy pays for utilities out of his own pocket. In addition, one, who has an official apartment, does not receive the "daily" 15 rubles which all people's deputies, who are participating in the work of the sessions of the Supreme Soviet or congresses, are provided.

Something else about salaries. Because a number of Supreme Soviet members occupy certain positions in the parliament, the pay corresponds to the post. For example, the chairmen of the Supreme Soviet permanent commissions and committees receive 800 rubles; and their deputies—650. The chairmen of the chambers receive 1,000 rubles.

A "personal" monthly wage fund—300 rubles—has been granted to each deputy. This is intended to pay for the work of assistants and secretaries which the deputies have a right to hire. The number of secretaries can be different—from one to—here, everything depends on

the deputy himself. The fund, we agree, is not large if one considers that practically each one of them is buried in letters and voter mandates.

During the second session of the Supreme Soviet, L. Kudrin, one of the deputies, proposed increasing the wage fund for assistants to 600 rubles. However, this proposal was somehow "lost." Perhaps it did not find support because it essentially hardly solved this problem. The deputies actively undertook a different lever, regulating the work with the mandates themselves. Perhaps, the discussions on this question during the discussion of the USSR law "On the Status of People's Deputies in the USSR" could have been more lively just as those on the question of recalling a deputy. It is possible to understand this animation: As practice has shown, the major portion of the mandates have a local nature. It is simply an unbearable burden for a deputy to undertake these mandates separately. Yes, and they do not answer his purpose—to work at the all-union level. Therefore, the norm, in accordance with which USSR people's deputies handle instructions whose realization pertains to the jurisdiction of all-union agencies, has been quite appropriately consolidated. It is difficult to say whether the new statute will have an effect on the psychology of a voter who has been "trained" by our bureaucracy to think that only higher authorities can solve any—even the most minor—problem. Everything will now depend on the deputy body of the local and republic soviets.

However, let us return to the question of compensation—more accurately, to those benefits and privileges which a deputy seemingly has and does not have. Why it is necessary to resort to this indefinite wording is probably understandable. Our deputy is, by far, not simply trying to ease his life somehow. One cannot say that our parliamentarian is abusing a great deal that has been granted to him as a state figure. On the contrary, he limits himself too much at times. However, it does happen because he does not notice that he has crossed over an invisible line behind which is located that against which he has promised the voters he would resolutely fight. Rather, it is a moral problem that investigates a deputy to the breaking point. Finally, when they say that there should be no privileges, including those for deputies, and that each one's contribution should be evaluated only in rubles, this does not mean that others support this same point of view. That is evidently why striking contrasts arise when the matter comes to the privileges that are stipulated for a deputy or "palmed off" onto him.

For example, I know deputies, to whom local authorities have very carefully offered better housing "closer to the voters" as a "conciliation." A categorical rejection of this offer followed although the individual had perhaps been struggling his whole life with the problem of moving from a cramped apartment. Along with this, however, I recall what a large hullabaloo originated during the congress when it was reported that the deputies and the members of their families had been assigned to a special polyclinic. It is still impossible to understand

whether one half of the deputies expressed their indignation in this matter to the other, whether the need was justified or whether it was necessary to leave this discussion rapidly. Or: Deputy A. Viktorovich's extremely alluring proposal to grant an opportunity to purchase an automobile for personal use did not find support suddenly. On the other hand, the entire delegation "ousts" passengers on a delayed flight in order to get home more quickly.... It is understandable that these episodes come from different planning. It is understandable that these are rather the "trifles of life" that, perhaps, do not require such intense attention. However, they are part of a deputy's life and part of his image—a complicated, not a simple, one having little in common with predecessor's image—the quiet parliamentarian of the years of stagnation.

Nevertheless, each of us has convinced himself of this rather well since today there exists an opportunity to observe the life of parliament directly thanks to television and draw conclusions. An article by my colleague, Aleksandr Shalnev about the life of U. S. congressmen is being published next to this. We would hope that it will cause the thoughtful reader to think on his own.

Number of USSR People's Deputies by Union Republic

Union Republics	Total Peo- ple's Dep- uties	USSR Supreme Soviet		
		Total	Council of the Union	Council of Nationalities
RSFSR	1097	244	146	96
Ukrainian SSR	261	62	52	10
Belorus- sian SSR	94	21	10	11
Uzbek SSR	108	29	14	15
Kazakh SSR	99	25	15	10
Georgian SSR	91	26	5	21
Azerbaijan SSR	72	22	5	17
Lithuanian SSR	58	15	4	11
Moldavian SSR	55	15	4	11
Latvian SSR	52	14	3	11
Kirghiz SSR	53	14	3	11
Tajik SSR	57	16	3	13
Armenian SSR	53	14	3	11
Turkmen SSR	47	13	2	11
Estonian SSR	48	13	2	11

Composition of USSR People's Deputies by Type of Activity

	Total number
Production and service area workers	585
Directors of USSR and union republic management agencies	32
Agricultural workers	424
State and soviet agency Workers	126
Scientific workers	160
Servicemen	82
Religious figures	7
Party workers	240
Trade union workers	48
Komsomol workers	12
Public organization figures	45
Cultural workers	32
Health care workers	76
Education workers	173
Literature and art workers	161
Retirees	37
Cooperative members	1
Others	5

Party Affiliation of USSR People's Deputies

		USSR Supreme Soviet		
	Total Peo- ple's Dep- uties	Total	Council of the Union	Council of Nationalities
CPSU members	1939	474	239	233
CPSU candidate members	18	2	1	1
Komsomol members	35	5	3	2
Nonparty members	253	62	28	34

Composition of USSR People's Deputies by Education

Education	Total Peo- ple's Dep- uties	USSR Supreme Soviet		
		Total	Council of the Union	Council of Nationalities
Primary	1			
Incomplete secondary	16	3	1	2
Secondary	313	90	44	46
Specialized secondary	213	56	30	26
Incomplete higher	34	9	3	6
Higher	1668	383	193	190

U.S. Congressional Duties, Experiences

90UN0971B Moscow SOYUZ No 5,
in Russian 29 Jan 89 - 4 Feb 90 p 13

[Untitled article by Aleksandr Shalnev, IZVESTIYA correspondent]

[Text] New York—There is an interesting headline in the magazine NEWSWEEK: "Overheard." Short, one-two line phrases dropped or written by some well-known and frequently completely unknown people appear here. They permit one to look quite differently—very ironically and frequently with an amused or bewildered eye—at events, phenomena and traditions that are standing their ground. A phrase, which a "Soviet official who has been observing for some time how the U. S. Congress operates"—as the magazine reported—uttered, was in a recent issue of this weekly magazine under this headline. The phrase was: "What should be done so that they will finish talking?"

Alas, NEWSWEEK did not report who had posed this question but one can assume that it was one of our people's deputies or members of the Supreme Soviet who had visited the United States get acquainted with the work experience of the American Congress.

I will allow myself a digression: An important Sovietologist once noted in a conversation with your correspondent that he could not understand how Soviet parliamentarians were planning to adopt America's experience. The conditions were unusually different!

I will say right out that I share his uncertainty. Indeed, conditions are very different. Here is an example: Each member of the U. S. Congress has a staff which numbers from 22 to 65 employees paid at public expense. It makes no difference: The senators and congressmen have no objection to complaining about the colossal work load which they have occasion to encounter. I wanted to add "daily" however, I do not add it since the legislators spend only three-four months a year on Capitol Hill, considering days-off, vacations, national holidays, etc. An inclination to reduce even this period is extremely noticeable. For example, last year, the parliamentarians disbanded for the Christmas holidays a month earlier than usual.

Although "holiday" is a relative concept. Every return home by a senator or member of the House of Representatives to his native district is accompanied by work no less intense and important than that in Washington. At home, congressmen are engaged directly in the concerns of those who elected them to congress and whose support they would undoubtedly like to enlist for the next election. You can be loved and adored on Capitol Hill. You can be well received in the Oval Room of the White House. The capital's newspapers can write enthusiastically about you every day. However, if the voters do not feel that you are their defender or, God forbid, suspect that their interests are lower on your list of priorities than the interests of the corporations whose lobbyists

intensely cajole you, then problems will certainly arise for you during future elections.

That is why the legislators try to visit home and their districts as much as possible in order to demonstrate the closeness of their interests through direct contacts with the voters. It is a blessing that there are no technical and financial difficulties with these trips. First, they are paid for from the state budget. Second, the legislators have a green light everywhere, beginning with preferences in receiving tickets and ending with special number plates for the automobiles which they can park free at the Washington airport and park it there until the legislator returns to the capital. The "right to park" is a right that is valued very highly in America: The cost of a parking place in garages reaches eight dollars for each half hour and it is often necessary to park several blocks from the required place since everything is tightly packed with vehicles.

However, in the absolute majority of cases, the legislator's automobiles are their own, private ones purchased with their own money. Those machines, which we call personal, can be counted on the fingers of one hand: Only the highest congressional leaders have the right to such vehicles. This rule has also been extended to the administration. In the White House, for example, only about 10 people, including the president and vice-president, have personal vehicles. All the others must depend on their own resources and capabilities.

There is also a difficulty with housing. Having been elected to Congress, a legislator must immediately think about where he will live. There are three possibilities: Sell his house in his native state and purchase a new one in Washington or its surrounding area; live in a hotel in Washington keeping his home in his native state; or purchase another one in Washington. True, there is the following alternative—to live in Washington in his own office on Capitol Hill and fly home on his days-off and holidays. However, this is for the "amateur" and there are literally few of these.

Each of the three alternatives is expensive. The public coffers practically do not help. Housing expenses come from one's own pocket. Incidentally, this partially explains why the question of raising the salaries of the legislators arises at almost every session of Congress and why they energetically look for additional earnings mainly in the form of honoraria for public speeches. According to the rules now in effect, the total honoraria must not exceed one third of their annual salary.

However, the rules will soon change. Congress has adopted a decision which assumes that the wages of the members of the House of Representatives will increase at the beginning of 1991.

Add to this the mass of free services, which the legislators enjoy—beginning with physical training gymnasiums in the congressional buildings and medical services, which are incredibly expensive in America, and ending with mailing services which devour on the order

of 100 million dollars from the state treasury annually. Considering all the expenses which the state takes upon itself—more accurately, the taxpayer—(for maintaining the offices of 100 senators and 435 members of the House of Representatives) and the employees of the numerous committees and subcommittees in both houses, it turns out that the actual pay of congressmen is many hundreds of thousands of dollars. This, however, is an unsound argument from the point of view of the legislators themselves. They say that they receive little in their hand. Concerning the other expenditures, they say that these are the state's direct responsibility and that this responsibility should not be depicted as a privilege for them.

It seems to me that they are correct. These are not privileges; they are the conditions for their work—work that is higher than the work of ministers based on the level of authority and influence accompanying it. It is higher because in contrast to ministers, legislators are persons elected by the people. This difference between "appointed" and "elected" is clearly sensed during every possible congressional hearing where they summon ministers and other highly placed members of the administration to explain and testify. I have often had occasion to be present during these hearings. The questions to the ministers, if circumstances require it, are posed very toughly and in a very sharp form. It sometimes seems that these are not ministers at all but guilty school children who have been called upon the carpet by the director.

There are no limitations on the questions that a legislature can ask and on the information that he can demand from the administration. True, there exist a great number of methods, with whose help the administration can avoid direct answers and not provide the requested information, especially that connected with intelligence matters.

Despite these dodges, however, the stream of information, to which congressmen have access, is enormous, including that with the highest classification stamp.

The possession of information, however, is not only the right of the congressmen but also their duty. In this sense, the duty is incumbent upon them to demonstrate maximum responsibility when dealing with this information. Based on their degree of knowledge, the members of the U.S. Congress are at the level of the cabinet secretaries—the leading ministers. For example, the secretary of labor would hardly know, for example, what the secretary of defense knows. A congressman, who is a member of the armed forces committee, has a right to expect that his knowledge should be no less than the knowledge of the Pentagon chief.

Where is this discussion leading? I had occasion recently to read on the pages of one of our popular newspapers an interview with a newly elected people's deputy—a journalist. Among other things, he said that if one deputy knows something, then all should know it. Having said that, he made public a document from the Ministry of Internal Affairs that had been disseminated among the

deputies. There is nothing special in the document: It only gives a forecast for the increase in crime in the Soviet Union. Such material should indeed be made public and published. However, the thoughtlessness, with which a people's deputy intends to treat the information that will come to him as a deputy, disturbs me. Frankly speaking, I do not remember a case where some congressman or other was ready to act in this manner: "What I know, everyone will know!" Should such a one exist, they would cut off his information "oxygen" rather quickly, and I can assure you that few of his colleagues would rise to his defense and the voters would not raise an alarm.

As we are talking about journalist deputies, I would like to direct your attention to the fact that membership in Congress is a profession in America. Having become a congressmen, you cast aside all your other work. Our polar practice again confirms the vitality of this rule. You see, several of the deputies are openly using their journalist profession to perform deputy work. In the United States, an appearance before a gigantic television audience with tales about the problems, which your electoral district is encountering, and the steps, which you have taken, would be assessed quite simply: as an element of your political advertising campaign aimed at enlisting support before the new elections. No one forbids you from conducting such campaigns on television. There is only one condition: Pay for them—either out of your own pocket or from the campaign chests of the political party that supports you. Other alternatives are ethically impermissible and, in the majority of cases, illegal.

The need to receive the most reliable information can also partly explain why the passing of legislation stretches out for many weeks and months. This primarily concerns budget legislation. One of the key reasons for the delay is the detail with which the draft and counter-drafts are discussed in the different committees and subcommittees.

I admit that I was somewhat surprised when the economic program, which was submitted to the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, was discussed and adopted in a little more than a week. I am prepared to guarantee that they would have discussed it on Capitol Hill for more than six months, summoning ever newer experts to the hearings, demanding ever newer analytical reports from the government and pursuing their own (it is good that there is a congressional investigative service) analysis of the present budgetary situation and the consequences of the proposals being introduced by the administration.

There are, of course, cases where debates are transformed into empty shop-talk. This usually occurs in the Senate where a rule, which permits the speaker to talk as long as he wishes, exists. This rule is used as a weapon of psychological pressure: Senators, who are exhausted by the endless speech, may, in the final analysis, vote as the orator wants—if only to end it more rapidly.

I assume that it was there, in the Senate, that the "Soviet official", as NEWSWEEK reported, wanted to find out whether it was possible to stop a speaker. It is difficult to do this in the Senate but completely practicable in the House of Representatives: There, the time is limited to several minutes all told. However, in giving a minute speech, a member of the House has the right to drag it out for dozens of pages in the Congressional Record, a collection published daily where all the speeches that were given in the meeting halls of both houses on the previous day are included.

One understands that congressmen are not judged only by their speeches. They have work which is much more important, for example, the development of resolutions aimed at solving specific problems, public activity, and participation in the work of various organizations. There is simply no time for the voters themselves to follow all this. However, there are special investigative services which keep their own dossiers on each of the legislators, setting down literally everything in these dossiers: In how many meetings of the houses of congress did he participate; for how many was he absent because he was ill or on a trip; how many votes did he miss; how did he vote on this or that resolution and why; how many times did he travel abroad on business during the year; how much state money was expended on these trips; the reason and purpose of the trips; etc.; etc.

No, there is essentially nothing in the life of an American legislator which is not noted by the investigative services and not included in his dossier. The life of the legislators is constantly under a magnifying glass. In some cases, this is justified. In others—completely not. However, it is unthinkable to protest. Congressmen are actually deprived of the right to "privacy," that is, to the personal life that Americans defend carefully and aggressively. If you decide to represent the people, the people should know how you are representing them and whether or not you are worthy of their trust. This is how quite a few Americans think and it is impossible to change their minds.

If this does not suit you and if you think that you cannot cope with such invasions into your life, there is a simple way out: Resign. Extremely few do this. No matter how stern, being a member of congress means having power with all of its pluses and minuses. The main plus is the opportunity to manage the country's affairs—to really manage and not simply assent to....

Left, Right Groups' Economic Platforms Compared to Government Program

904A0234A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK
in Russian No 9, Feb 90 pp 4-5

[Article by Yuriy Rytov and Yevgenniy Sosnin: "Movements According to Rules and Without Rules"]

[Text] Soon the majority of union and autonomous republics will have elections to the supreme soviets and to local soviets. Is the population ready for them? One can hardly answer this question positively. Recently, the

TV program "Good Evening, Moscow!" conducted a flash survey of voters. None of them could name the names of their deputy candidates.

True, posters have appeared in the entrances of capital buildings: photographs of the candidates with brief biographical information. The picture apparently is also the same in other cities. But how do you learn who is who, on what platform he stands, what positions he defends, and what program he has put forth? After all, many districts have more than 10 contenders for the office of deputy. Is it conceivable to attend all election meetings?

However, one should not conclude from the population's poor knowledge of their deputy candidates that society is disillusioned with the course of democratic processes and has lapsed into apathy. On the contrary! Never before have discussions about the country's economic and political situation burned with such passion. Discussions on the streets and squares, at enterprises and institutions, and, yes, perhaps even in every family....

The rapid formation and development of all sorts of public movements, associations, and formations attest to the increase in political activeness of citizens. According to the most modest estimates, their number has already reached 215. Almost 90 percent of them are registered in Moscow.

It seems that on the eve of the elections it is appropriate to talk about the most imposing movements, their concepts, and those rules according to which they play their game.

The MDG: Goals and Reference Points

Undoubtedly, the Interregional Group of USSR People's Deputies [MDG] and its supporting formations in many cities of the country is quite an influential and popular movement today. To a considerable extent, this is linked to the fact that the group's leaders—B. Yeltsin, G. Popov, S. Stankevich, V. Tikhonov, and others—have the opportunity to explain their platform not only at rallies, on television, and in the press, but also at sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and at the Congresses of People's Deputies.

In analyzing the draft platform of the MDG (although it still has not been completely drawn up), one cannot help but come to the paradoxical conclusion that in many of its positions it coincides with the government program supported by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies for improving the health of the economy. Although, as a rule, these positions are given under the badge of criticizing the concept of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Are there differences? Yes, there are, and they are quite significant. First of all, they come down to the time periods and sequence of the proposed reforms. Secondly, in the approaches to certain economic categories determining the nature of social relations (such differences are sometimes caused by a different understanding and interpretation of the terms).

So, just what is the essence of the MDG economic program (authored by G. Popov)? "The basic form of interaction between enterprises," we read, "is a free market and free competition. Market prices are in effect. Anti-monopoly and anti-trust legislation is passed and implemented to preserve the market and competition; in particular, as it applies to enterprises of the state sector. In order to form a true unified unionwide market and reject mandatory state order, a program for turning the ruble into a convertible currency is drawn up immediately and implemented in the shortest possible time."

As you can see, if we talk about the ultimate goal of economic reform, this program coincides completely with what is outlined in the government program. Yes, now the vast majority of economists (and legislators, too) are convinced that only a market-based economy and only free competition of producers can stabilize supply and demand, regulate money circulation and the financial system as a whole, restore the purchasing power of the ruble, and strengthen its rate of exchange. Anti-monopoly legislation? Yes, it is necessary. And a corresponding draft bill is being prepared in the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Economic Reform. A program for switching to a convertible ruble? In essence, it has also already been set forth in the government program, only the process is gradual, and here it is necessary to proceed step by step.

Of course, the central aspect of any economic concept is the question of ownership. The MDG platform speaks of the need to make relations of ownership correspond to the level of development of productive forces and to overcome premature universal nationalization of means of production that does not correspond to the level of the modern economy.

If you have followed the debates on this problem at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, you probably would agree that the draft submitted for consideration by the deputies corresponds completely with this requirement. A difference is seen only in some wording. Namely, the MDG platform proceeds from the prerequisite that the following should become full-fledged types of ownership in the society: collective joint stock ownership of all members of a labor collective; cooperative ownership; and private ownership. As you know, the concept of private ownership is not contained in the draft law submitted. In our view, Academician L. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, gave a quite convincing explanation for this.

Why was the concept of private ownership not included in the draft? There is also an explanation for this. The specific social and psychological conditions in which certain concepts are used were taken into account. In our country, the term "private ownership" evokes a whole series of not only historical but also contemporary associations. And it is not by chance that two diametrically opposed viewpoints have come to light in all the debates that have taken place recently. Some decisively deny this

very concept as it applies to our conditions as much as others decisively insist on its application.

That is why the draft law bears the imprint of a reasonable compromise. Let us recall that three major blocks of ownership are represented in it. These are: ownership by citizens (or individual ownership), which also calls for owning means of production; collective forms of ownership, which include five varieties—leasing, collective enterprises, cooperatives, joint stock companies, and, finally, ownership by public organizations; and state form of ownership, which includes unionwide ownership, republic ownership, and municipal ownership. As the MDG proposes, all forms of ownership are based on the principle of full equality and equal protection.

Although the draft law, after its discussion at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has been sent for additional working to take into account the remarks made, it is obvious that it creates the necessary base for consensus.

Practice Makes Perfect

The MDG platform contains a special section entitled "The New Social Policy" (authored by T. Zaslavskaya). However, claims to a new word are hardly justified. In essence, the section completely repeats similar provisions of the government program (the difference again being only in the use and understanding of certain terms).

Let us take, for example, the initial paragraph of the section. It states that the state consistently implements a policy of increasing the proportion of national income directed at popular consumption by decreasing the percentage of production accumulation, military spending, and other nonproduction expenditures.

This is all correct. But you would agree that social reorientation of the economy is not simply the government's plan for the future, it is already an accomplished fact! Already last year, as you know, given all its difficulties, the increase in production of group "B" surpassed the increase in group "A."

The MDG social section further states that people are granted the opportunity to acquire on favorable terms the housing they occupy with the right of subsequent resale, leasing, or transfer as an inheritance.

You will agree that here, too, it repeats with some additions one of the most important provisions of the government program, which has found logical embodiment in the draft law on ownership.

Let us take another section of the MDG social platform—on pensions and benefits. It is based on the following basic principles. First, the universal nature of social guarantees of all groups of the nonworking, disabled population. Second, providing money payments from the state budget not below the subsistence minimum. Third, rejecting the setting of a maximum level of

benefits and pensions of each type. Fourth, an annual revision of all types of payments depending on the retail price index.

It is possible that the reader will say that we have already encountered something similar somewhere. He is absolutely right. Roughly the same wording is contained in the draft law on pensions drawn up by the government.

A question may arise here. Which came first, and which came second? Perhaps it was not the leaders of the MDG who borrowed their ideas from the government program, but, conversely, the government program that relies to a certain extent on the elaboration of MDG theorists?

If that is true, what is wrong with it? We have repeatedly said that the government program is by no means a product of apparatus creativity. This is a scientifically elaborated document which relies on progressive domestic and foreign experience. It most thoroughly takes into account public opinion, using the many logical ideas advanced by scientists. Compromise solutions have also been put in the program. But how could it be otherwise, if the dispersion of opinions on each fundamental issue is unusually wide? Naturally, it was not possible to reconcile with extreme points of view. And that is why the government program has so many opponents and critics.

That is not so terrible. The times are long gone when any decision made "at the top" was met with unanimous applause (although they often were not carried out later). Today, pluralism of opinions and criticism of many decisions being made are perceived as a quite normal phenomenon. But...criticism is criticism, and work is work. Unfortunately, it is namely here, in the work, that the costs of our democratic reorganization are especially perceptible.

This is not just a matter of interethnic disturbances. It is not just about unjustified strikes. It is not just about unsanctioned rallies and demonstrations. It is a matter of a massive decline in discipline and order in many sectors of production. Unfortunately, no place is found in the MDG platform (or in the platforms of many other movements for that matter) for an analysis of this problem. Apparently, they are placing all hopes on new forms of ownership and market relations, when its Majesty the full-weight ruble in and of itself will arouse in the worker responsibility and self-discipline. But until then, we must cover a still difficult path, inconceivable without discipline and order.

Right, Left, Which Side?

Many of our sociologists and commentators divide social movements into "left" and "right," following terminology adopted in the West. I would like to emphasize right away that such a qualification is fairly relative in nature. No matter which formation we take, its banners invariably contain the words—"We are in favor of perestroyka!" It is just that the concept itself of perestroyka is often perceived from various, sometimes diametrically opposed positions.

The other day in the capital, the United Workers Front (OFT) reminded me of itself. Its leaders organized a large rally at Ostankino. The speakers demanded that a decisive barrier be put up against private ownership and a market economy and condemned the actions of the MDG. They also voiced appeals to revive Russian "with an iron hand."

One of the main tasks of the formation, according to the idea of its leaders, is to organize a massive workers movement in support of perestroyka and to develop real workers' supervision of the course of reforms. This includes not to permit their orientation on a decrease in the standard of living of workers and a the formation of a property elite, as well as a new bureaucratic elitist parliamentary group of politicians. Of course, the front's program includes a struggle against corruption and social injustice and illegal privileges. What specific content is put into this generally quite vague wording?

Above all, the OFT is extremely critical of the idea itself of today's radical economic reform. In the opinion of its leaders, the deep crisis of the economy is the result of the fact that it (the reform) is squeezing the productive forces of a socialist society into the narrow framework of production relations characteristic of pre-monopoly capitalism.

This process, the authors of the concept maintain, began back in 1985 when the ruble (profit and income) was assigned primary importance, and not satisfying the needs of people, which led the country to stagnation (?). The subsequent reform, even further intensifying the role of profits, turned the crisis into stagnation.

The authors of the concept spare no black words in characterizing all the economic and social processes taking place today. They are convinced that the destruction of the economic basis of socialism is taking place—public ownership of the means of production and development of group egoism ruinous for society—and that a wide social polarization is taking place to please shrewd businessmen from the economy and to the detriment of the interests of the working people. Maintaining the present course of intensifying market relations would bring the country to economic and social collapse.

The authors of the concept must be given credit. They have skillfully used the country's calamitous economic situation. However, they deliberately refused to examine the situation from several other positions. Namely: Haven't all the current difficulties arisen precisely because the economic reform is being implemented slowly and not comprehensively and because it can reach its conclusion and provide a return only through a number of painful stages? Is it not because a transitional period inevitably weakens the economy, impairing the administrative levers and not having time to replace them with economic levers? Is it not because highly productive labor of people is possible only after they regain the feelings and rights of ownership they lost at one time?

Well, what constructive economic ideas do the leaders of the OFT advance? To move forward means to go back. That is how you could decipher their vague recommendations. Of course, here we are talking about the rejection of value indicators and modernization of those used earlier, reflecting the level of satisfaction of the needs of the population and society as a whole. Here we are talking about creating an effective mechanism of distribution according to labor based on competition (!) and cost-accounting incentives for comprehensive economy of labor costs, reducing prices, and increasing product quality. Here we are talking about—of course!—implementing currency reform in order to expropriate illegally amassed capital and stabilize money circulation.

In short, the "image of the enemy," which populists like so much to try to find, is represented here by "Soviet Boers" and other of our citizens yearning to crawl out of poverty and receive a worthy payment for their initiative-filled and conscientious labor. Why, the slogan "Let it be equally bad for everyone than good for some" also has a magnetic force for a certain portion of the population...

However, there is no reason to be surprised. Even the supporters and followers of Nina Andreyeva today have created their own formation—"an informal organization fighting for Leninism and communist reference points of perestroika"—under the name of "Yedinstvo" [Unity]. It is understandable how such a banner could rally these people. "Restore the historical truth about Stalin and his comrades in arms." The struggle against "bourgeois influence on the process of perestroika," and so forth.

In analyzing the platforms of the social formations that are springing up like mushrooms, one is simply struck by the scope which pluralism of opinions has taken on in our country, developing into a pluralism of actions, from the widely known democratic union to the lesser known "Pamyat". Let us turn to just some of the specific problems that some or other public associations are trying to resolve.

Dispute at the Boundary

These are hectic times. The other day, the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet scrupulously discussed the draft Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on Land. The first reading of this draft law took place more than 2 months ago now. But the final hearing evoked quite a number of sharp clashes.

Strictly speaking, the question of land and forms of its ownership long ago became both a political and economic issue in the country. It is not by chance, therefore, that the platforms of certain informal organizations and associations devote considerable space to it. In our country almost one-sixth of the workers are agricultural workers. And this law vitally affects their interests. In addition, those who run private subsidiary farms are also anxiously awaiting new rules on land use. We must also mention the owners of suburban and garden plots or those who dream of having them.

Although, we must clearly imagine that the interests here are far from identical. Kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers expect the right to independent economic management from the Law on Land. This involves farming development and wide leasing. Others want an end finally to various oppressions and extremes concerning private subsidiary farms. And those who would like to have a cottage or to purchase a vacant house in the countryside would like to not have to wander through numerous offices, running into paling bureaucratic obstacles.

Yes, today someone is inclined to give the Law on Land a "utilitarian" importance. Others see in it a great policy, believing that passage of the Law on Land is, in essence, the "February Peace Revolution of 1990."

What kind of slogans do the representatives of the informal movements have? The Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations and Movements of the USSR (MADO), for example, advocates receiving land to own with the right of inheritance. The People's Front of the RSFSR in its program, declaration, and charter sees the local soviets as full-fledged owners of the land. Participants in the "Pamyat" movement advocate implementing agrarian reform with the transfer of land to the peasants and promoting the formation and activities of farming cooperatives.

The author of the section on land reform in the platform of the interregional deputy group [MDG], VASKhNIL Academician V. Tikhonov, advocates ensuring conditions for complete and administratively unrestricted democratic and free choice by peasants of the forms of economic management on the land transferred to them. It is emphasized that each landowner independently decides the form of economic management on the parcel of land belonging to him: in a kolkhoz or sovkhoz, or leaving it with a portion of the accumulated property.

There is no denying, these programs have a positive beginning at their basis and raise the issue of land in the context of today's requirements.

Now let us turn to the government program. Here it is clearly stated that the executive power favors a "decisive shift to development of the agrarian sector based on a diversity of forms of use and disposition of costs." It turns out that there are no fundamental differences in the approach to the question of the right to land. And this fact is reassuring. That means more assurance that we are on the right track.

But here is what is alarming: V. Tikhonov maintains that "immediate forced elimination of sovkhozes and kolkhozes is impossible, although they have also proven their futility and extremely low effectiveness in farming." What are we to understand from this? Today we cannot break up kolkhozes and sovkhozes, but tomorrow, it turns out, we can, for their futility is obvious. But is this the case?

Yes, lately passions with respect to public farms have become quite heated in the country. Fairly influential

forces have appeared which see kolkhozes and sovkhozes as the main cause of the food shortage. If that is the case, get rid of them.

Can one agree with such a point of view? One should hardly get it off our back and reject and pull down kolkhoz and sovkhoz production. After all, during the years it was becoming established both the farms and the entire infrastructure were oriented on the appropriate scale of production. Now you can argue yourself hoarse about whether or not it was correct. Most likely, still, a mistake was made. Let us take tractor building for an example. Basically, only powerful tractors go to the rural areas. Of course, the distortion is obvious. After all, in each public farm, where they have dozens of strong plowmen, they also cannot get by without small tractors with the necessary set of pull-type equipment. But there are none. The course toward concentration of production "worked" here, too.

With what should the farmer be equipped today? Not everyone will take a powerful "Belarus." But production of medium and small tractors has not been set up as it should. Unfortunately, such problems exist not only in tractor building.

So, can a newly made farmer immediately handle the production volumes that kolkhozes and sovkhozes provide today? This is hardly possible even in the immediate future. In short, in advocating diversity in forms of economic management on the land, in its program the government set the task of increasing the efficiency of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, including the weak ones.

Is this step logical, or should we take and get rid of the weak farms? Probably, a zealous person and moreover an intelligent economist would consider the first variant correct, of course, not forgetting here about bringing the production relations into compliance. It turns out there is a heated argument at the boundaries of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and meanwhile food is not being increased from this. Its shortage is increasing social tension in society. Is it worth making this situation even worse? Maybe it is time to think seriously about tomorrow?

The "Greens" and Others

What is going on with the environment? Why is the ecological situation growing worse from day to day? These questions concern everyone today. It is not by chance, therefore, that the documents of the Moscow People's Front (MPF), the Moscow Voluntary Society of Russian Culture "Otechestvo" [Fatherland], and certain other informal associations devote a special place to problems of ecology.

The program of the USSR people's deputies who belong to the interregional group looks quite convincing. It raises the question that soviets at all levels have the real legal and economic levers to affect the

nature of economic development and use of the territory. It advances the requirement to intensify the ecological orientation of social and economic development plans.

In analyzing people's reaction to problems of ecology, one instinctively concludes: there is no longer indifference toward the environment. Every citizen understands well that if a barbaric attitude toward it continues, there may be a catastrophe tomorrow.

How do we prevent it? Every region of the country must have a special program for improving the ecological situation, and on the unionwide level a state ecological policy must be drawn up. But the main thing is that a set of interlinked measures must be implemented consistently. To this end, we have to conduct an ecological examination of many enterprises, strive to sharply reduce the energy consumption of the national economy, and reduce exports of nonrenewable natural resources.

Today the government has taken a firm course toward increasing budget appropriations for environmental protection measures. A draft long-term state ecological program has been drawn up.

In short, there are changes for the better. But at the same time, new alarm signals have appeared. The country has begun a mass closing of enterprises in the chemical, medical, paper and pulp, metallurgical, and a number of other sectors under the pretext of their ecological hazard. Are such demands just? Without a doubt. As a rule, strict sanctions are imposed on those production facilities that are unsafe for man and the environment.

Last year and early this year, production was halted at more than 1,000 enterprises. But in this situation there are few who think that a reduction, even a partial one, in the output of certain products brings some arrhythmia.

Just where is the golden mean? And how do we make it so there are no distortions in the "Greens" movement that painfully affect the national economy. There are no ready answers here. But experience prompts us that we need a weighed approach and coordination of actions.

The period of rally euphoria has obviously dragged on. Naturally, no one can now dispute people's right to hold meetings and rallies, to express their opinion, and to assess the phenomena taking place in the country. It is important that these processes be kept within legal limits characteristic of a civilized society. It is necessary that they not threaten the normal life of fellow citizens. And that is why we should accelerate in every possible way the drafting and passage of legal fundamentals for the activities of public organizations and mass movements in the course of democratization of society.

Let there be both pluralism of opinions and pluralism of movements. But is a movement conceivable without rules? After all, in the final analysis, we all would like to arrive at a consolidation of forces, for the sake of progress and for the sake of true perestroika.

Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Report Summarizes Article 6 Debate

90UN0925A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 28 Jan 90 p 1

[ETA Report on Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Session: "Report by Committee on Proposed Legislation Chairman Kh. Eller on Amending Articles 6 and 7 of the Estonian SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)"]

[Text] Esteemed Deputies! The agenda for discussion of the given subject was preceded by serious work, begun last Autumn. In order to refresh our memories of the preceding events, I shall briefly recount them.

On 6 October 1989 the Supreme Soviet formed the Deputy's Group for Democratic Development. The terse demand, "to Remove Article 6 from the Estonian SSR Constitution," was placed on the agenda of the group's first meeting.

On 12 November 1989, Deputy T. Kork introduced this proposal to the Supreme Soviet in the name of the group. As best I recall, the Supreme Soviet decided, "to adopt the draft as a basis for drawing up a new Constitution, and to instruct the Committee on Developing Constitutional Law [Komissiya po sovershenstvovaniyu konstitutsionnogo zakonodatelstva] to provide an analysis at one of its coming sessions."

The analysis was provided, and on 6 December 1989 we discussed the draft, which had already taken on a more clear-cut form, presented by the aforementioned committee with the active participation of the Democratic Development Group. The content of the draft was as follows:

1. To acknowledge that Article 6 had lost its force.
2. To amend Article 7, editing it to conform with the Law On Citizens' Associations. The draft included a representative list of citizens' associations which might enter the political system of the Estonian SSR, and also spelled out their rights to take part in the resolution and administration of public affairs. The following conditions were established: the requirement to register the associations according to prescribed procedure; and the requirement to operate within the bounds of the laws of the Estonian SSR.

As you will recall, the Supreme Soviet submitted the draft to popular discussion in order to then take the final decision. It is fitting to note that early in the period of public discussion, the Estonian CP Central Committee held its 16th Plenum which adopted a political statement, that the communists of Estonia are firmly convinced of the fact that there is no place for a monopoly on power in the society of the future; and that Articles 6 and 7 of the Fundamental Law should be repealed or replaced by legislation which reflects the democratic bases of a law-governed state. A committee for drawing up a draft law on parties was also formed at the Estonian CP Central Committee Plenum. The corresponding draft

law was then submitted to analysis by legal experts at Tartu University, and has now been presented to the Supreme Soviet Presidium. The Estonian CP Central Committee has officially appealed to the Supreme Soviet Presidium, having summarized the results of popular discussion, and has asked that the declaration described above be considered the official point of view of the Estonian CP in the course of discussing the question of amending the aforementioned articles at the Supreme Soviet session.

The Presidium has received a great many statements from party committees, primary organizations, working collections, political movements and groups, and from individual citizens, supporting a constitutional amendment on a monopoly on power. Their reasons varied—from concrete proposals to a terse demand in a letter from Kohtla-Jarve, "Down with it!" But all of them could be reduced to the common denominator, that under conditions of developing representative democracy, a constitutionally-guaranteed leading role for one party becomes an anachronism, if we are at the same time speaking about handing over all the fullness of power to the Soviets and the Supreme Soviet elected by the people.

True, the Presidium has received two other opinions as well: Citizen Sarenov bluntly states, that although repeal of Article 6 is possible, "the people are nevertheless used to feeling a firm hand on their shoulders." A plenum of the Estonian CP Raykom in Tallinn's Morskoy Rayon also submitted a resolution, which notes that amending the Constitution on the leading role of the Communist Party, as the initiator of perestroika and the guarantor of its irreversibility, are premature; and that it would be more prudent to amend Article 6 in such a way that it would reflect the present task of the Communist Party. The plenum was of the opinion that the party's leading role in society is an intra-party matter; that only a party congress has the competence to resolve the question; and after that, the legislators in the Supreme Soviet would approve the decisions taken at the congress.

It must be noted that there was, indirectly, a third factor in the public discussion—the tumultuous development of political events in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Therefore, in elaborating on and polishing the draft law in the Committee on Proposed Legislation and in the Committee for Developing Constitutional Law, it was possible to make use of empirical material for comparison, on ways to legalize political pluralism—figuratively speaking, from Latvia to Romania. The results of the work accomplished in the Committee on Proposed Legislation have now been distributed to you. As you can see for yourselves, all the principles of the draft submitted for public discussion have found reflection in it, although they have been subjected to a number of formal amendments. The basic purpose of the amendments was of a normative and technical nature. The committee believes that it would not be prudent to leave blank spots in a normative act which possesses the highest force of law, even if this concerns Article 6. In

order to provide greater clarity to the text submitted for discussion, its contents have been divided into two articles. Article 6 contains the concept of the political system; and article 7, the constitutional rights possessed by the associations included in the political system, while participating in the affairs of society. A portion of the text contained in the initial draft was omitted, which spoke about registration of civic associations, since that requirement has been presented in a specific normative act, in the Law on Citizen's Associations. But this does not signify that the present edition supports the action of any arbitrary political grouping as part of the political system. Articles 6 and 7 contain three conditions: associations must be formed according to procedure prescribed by law; they must operate within the bounds of the laws of the Estonian SSR; and they must observe the principles stated in their regulations and programs.

And this is how the Committee on Proposed Legislation submitted the draft of the political Committee on Developing Constitutional Law.

The committee has approved the draft, and has recommended presenting it to the Supreme Soviet for discussion; but it has at the same time introduced three refinements and clarifications of an editorial nature. Since the committee held its session only yesterday, these are not included in the copies distributed to you. In this connection, I ask you to pick up the designated draft law and enter the following corrections to it:

Article 6, the second line, which states, "are being created," should read: "which have been created."

Article 7, the third line: after the words, "associations of citizens shall participate," the words, "within the bounds of existing legislation," should follow. Beginning at the end of line five and continuing, it states: "in resolving political, economic, social and cultural questions;" but should state: "forming the positions of public and social institutions on political, economic and social questions and questions of culture."

The political and economic situation in our country today is critical. One could say that the fate of *perestroyka* is being decided. It is completely obvious that only in concert can we find a way out of this complex situation. In today's Estonia no single political force exists which is capable of exercising political power on the basis of its own capabilities alone. First of all, the legal guarantees must be established for cooperation and social partnership. Such a guarantee can only be—equality before the law of all parties, social organizations and movements, and all political and civic initiatives.

The amendments to the Fundamental Law under discussion here today can be a step to the law-governed state. I appeal to you to vote for them.

At the same time I ask you to accept the Supreme Soviet resolution, which presents to the Presidium specific tasks for creating the conditions for official registration

of the political parties we are actively forming and for including them in the legal political system.

Kazakh 5 Jan Party Plenum Held

Information Report

90US0466A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 6 Jan 90 p 1

[“Information Report on the Plenum of the CC of the Kazakh CP”]

[Text] On 5 January 1990 the 18th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP was held. The Plenum considered the following issues:

1. Nominating candidates from the Kazakh CP for people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR
2. Holding elections for people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR from the Kazakh CP
3. Progress in implementing the resolutions of the 4th, 6th, and 13th plenums of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP on the question of improving the food supply to the population.

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP N. A. Nazarbayev gave a speech on the first two items on the agenda. Plenum speakers were: R. E. Litman, shaft sinker brigade leader at the V. I. Lenin Mine of the Karagandaugol Production Association; Yu. P. Shlemov, head of the experimental metallurgical shop of the Ust-Kamenogorskiy Lead-Zinc Industrial Complex; Ye. G. Yezhikov-Babakhanov, first secretary of the Dzhezkazganskiy Obkom; I. I. Dumanov, director of the Leninogorskiy Polymetal Industrial Complex; K. A. Taukenov, first secretary of the Kokchetavskiy Obkom; B. Mustapayeva, rice grower at the Chirkeyliyskiy Sovkhoz, Kzyl-Ordinskaya Oblast; A. Mambetov, artistic director of the M. O. Auezov Kazakh Academic Theater; A. A. Shilin, first secretary of the Sayramskiy Raykom, Chimkentskaya Oblast; K. S. Smailov, editor-in-chief of the magazine KAZAKHSTAN KOMMUNISI; B. S. Andreykin, Kok-Dzhon pit excavator machinist at the Karatau Production Association; G. M. Shalakhmetov, chairman of State Television and Radio of the Kazakh SSR; L. Ya. Chichenkova, secretary of the Semipalatinsk Railway Junction Partkom; R. Kh. Suyerbayev, secretary of the Ural'skiy Obkom; V. S. Myslina, first secretary of the Aktyubinskay Raykom, Aktyubinskaya Oblast; K. B. Darzhumanov, chairman of the party control commission for the Pavlodarskiy Obkom; R. T. Cherdabayev, first secretary of the Novouzenskiy Gorkom, Gur'yevskaya Oblast; V. P. Osipenko, deputy chairman of the Tselinogradskiy Oblast Ispolkom; S. M. Bayzhanov, first secretary of the Dzhambulskiy Obkom. The plenum nominated candidates for people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR from the Kazakh CP. According to the established procedure they will be presented for registration to the select commission on elections and review of people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR from the

Communist Party of the republic. The plenum adopted a resolution "On the Conduct of Elections for People's Deputies of the Kazakh SSR from the Kazakh CP," which is being published. The plenum heard and took under advisement information on the progress in implementing the resolutions of the 4th, 6th, and 13th plenums of the Kazakh CP on the question of improving the food supply to the population, which was presented by Kazakh CP Secretary V. I. Dvurechenskiy. The plenum considered the organizational issue. The plenum confirmed O. Abdykarimov as head of the Party-Organizational and Cadre Policy Department of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP. Here the plenum concluded its work.

Resolution on 16 Mar Elections

90US0466B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 6 Jan 90 p 1

[“Resolution of the 18th Plenum of the CC of the Kazakh CP: On the Conduct of Elections for People's Deputy of the Kazakh SSR from the Kazakh CP”]

[Text] 1. To convoke a plenum of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP on the elections for people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR from the Kazakh CP on 16 March 1990.

2. To conduct voting in the elections for people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR with the participation of candidate members of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP, members of the review commission of the republic party organization, as well as the department heads of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP, first and second secretaries of obkoms, chairmen of oblispolkoms, department ministers and supervisors, and representatives of the USSR Armed Forces not belonging to the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP.

3. To instruct the Buro of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP to present, according to the procedure established by law, a list of the voters at the Central Committee to the select commission on elections and review of people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR from the Kazakh CP.

Nazarbayev Speech

90US0466A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 6 Jan 90 pp 1-2

[Speech by N. A. Nazarbayev: "N. A. Nazarbayev's Speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP"]

[Text] Comrades! I think I will not be wrong if I stress how out-of-the-ordinary today's plenum is. For the first time in its history the party organization of Kazakhstan, in accordance with the new electoral legislation, is realizing its incumbent right to nominate and directly elect people's deputies to the highest state organ of the republic.

In this way, the central questions we must discuss are directly related to the development of democratization and glasnost, with the growth in self-awareness and initiative among the masses, with the realization of a new stage in political reform. They accurately reflect those positive processes of perestroika by which the republic and the country live and have enormous significance not only for the Communist Party of Kazakhstan but also for all societal structures, for each and every voter.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the current political situation was in large part determined by the plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the second Congress of People's Deputies held in December of last year. The chief conclusion to be drawn from the complicated decisions taken there is the crucial necessity for unity among all healthy social forces on the perestroika platform. The only possible way to overcome our accumulated economic, political, social, and international problems is by means of the socialist revitalization begun by the party, and only on condition of unwavering loyalty to the ideals of Great October.

We have approached a difficult and important frontier. As was stressed at December's extraordinary plenum, this is what defines the special and critical role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Every sound-thinking person must understand that now only the party can be the basic consolidating force capable of uniting all strata of society striving toward political, socioeconomic, and spiritual renewal.

Let us analyze candidly what lies behind the current ringing demands for an immediate reexamination of the social role of our party. What goals are being pursued here? Who stands to profit?

At first glance, it seems to be a matter of a division of functions. Immediately the question arises: whose? If we are talking about party and soviet organs, then the party is actually fighting to strengthen the sovereignty of the soviets in every way possible. If it is party and economic organs—once again, there is no contradiction, insofar as the party has adopted a strict course limited to political methods of leadership and rejects making decisions inappropriate to it on economic problems. What remains? What other functions would those who today do not disdain any, even the most provocative, means to slander the party, want to deprive it of?

The answer is obvious. There are those who would like to deprive the CPSU of its role as the political avant-garde of Soviet society, to emasculate the core political essence of party activity, without which the CPSU as such would cease to exist.

In general I must say that healthy party principle, courage in admitting past mistakes, somehow imperceptibly have begun to be transformed in some Communists into a sick guilt complex, a universal remorse that wholly negates any of socialism's accomplishments. The impression is created that certain forces even find gratification

in self-flagellation, in the desire to lower, to trample the party morally as much as possible. People like that, as the saying goes, would even let their own father hang for the sake of getting their two cents in!

It is fine for Communists to shoulder bravely their difficult consolidating mission for the sake of uniting the forces of society on the high road of perestroika, including informal organizations. But how can we characterize the actions of CPSU members who take up the party's slanderers' song, who set society against the party?

The time has come to draw a sharp line between pluralism of opinion and unscrupulousness. In a situation when the muddy wave of attacks against the party is growing, when the political and socioeconomic situation is being exacerbated to the flashpoint, Communists do not have the right to be silent, not to repulse social demagoguery and political extremism. In the given instance, the position of a Saltykov-Shchedrin "very wise fish" is not only immoral but extremely perilous for the destinies of the party and socialism.

We must actively oppose any attempts to undermine the unity of the CPSU, to chop it up along ethnic lines. I am certain that the plenum's participants will support me in this. We are for the independence of the Kazakh Communist Party in deciding many of its own questions, including those of cadre policy, but only within the framework of a united CPSU.

The decades of our common development have proven that it is easy to go it together, as well as more reliable. Of course, the road we followed proved bumpy; there were ruts in it, and potholes, but there were, after all, accomplishments, too! How can we forget all that? How can we excise our jointly suffered fate?

It is better to understand that separatist moods are showing up, a desire to secede from the CPSU, among individual Communists. Moreover, the extremely radical step of any Communist Party whatsoever toward total independence from the CPSU is fraught with serious losses for perestroika, and for the further improvement of inter-ethnic relations. In these areas the crisis has not yet passed. Such centrifugal actions literally chop off at the root the first shoots of renewal, which all the peoples of our Union look upon with hope, and cast a shadow of mistrust on the party's new political course.

Meanwhile, the political situation that has taken shape in society, is undoubtedly decisively dictating the necessity to speed up substantially perestroika, the democratization of intraparty life, the overcoming of the barriers of passivity, and conservatism and recidivism in government. There is an acute need for revitalizing the interrelations between party committees and soviet, trade union, Komsomol organs, and other public organizations and groupings.

The resolution of this important and serious task demands a rebuilding of the very system of popular rule at all its levels. In examining a cross-section of the path followed since the first Congress of People's Deputies, each of us sees how much distance has been covered in this direction. We can say with confidence that the first stage of political reform is complete: new higher organs of state power for the country have been formed.

The second Congress of People's Deputies was yet another step on the path of transferring political and economic reforms from the sphere of ideas into practice. The documents passed there possess a unique importance for each union republic, each region. Here, first, I think of all the measures noted on restoring the economy, intensifying the struggle with organizational crime, changes and additions to the Constitution of the USSR on questions of the electoral system, the Law on Constitutional Oversight of the USSR, legislative acts determining the regulations of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, and the status of people's deputies.

As you see, even a simple enumeration of the questions examined speaks to the scale and topicality of the problems raised for discussion at the Congress. Of course, time will put everything in its place, will illuminate more precisely the new limits of this experiment. But one thing is certain: the Congress of People's Deputies gave a powerful impetus both to thinking and to concrete actions. In this respect I have to say something about the position of the Kazakh deputies, as connected with their sincere desire to attain in the imminent future decisive results in the sphere of economics, in raising the people's standard of living.

The main idea is that raising the efficiency of production and popular well-being, in our opinion, is inseparably tied to strengthening the republic's independence, to the processes of decentralizing government in favor of the territories. It is these fundamental questions that we doggedly posed from the tribune of the Congress. And our stout-hearted word was heard and supported. A concrete result was the decision of the people's deputies to pass a set of laws in the first quarter of the current year guaranteeing the right of the republic, and that means the enterprises and associations as well, to administer their economy independently, to dispose of their own natural resources and mineral wealth. For Kazakhstan—one of the foremost regions for raw materials in the country—this is a matter of the utmost importance. Today the political awareness of the people of our multi-ethnic republic, their feeling of self-worth, have grown immeasurably.

Having taken the administration of the economy into their own hands, they have acquired the opportunity to deal with the republic's economy effectively, independently, without promptings "from upstairs," to make mutually advantageous contact with foreign firms, to conduct business successfully both for their own good and for the good of the entire socialist federation. The

results of the elections for deputies to the local soviets held on 24 December of last year attest to the raised level of political thinking among the people of Kazakhstan. We can say with confidence that those elections opened up a broader path for perestroika of the mechanism of power, administration, and control in the republic. They became a landmark point in the democratization of life; they created a new political situation in Kazakhstan.

As a positive fact it should be noted that the party committees, taking into account their experience in the elections for people's deputy, got going on the preliminary work long before the start of the election campaign, worked out pre-election platforms in which they defined their position on the coming elections and planned the key directions for party-political activity during this period.

Nominations for candidates for deputy to the local soviets were on the whole well organized. Rejecting impositions from above, many party committees tried to search out beforehand genuine leaders among labor and students and among citizens organized according to their place of residence, people capable of competently resolving issues in the local organs of power. Using this as a point of departure, they carried out their pre-election preparations.

In the republic at the first stage in the election campaign more than 136,000 candidacies were discussed and nearly 100,000 candidates for deputy registered.

The elections results were published in the press and widely commented on in the mass media. I want only to cite a few figures, because they provide summary material for analysis and thought.

As you know, there were 9.7 million voters registered in the republic, and of these 87 per cent participated in the voting. This is a rather strong indicator, reflecting the political activeness of the population and testifying to the far from indifferent attitude of the majority of the citizens of the Kazakh SSR toward the ongoing processes of renewal.

However this objective conclusion should not make us complacent. We cannot ignore the fact that more than 1.2 million voters did not participate in the voting. Of course, the easiest thing to say is that that's every citizen's right. But let's look at the problem somewhat differently. After all, behind each instance of refusal to vote stands a concrete person. It is no secret that in some places social problems were not resolved in a timely fashion, and in some places the voters did not wish to express their attitude toward specific candidates. This probably testifies to a lack of faith in the powers of the local soviets. Let us take just one fact. Many electoral okrugs wound up with a single candidate for deputy. This, unquestionably, is within the bounds of the law, but did the party committees in those places do everything they could to realize the principle of choice?

Is this not where we should look for the reason why in the course of the voting 3 obkom secretaries, 22 raykom and gorkom first secretaries and rayon and municipal ispolkom chairmen, as well as 6 first supervisors of the corresponding party and soviet organs for the municipal and rayon soviets, failed to win the voters' support?

It is essential to recognize that the trade union and Komsomol organs and social organizations did not manifest the proper interest in the electoral campaign. As before, a tiny number of candidates were nominated from citizens' place of residence. An active dialogue with various types of independent organizations and associations was not set up everywhere. Some Communists avoided "awkward" discussions, voluntarily surrendering the field of ideological discussion, as if they were afraid to meet with people.

In the republic 75,807 deputies were elected to the various sections of the soviets. Virtually all strata and groups of the republic's population were represented. Workers comprise 37.9 per cent, kolkhoz farmers 7.9 per cent, women 30.2 per cent, Komsomol members 10.1 per cent, Communists 51.7 per cent.

In analyzing the makeup of the body of deputies, one cannot fail to note that the free nomination and election, unregulated from above by the various types of compulsory forms, led to a substantial curtailment in comparison with the past in the numbers of workers, kolkhoz farmers, women, and Komsomol members. This means that somewhere the labor collectives, public organizations did not make a strong enough effort, they did not fight hard enough for their candidates. There is food for thought here for party committees as well.

In many places the election campaign is still not over; runoffs are going on. So that some local soviets will have to begin work with an incomplete roster.

It is no accident that I have dwelled in such detail on the results of the election campaigns. Correct conclusions should be drawn from them, and the lessons learned need to be taken into account in the course of the coming elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR.

Right now the first sessions of the local soviets of various levels are being held everywhere; they are forming their presidiums, executive committees, and standing commissions. The quality of their rule and administration will depend greatly on the quality of this work. Therefore party committees and organizations cannot stand aside from it. Action, however, must take into consideration the party's new functions in society; it must use political, organizational, and educative means rather than command-administrative methods. We must learn how to work with people, employing party groups in the soviets and relying on Communist elected deputies.

Comrades! The distinctiveness of this present moment consists in the fact that we have entered the stage of formation of a qualitatively new Supreme Soviet of the

Kazakh SSR. With the completion of this stage we will have functioning an integrated, revitalized system of popular rule at all levels.

The electoral legislation about to be tested in practice, the entire political atmosphere, presents an opportunity to put into effect those norms which were officially proclaimed earlier but in practice were frequently left mere declarations. The electoral system itself now guarantees that millions of people will be drawn into the active political process and allows for the formation of a body of deputies that will properly and actively defend the interests of the people and that will begin a true struggle with conservatism and bureaucratism in the localities.

As we know, a principal innovation of the current electoral campaign is the elections of one quarter of the republic's people's deputies from public organizations. This provoked heated debates during the period of discussion of the draft election law, and there were debates on this question at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR. Deputies of the highest republic organ of state power voted for the proposed procedure of representation for public organizations in the new Supreme Soviet. The question was also raised at the second Congress of People's Deputies, where it was decided that a portion of the people's deputies from the union republics could be elected from public organizations, if the constitutions of those republics so provided.

Building on this, I also want to emphasize that candidates are going to be nominated from public organizations not because someone wants to free them from the pre-election campaign in the okrugs, not at all. The concern is that the Supreme Soviet include the truly best representatives of the intelligentsia, Communists, Komsomol members, activists in the trade union movement, in short, the leading people of our time. We consider it essential that at all stages of the nomination this process proceed frankly and openly. It makes sense to publish lists of registered candidates from the public organizations in the republic and local press so that they might be discussed among the general population.

The election campaign is picking up speed. What position should party occupations occupy right now? I can't see there being two opinions here. An aggressive one, of course! Some of the "radicals" might have the thought that they've caught me up here: "aggressive position," indeed—and what is that supposed to mean? Yet another direct diktat from the party?

No, I cannot agree with such a statement of the question. I've already said that the party is decisively changing its style and methods of work, rejecting functions inappropriate to it. But it is not in the least rejecting the role of political avant-garde. It is the party today and henceforth that will be the guarantee of true sovereignty for the soviets, the organizer of genuine democracy. This was proclaimed with complete decisiveness both in the Address of the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union to the party, the Soviet people, passed at the 9 December 1989 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, and in the Political Platform of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP for the elections for people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR and people's deputies of the local soviets, approved by the 17th plenum of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP.

The sense of these documents is based on a deep understanding of the new, consolidating role of the party at the present stage. After all, no one is bothered when other public organizations approach the elections with their own pre-election programs, and the candidates for deputy themselves can speak out with their own vision of any given concrete problem.

Under these conditions the necessity is felt especially acutely for a unification in the diversity of opinions and demands of the various strata of society, for providing them with a cohesive nature in the course of concrete tasks of the present stage of perestroika. This is why there is no need to explain the particular topicality of the party's program documents. Today this is the sole fulcrum with the help of which we can first unite our efforts and then emerge at a qualitatively new level of popular rule.

The Political Platform of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP stresses that the central place in the transformations now taking place is taken up by man, his essential needs and hopes. The day-to-day work of party organizations is directed above all at improving the well-being of the people, at strengthening its feeling of social security, at multiplying its spiritual and intellectual potential.

The practical realization of this task is covered in the social reorientation of the economy, in the establishment of fundamentally new relations between the center and the union republics, and also with the local organs of power, and the shift of Kazakhstan as a whole and all the regions that make it up to the principles of self-government and self-financing.

Our economy has yet to begin working in the new way; people have not yet felt the real positive results of perestroika. That is why now especially we need broad expiatory, organizational, and propaganda work in the party organizations. The people must know our exact priorities and understand what we are striving toward and moving toward. Only in this way will we be able to lead the masses out of the state of passive contemplation, idle waiting for changes, and truly include them into the process of the transformations going on.

On the tribune of the second Congress of People's Deputies I already mentioned and now wish to repeat the words of M. S. Gorbachev, in which, it seems to me, lies the key to understanding the most crucial problem of the present day. "Perestroika will conquer," said Mikhail Sergeyevich, "if it conquers economically." He was not talking about the usual economic growth figures that set your teeth on edge, the kind we learned so well to

manipulate over the past decades, but about concrete things—goods on store shelves, a regular supply of food for the population, a solution to the housing problem, a radical improvement in health care, and so on. Here are our priorities! And people today have a right to know when and in what quantity all this is going to happen, how and at what cost we are going to accomplish these tasks. Moreover, not only overall throughout the republic but for the cross-section of society, for the rayon, the city, and the remotest settlement.

Of course, man does not live by bread alone. He is also worried about many other social and spiritual problems. Here it is also important to select the chief trends and explain them to the people. Although, there is no need to explain too much. Everyone, for example, is concerned about the rise in crime, and our direct duty is to reveal to the people and accomplish a precise program of struggle against it.

Or take an age-old, hard-to-eradicate disease of society—the domination of bureaucratism. Today it is already extremely clear that liquidating this most powerful brake on perestroika by means applied only "from above" is in practice an impossible task. The command-bureaucratic system can be successfully dismantled only with the active participation of the people who as yet given the powerlessness of the soviets do not have any real power to effect the bureaucratic apparatus. This means that the party organs must encourage by all possible means the shoots of genuine popular rule, must support every day and every hour the people's aspiration to rid themselves of the bureaucratic oppression in whatever hypostases it manifests itself.

The idea that bureaucratism has many faces has been expressed more than once from this tribune already. However, lines still have not disappeared at passport desks and housing offices, thousands of workers waste thousands of working hours daily, to say nothing of their own nerves, so that people can obtain an utterly useless pass. We have drawn attention time and again to the necessity to struggle against speculation, to organize hours of operation in business and service enterprises that are convenient for people. Why shouldn't this simple but concrete matter be within the purview of party and soviet organs and the people heading them? Workers controllers, residency committees, and informal public organizations could render substantial aid in mobilizing the masses of people for the struggle with bureaucratism.

I would especially like to expand on one top priority of our party work: the improvement of interethnic relations. Quite a lot has been done in this regard already. The leadership of the Central Committee of the Kazakh SSR and the republic are maintaining a firm and unswerving line, the only true one, to ensure the unshakeable guarantee of equal rights and opportunities for all nations and peoples populating Kazakhstan without exception. We are deeply convinced that only in

this way can we attain a genuine culture and harmonization of interethnic relations, a peaceful, neighborly life in our common Kazakhstan house.

Practice is confirming the correctness of this course. Having tossed aside our old reticence in discussing acute interethnic issues, having ceased to stow them away in the corners of our consciousness, the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP has been able, despite many contradictions and complications, and with great understanding and tact, to sort out the entire tangle of disturbing problems. In particular, we have found it possible in the course of broad discussion to bring divergent positions closer together and to find sensible compromises on the language issue. As a result, the Supreme Soviet of the republic has passed one of the most democratic laws in the country, one which takes into maximum consideration the language interests of each and every Kazakhstaner. The good names of literary figures repressed during the years of Stalinist tyranny have been restored, resolutions of the 1950s that labeled so many of the republic's best-known people as nationalists have been rescinded.

The present candor and glasnost have helped us to pose directly the question of restoring trampled justice with respect to the Kazakh people. I have in mind the specific decrees of the CPSU Central Committee passed after the December 1986 events, which offended the national feelings of Kazakhs. The Politburo reacted with understanding to the request of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP to reexamine the formulations that groundlessly accused the entire people of nationalism and is planning to discuss it at a session in the near future. This request of ours reflects the opinion not only of the Kazakh portion of the republic's population but also of all the other nationalities of multinational Kazakhstan.

By the way, recently public opinion has been asking more and more insistently for a reexamination of several other evaluations of the December events. Now that the passing of time has lessened passions and emotions and we can take a more sober look at what happened, it should be stated very definitely that the young people did not go out on the square with any ill intent toward the other peoples inhabiting Kazakhstan, especially against the Russian people, with whom Kazakhs are linked by a traditional, centuries-old friendship. The reverse has been claimed by those who would like to set our peoples at odds, who would like to tag Kazakhs with the repugnant label of a nationalist people.

At the same time, unquestionably, there is no justification for the individual extremists, the hooligans, who took advantage of the situation to commit criminally punishable offenses, who allowed themselves frankly nationalistic outbursts. But the unalterable fact cannot be denied that those young men and women went out onto the square in a demonstration of growing national self-awareness, to express their dissatisfaction and outrage at the lack of glasnost in the election of the first leader of the republic under perestroika.

The strain in the situation has been fostered to a significant degree by the many social problems left unresolved during the years of stagnation, especially the housing problem. It is no secret that during that period nearly three thousand students were refused a roof over their heads because homeowners had been frightened by the recently issued law concerning the struggle against unearned income. Here we should add too the growing quota-mania at the time in determining the ethnic makeup of the student population, the insensitivity to the language of the people that gave their name to the republic, and the closing of schools and kindergartens with instruction in and of the Kazakh language, which also pushed the young people to go out on the square.

It is possible that in the tense situation of that complicated moment elements of haste, specific mistakes were permitted. The Central Committee of the Kazakh CP feels that everyone concerned, above all the lawkeeping forces, should go about correcting them, without arrogance, and restore justice. All complaints and statements on this subject must be immediately examined in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the republic so as to dispel, finally, all disturbing questions.

We would like it if the central, republic, and local mass media approached the December events with all possible objectivity, refraining from irresponsible publications facilitating the dissemination of unverified rumors and the inflammation of unnecessary passions.

In this respect something else concerns us, namely, the far from positive, often extremely harsh position of some representatives of the intelligentsia and student population who continue to toss burning matter into the smoldering fire of interethnic conflict. I don't think they are doing so consciously. More likely in the heat of polemics, in the desire to satisfy their own leadership ambitions, their sense of measure at times betrays them. But can that really serve as justification? Can personal ambitions really be compared with the terrible danger that can be ignited by the spark of an unsuccessfully hurled phrase or an unfounded accusation offensive to the national feelings of another people? We are certain that it is impossible to satisfy personal national feelings at the expense of degrading another people. This must be borne in mind at all times!

On the background of the ethnic quarrels and ill will which, to our great regret, has put down deep roots in some other republics and regions of the country, we especially need to value and safeguard the peaceful atmosphere in which the people of Kazakhstan live today. Here, as the saying goes, it's better not to add salt at all than to oversalt. The task of the party committees, of all Kazakhstaners, is to watch vigilantly for the slightest manifestations of national extremism, to cut off promptly any attempts at destabilizing interethnic relations. A special request must be made to those Communists whose actions one way or another interfere with the normal interaction of people of various nationalities. In evaluating their moral and political position

we cannot allow any compromises, to say nothing of a lack of principle or tolerance.

I want to emphasize one more time: the line of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP is unshakeable on this front; we shall not turn from our adopted course. Considering that all these questions are so very closely linked with the interests of the republic's entire population, the party committees absolutely must make a special effort in coordinating their actions in the course of the election campaign.

We are interested in active interaction with all public organizations and labor collectives, and as before we intend to stand in a united bloc with the nonparty masses. At the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee held on 9 December of last year, it was announced that the CPSU is open to broad dialogue with all social forces that support the renewal of society and is interested in their collaboration and consolidation. It is in favor of a constructive approach to resolving all the problems that have accumulated in the various spheres of our life.

The obkoms, gorkoms, raykoms, and primary party organizations have been called upon to do much for the democratization of the election process. We must put a decisive end to excessive organization, listen attentively to the opinion and moods of the people, and act with the force of arguments and conviction. The experiment of alternative nomination of candidates showed convincingly that when party organizations go about their business with candor and glasnost, they attract people's support. Attempts to put pressure on the electoral process inevitably lead to grave losses.

Now that the election campaign has entered its final phase, the question of questions is the formation of a body of deputies. At this point the labor and student collectives, public organizations, and citizens from their place of residence clearly are basically proposing the candidacies of active champions of perestroika, among them representatives of the working class, peasantry, intelligentsia, veterans, youth, and various nationalities. This opens up the possibility for the broadest and most democratic election possible.

We must keep in mind, however, that one does not only encounter phenomena of a positive nature. Destructive forces, too, are entirely capable of entering the political arena. Manifestations of group egoism, frank careerism, and political speculation on objective difficulties by those who personally have done nothing for the success of perestroika may also find themselves a place.

In these circumstances, the effectiveness of the election campaign will be determined in large part by the composition, depth, and active ideological activity of the party organizations—not simply an explanation of slogans, appeals, support for one candidate or another, but a serious, businesslike argumentation, an ability to hold critical discussions, to confront diverse opinions. This calls for the mobilization of our entire agitational-propaganda potential.

The mass media are being asked to make an important contribution to the common cause. It is important that the pages of the republic and local newspapers, television and radio broadcasts, pulse with life itself, that they shed light on the course of the electoral campaign. Television journalists must make bolder use of the "straight ether" for interviews with candidates for deputy and for their responses to viewers' questions. The voters must know the people they are going to vote for as well as possible.

There is one more point I would like to dwell on. The pre-election campaign must be examined in conjunction with the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 17th Congress of the Kazakh CP. As we know, a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee will be held to discuss questions connected with the conduct of the 28th Party Congress. By then a draft will have been prepared of the political platform of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Course of Perestroyka and the Tasks of the Party," which will encourage broad discussion of the most important issues of party life. It is important that open discussion of this document enable Communists to close ranks on a united position corresponding to the demands of the modern stage of perestroyka.

Comrades! Today we are to discuss the question of nominating candidates for people's deputy of the republic from the Kazakh CP.

On 19 October of last year the select commission on elections and review of people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR from the Kazakh CP appealed through the press to party organizations, members and candidate members of the CPSU with a request to offer suggestions on candidates for deputy from the party.

The commission established a procedure for presenting these suggestions to the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP. It was decided that suggestions on Communists working in the localities are to be examined in the primary party organizations and then in the higher party organs.

It was also decided that suggestions on candidacies of political, governmental, and public figures well known in the republic, outstanding representatives of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry, science and culture working or residing in the territory of other oblasts could be sent directly to the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP.

In this manner, each Communist was given a real opportunity to participate in the nomination of candidates for deputy from the Kazakh CP.

The following figures attest to the democratic nature of the discussions held. In the nomination of candidates for deputy, of the Communists working in the localities, 4,277 primary party organizations participated. They considered 2,464 candidacies. In the subsequent examination the gorkoms and raykoms supported 421 people. Further, at plenums and extended sessions of the obkom bureos it was decided to present 63 candidates to the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP.

We were also given suggestions for the nomination of candidates for people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR from the party by the Republic Soviet of War and Labor Veterans, the German Cultural Center, and the Kazakh Republic Division of the V. I. Lenin Children's Fund.

Moreover, several candidacies were introduced directly by the Central Committee Buro of the Kazakh CP. In this manner, taking into account all suggestions, a list was drawn up of 73 people, which you now have.

Having closely examined all the proposed candidacies at the Central Committee Buro of the Kazakh CP, we propose it would make sense to recommend the nomination of the 26 Communists on the final list. You also have the names and data for these comrades. In our view, this would be a more optimal number of candidacies.

What was the Central Committee Buro governed by here?

Above all, we relied on the opinion of the primary party organizations. The Buro also expected all these people to have shown their best side over the course of several years and especially during the years of perestroyka. The majority of the recommended candidacies are members of elected party organs.

I would like to turn your attention to the fact that on the proposed list there are many Communists who are well known in the republic: member Central Committee Buro of the Kazakh CP, milkmaid at the Kamenskiy Cattle Plant, V. A. Kuz'menko; people's artist of the USSR, soloist in the Abay Opera and Ballet Theater E. B. Serkebayev; senior roller in the sheet-rolling shop of the No. 2 S. V. Drozhzhin Karagandinskiy Metallurgical Industrial Complex; general director of the Kazpolimetal Production Association; director of the Ust-Kamenogorskii V. I. Lenin Lead-Zinc Combine A. S. Kulenov, the writer G. K. Belger; and other comrades.

Among those recommended are two-time Hero of Socialist Labor N. N. Golovatskiy; Hero of the Soviet Union S. K. Nurmagambetov; Hero of Socialist Labor A. P. Yeremin; and State Prize Laureates of the USSR and the Kazakh SSR whose work has been frequently honored by state prizes.

The obkoms have presented extensive references for the recommended comrades that express the opinion that they all possess the requisite political, practical, and civil qualities in order to carry out successfully the high duties of a people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR.

In examining the candidacies, it was taken into account that the suggestions from the localities tended to favor the more active, authoritative representatives of the working class and peasantry.

As a rule, the materials presented by the obkoms propose people of various nationalities. In our view, this not unimportant factor, which characterizes our multinational party organization, found its reflection in this list.

If anyone has any questions in the course of the discussion of the proposed candidacies, they can be answered by the obkom first secretaries present here or directly by the comrades recommended by the Buro themselves, whom we have invited to the plenum.

One more point merits attention. Our proposals with respect to the 26 candidacies do not by any means mean the end to participation in the electoral campaign for the Communists included on the first long list. We suggest that labor collectives can nominate these worthy comrades as candidates for deputy from the electoral okrugs.

Comrades! Hundreds of telegrams, letters, and excerpts from the resolutions of the meeting with suggestions to nominate members of the Central Committee Buro of the Kazakh CP as candidates for people's deputy were sent, in accordance with the provision of the select commission, directly from the party organizations to the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP. We are sincerely grateful for the faith expressed in us and consider this high praise of our work. However, considering the political situation that has come about, the Central Committee Buro of the republic's Communist Party has decided that without exception all Central Committee secretaries and chairmen of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Soviet of Ministers of the republic should stand for election in their territorial election okrugs, where we have also been nominated as candidates for people's deputy.

Now we need to agree on the conduct of the Central Committee plenum on elections for people's deputy of the Kazakh SSR from the Kazakh CP. We have introduced for your consideration a proposal to hold it on 16 March 1990. We propose inviting members and candidate members of the Central Committee and members of the Revision Commission of the Kazakh CP, as well as first and second obkom secretaries, directors of republic ministries and departments, and representatives of the armed forces who are not members of the Central Committee of the Kazakh CP to participate in the voting.

These are the thoughts I wished to share with you.

Kazakh Council of Ministers First 1990 Session
90US0542A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 20 Jan 90 pp 1,3

[Report by KazTAG correspondent: "In the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers: Notes from the Enlarged Session"]

[Text] Taking stock in the past year is always a great event in the life of the government. It is time for a serious analysis of the chosen line and level of organizational and economic work of soviet and management entities and labor collectives. In the course of often heated and principled debates on the correct development path, new ideas and bold proposals are forged and future production forms and methods affirmed.

This took place at the first session of the republic Council of Ministers in the new year.

Approximately six months have passed since concrete work of switching regions and entire republics to self-management and self-financing has begun, and organizational structures of management are being perfected. Taking this into account, the session not only had to analyze achievements, which could have been greater, but mainly to discuss the causes of failures, why they occurred and were not stopped.

Unfortunately, the new economic system, having solved some problems, has created many new ones. First of all, it widened the gap between growing demand and the meager selection of goods and services, which exacerbates social tensions.

The intensified contradictions between group and public interests, which is a new phenomenon, was cast into bold relief. This is why labor disputes and conflicts are growing. The arsenal of the so-called "radicals" now includes the threat of strikes and obstruction of government decisions.

In order to achieve tangible results faster, to fill orders consistently, truly accelerate the introduction of modern technologies and thus sharply increase productivity, to stock store shelves with goods and food products and to improve the social aspect in towns and cities we must not permit chaos in the renewal process. Critically assessing the situation and rejecting all nonessential parts, we must tap as rapidly as possible all economic reserves. This was the premise from which the enlarged session of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers reviewed the results of the implementation of the economic and social development plan in the republic and the state of the treasury in 1989 and since the start of the five-year plan.

It was noted that despite all the difficulties party, soviet and economic entities did considerable work to stabilize the political climate, to overcome negative phenomena in the economy and to solve pressing social problems. Despite the difficulties, political and economic reform is gaining momentum.

"Labor collectives generally learned the principles of full economic accountability; their social activity and creative initiative are on the rise," said U.K. Karamanov, Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers.

Much has been achieved by joint efforts. In the current five-year plan, the supply of the main types of food has increased noticeably; the production of meat, poultry and milk rose by nearly one forth; that of consumer goods 1.3 times and an average of 8.15 million square meters of housing is being built every year, compared to 6.3 million in the previous five-year period. This helps improve other vitally important indicators. Thus, in the first four years, the average annual increase in national income amounted to 2.1 percent, vs. 0.7 percent in the same period of the 11th five-year plan. Moreover, the increase was largely due to higher productivity, which

was up 5.3 percent during those years, compared to a decline in the previous five-year period. The financial condition of the economy is strengthening. Profits rose an average 17.5 percent a year, instead of just 1 percent in the previous period.

The republic state budget plan for 1989 was implemented 101.8 percent for profits and 98.5 percent for outlays.

However, we must not ignore the fact that improvements have not yet become irreversible or cardinal. At the age of rally democracy, some collectives decided to make life easy for themselves, setting low targets for production, profits and other indicators. One out of ten enterprises failed to fill orders for products and no radical departure has occurred in production efficiency, the financial state of the economy and consumer markets.

Some enterprises, while reducing output, manage to increase profits. For instance, at the Ust-Kamenogorsk garment enterprise "Rassvet" and the Alma-Ata enterprise "1 Maya", the remuneration fund rose 14 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively, and profits 16 percent and 10.5 percent, even though the volume of production fell. This situation is nothing but local selfishness. The collectives of those enterprises should know that such a position ultimately will turn against them. Every worker is also an interested consumer.

The ministers and oblast ispolkom chairmen noted that unfounded price hikes on consumer goods are unacceptable. The following facts were mentioned: the retail price of frying pans of the Urals metal products plant label rose 1.7 times, that of furniture sets of the Dzhambul furniture plant 3 times, that of athletic weights made by "Dzhezkazgantsvetmet" 1.5 times and washing machines of the "Elektrobytprapor" plant in Alma-Ata 1.3 times. Even padlocks became more expensive, with the "Pavlodarskiy Traktorny Zavod imeni V.I.Lenin" complex raising the price of their locks 1.2 times.

Today, as never before, it has become necessary to build a reliable defense mechanism against the rotten practices of enterprises which, instead of engaging in active and purposeful work to reduce production expenditures, seek collective and personal gain by raising prices.

All this, stressed session participants, leads to accelerated inflation, worsening of the money supply situation and increased introduction of money in circulation. Disposable income rose twice as fast as consumer goods production.

At the same time, it would be illogical to get rid of the existing counterweight. The concentration of efforts by party, soviet and economic entities to eliminate crisis situations allowed us to bolster the social orientation of the economy. The program "Housing-91" is being implemented successfully and the rate of completion of hospitals, preschool facilities and schools and the volume of paid services have all increased. Naturally, that counterweight is still small and has not produced cardinal

improvements in the life of the people yet. However, let us not forget that the new economic system, while removing from the agenda some specific problems, simultaneously creates other difficulties which are often hard to overcome. How can they be removed irreversibly?

It was noted by speakers that the main lever for strengthening the economy effectively is to raise the responsibility of economic managers and to use the economic arsenal correctly. Today, our efforts and thoughts must as never before turn to satisfying basic needs of man. In reality, however, this goal is often pushed to the back burner.

Thus, the Ksyl-Orda Oblast ispolkom provides no help to the Aralsk electrotechnical plant in rebuilding and converting it to making parts for vacuum cleaners, even though requisite material and technical resources have been allocated by the government at the request of the ispolkom itself. What little resources there are, are used poorly. And yet, it is clear that the conversion of the plant to social production means speedy saturation of the market with consumer goods and jobs for the idle population of the city.

Another negative fact is the following: many resolutions have been passed noting that work schedules of many retail trade outfits and public catering facilities do not suit consumers. Department heads N.D.Tantsyura, T.B.-Kuppayev and U.S.Sarsenov and soviet ispolkoms regularly promise to do something about it, but nothing has been done as yet.

While searching for new solutions, things that lie on the surface are often ignored. Take technological discipline, for instance. If strictly adhered to, it can quickly stabilize the work of enterprises and, without requiring additional capital investments, help produce high-quality goods. In reality, the situation is different: if production processes are followed, we sell the output abroad for hard currency, and if it is not, domestically. Insufficient attention to introducing fruits of scientific and technological progress into production and to wasteless production processes translates into poor selection in the consumer market. Deficiencies of this mode of thinking lead to growing shortages, breed speculation and contribute to social tensions.

In addition, while chasing after volume many enterprises practically made it an accepted practice to work intensively at the end of reporting periods, which directly results in mismanagement. Busy periods and chaotic work schedules usually increase defects in output.

All this taken together translates into enormous losses. Last year, the republic lost 8,000 tons of its ferrous metals output, 65,000 tons of cement, over 10,000 cubic meters of lumber and much electric power and heating fuel.

End results for 1989 in the republic were influenced by blatant mismanagement, violations of labor discipline

and failure to deliver on contracts by many complexes and enterprises. Slogans and admonitions to bolster discipline and assume more responsibility have done little to eliminate wasteful losses and expenditures. We need decisive measures to restore order at all levels of management.

The government session especially criticized violations in inter-oblast deliveries of food products. Authorities in Karaganda Oblast forbid the local candy factory to ship its products to consumers in the final two days of December, while people in Kustanay, even though they failed to fulfill the plan for union and republic deliveries, shipped meat products outside Kazakhstan. The Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers issued a strict warning that these and other, similar selfish actions by soviet and economic managers would be punished.

In today's conditions, every enterprise must work boldly and creatively for the future, applying new technologies and introducing advanced equipment, machinery and new types of products. This is sure to benefit both the enterprise itself and society as a whole.

Another untapped reserve is to get rid of inertia among some at the middle management level who throttle initiative from below while putting brakes on progress from above. Experience of more developed regions has demonstrated the advantages of small and medium-sized enterprises. A long time ago, the republic government asked ministries, agencies and oblast ispolkoms to come up with proposals on this subject. Thus far, they have taken no action.

Economic reform is being held back also by the lack of basic legal acts on property, land, etc., and by the diversity of opinion on the choice of forms and methods in further restructuring of the economic system. Kazakh scholars are yet to make a significant contribution in this area.

Session participants made many critical comments about the government and about themselves, but this time it did not look like yet another tribute to fashion. As a rule, only the indifferent kept silent, those who did not care about industry or seek ways out of the complex situation. This stance leads ultimately to failure to carry out decisions to stabilize the economy and raise the living standard of the people.

Government members, oblast leaders and other participants of the session made concrete proposals on how to heal the economy, speed up the development of the social sector and improve the work of the Council of Ministers of the republic, agencies and oblast ispolkoms.

While calling on everyone to think and seek constructive ways to take the economy to a qualitatively new level, the government feels that it must accept regional self-management and self-financing as the basic concept. Its detailed draft, taking into account today's state of the economy and special features of its future development, must form the foundation of draft plans for social and

economic development of Kazakhstan, economic sectors, oblasts, rayons and individual enterprises in the 13th five-year plan.

We must foster and encourage the impetus that is building in the economy, making the process of acceleration and renewal truly irreversible. The most important task of economic entities, labor collectives and every worker at his workplace is to imbue this process with a concrete meaning.

We must enter the 13th five-year plan with the model of republic economic accountability already in place. The goal in the current year is to solve all organizational problems, carry out all preparatory tasks, make sure that management structures conform to the goals and purposes of economic reform and continue the work to eliminate superfluous management levels and bodies. While addressing these important tasks, we must not destroy existing systems just for the sake of destroying. The management system, however flexible, must also be steady.

Ministries, agencies and oblast ispolkoms were directed to thoroughly analyze the causes of unsatisfactory performance of sectors and oblasts in 1989 and to take immediate steps to eliminate miscalculations and mistakes, while engaging in the work of carrying out in full the plans for 1990 hand in hand with labor collectives.

U.K.Karamanov, Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, presided over the session.

V.G.Anufriyev, second secretary of the Kazakh CP Central Committee, participated in the work of the session.

Masaliyev Criticism of Interregional Group Noted in Kirghiz CC Meeting

*90US0540A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 28 Dec 89 p 1*

[KirTAG News Agency Report: "Conference in the Kirghiz CP Central Committee"]

[Text] On 27 December a conference took place in the Kirghiz CP Central Committee, to which members and candidate members of the Central Committee, people's deputies of the USSR, secretaries of party raykoms and gorkoms, chairmen and deputy chairmen of the city rayon soviet executive committees of the Chu Valley, administrators and secretaries of the primary party organizations of the ministries and departments, the creative unions, the KiSSR Committee of People's Control, the Kirghiz Komsomol Central Committee, and other public organizations, officials of the Central Committee apparatus, the republic's Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers, and the mass media, and the administrators and secretaries of the party organizations of a number of enterprises and organizations.

The conference was opened by A. Dzhumagulov, member of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee.

Information on the results of the work of the 2nd USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum was reported by the first secretary of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee, A. M. Masaliyev.

At the Congress, he said, various aspects of political reform, the socio-economic development of the country, and the assessment of the events of the past and the present were examined. A broad and free exchange of views took place, and many acute problems of our multinational state were touched on.

The Second Congress, in contrast to the first, proceeded more productively and in a more balanced manner, it took into account the needs and moods of the voters and the entire people. There were far fewer opinions that were cut off from life.

The majority of the deputies of our republic took an active part in the work of the Congress. They had a clear-cut position, they supported constructive and reasonable decisions, and they were able to express freely their attitude to the questions being discussed.

The chief one among them is "On Measures to Improve the Economy, on the Stages of Economic Reform and Fundamental Approaches to the Development of the 30th Five-Year-Plan." A report on it was sent beforehand to the people's deputies. In our view, the proposals of the government of the USSR, dictated by the extremely difficult situation of the country, were the only correct ones, there were no serious alternatives.

At the same time, some deputies, above all from the interregional group, came out against the proposed measures, taking the view that they will not yield any results, they called for private property, a free market, the repudiation of central planning, and they whipped up the question of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution.

This group, having called itself an opposition, attempted to attract deputies from various regions to their side and exerted pressure on them. The people is already trying to understand the true intentions of those who lead it off to the side, distract it from the solution of urgent tasks, undermine perestroika, and do not contribute anything concrete and sensible to the solution of acute problems. They try not to note the positive, they criticize and run down all and everything, even calling for strikes. For them, the worse, the better.

The absolute majority of the deputies approved the importance and necessity of the measures developed by the government of the country and proposed the beginning of their implementation without delay.

The Second Congress became a good political school for the people's deputies and the entire Soviet parliament in regard to the democratic, patient examination of questions, and the search for compromise solutions.

The Congress also showed that there is still a shortage of high labor activeness and effectiveness for the quickest

establishment of order in our common house. In the speeches of the people's deputies and numerous telegrams of citizens addressed to the Congress, a strong opinion was heard—to lead the country out of the crisis situation is possible only through the honest, highly-productive labor of everyone. It is impossible to live well while working poorly. It is also necessary to overcome speculation, various machinations, the violation of the public order, and the destabilization of the situation.

From the work of the 2nd Congress, the following conclusion also emanates: Every people's deputy, the Supreme Soviet as a whole, and our entire public must create the kind of atmosphere in order for all laws, decisions and constitutional provisions to be implemented precisely. Inadmissible is the repetition of such situations where, after the adoption, by the USSR Supreme Soviet, of the Law "On the Procedure for the Resolution of Collective Labor Disputes (Conflicts)", miners' strikes took place in the country.

The republic Supreme Soviet, the oblast, city, rayon, rural, and settlement Soviets of People's Deputies must work efficiently and successfully as never before. In their activity, bureaucratic, formal approaches to the determination of the functions entrusted to them are intolerable. They need to treat correctly the questions and demands of the workers and to regard them flexibly. In connection with this, it is necessary to increase the responsibility of the people's deputies of the republic of all levels. Further, the speaker turned to the people's deputy of the USSR from Kirghizia with the request to work openly and efficiently on the implementation of the decisions of the 2nd Congress, to help its voters in the successful implementation of the plans of the economic and social development for 1990 and the 30th Five-Year-Plan. There is no need to be carried away by the organization of various dubious groupings, societies, and associations. It is necessary to join in earnest, within the framework of our status, in the activity of the local Soviets. I think that the voters will support such an approach.

The speaker emphasized the important role of the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies in the consolidation of the healthy forces of society and he expressed the conviction that it will become an example for the local Soviets in the cause of the broad democratization of our life, and the increased responsibility and authority of Soviet power.

Then A. M. Masaliyev talked about the work of the extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which took place 25-26 December and examined questions connected with the decisions of the the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

As is well known, at this congress documents were adopted in which it is declared that the Lithuanian republic organization of the CPSU is becoming an independent communist party. Such a decision will in fact lead to an organizational and political break with the CPSU and strikes a blow at perestroika and the renewal of socialist society.

The situation that has been created arose as a result of the inability of the leaders of the party organizations of Lithuania to master the political situation, to influence it, through the deviation from the firm party line, through the compromise and flirting with nationalist, separatist forces. Among them the informal association Sajudis plays an especially destructive role.

The leadership of the Lithuanian Communist Party has made concessions to the political ambitions of the Sajudis leaders, it has not repudiate their claims to power, and it has lost influence over the mass media. It has actually supported legislative acts contradicting the USSR Constitution.

Bourgeois-type formations started to spring up without impediment in the republic. They led to the discrediting of socialism, the CPSU, and the Soviet Army. At the same time, the communists who do not share such a policy of the Lithuanian CP leadership were persecuted and declared to be enemies of perestroyka.

In the report of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev and in the speeches of the participants in the Central Committee Plenum, the speaker said, a principled assessment of the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress was given. They were recognized to be illegitimate. First of all, because the delegates of this congress were elected in conformity with the Statute of the CPSU and no one gave them the authority to divide the party. Secondly, the congress did not have the right to decide for all communists of the republic their transfer from one party to another. This every communist must decide independently. The documents of the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress do not have force also because no part of the CPSU can examine such questions without taking into account the positions of the entire CPSU.

At the Central Committee Plenum, incidents of forceful pressure on the delegates of the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress were cited, beginning with their elections and up to their participation in voting, the regulation of speeches, where the floor was given primarily to those who have supported the policy of delimitation from the CPSU. Those who expressed a different opinion were subjected to undisguised attacks.

Analyzing ways out of the situation, the Central Committee Plenum underscored that the independence of the republic communist parties is possible only within the framework of the CPSU, just as the sovereignty of the republics within the framework of the Soviet federation. In connection with this, it was strongly declared that the party and state leadership of the country will not tolerate the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is necessary to give a decisive rebuff to any nationalist forces which are speculating on the existing difficulties and shortcomings, and pursue goals which are far from the real interests of the peoples.

At the Plenum the question was raised concerning the necessity of examining in the USSR Supreme Soviet the

legitimacy of the existence, in the country, of organizations and movements which are stirring up dissension and enmity.

In the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum that was adopted, the assessments and conclusions contained in the report of comrade M. S. Gorbachev were fully approved. It was decided to inform all communists and workers of the country about them. Members and candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee, members of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission, the first secretaries of the central committees of the communist parties of the union republics, the party kraykoms and obkoms, and a broad party aktiv will take part in this work.

It was recognized as necessary for members and candidate members of the Politburo and secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee to travel to Lithuania for meetings with communists, party organizations, and labor collectives of the republic. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev will also make a trip to Lithuania. After this, the Plenum will resume work and will take the appropriate decisions.

In conclusion, the speaker emphasized that during the present, crucial stage of perestroyka, the unity and cohesion of all forces of society are necessary. It is necessary to develop active political and organizational work in the labor collectives, to secure a high labor rhythm from the first days of the new year. The mass media, the intelligentsia, the labor unions, and the Komsomol, which are called upon to strengthen the friendship and mutual understanding of the workers of all nationalities and attain their consolidation in the ideas and goals of perestroyka, must make their contribution to this important cause.

A. M. Masaliyev answered the questions of those present.

The conference participants included the following members of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee Buro: T. Akmatov, A. Zhunusov, V. K. Kandakov, U. Sydykov, N. M. Chepelev, U. K. Chinaliyev, and M. Sh. Sherimkulov; and candidate member of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee Buro: E. Abakirov.

Kirghiz Official Defends Nomination, Election Practices

*90US0545A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 16 Jan 90 pp 1-2*

[Interview with M.F. Vasilenko, USSR people's deputy, head of the Party Building and Cadre Work Department of the Communist Party of Kirghizia Central Committee, by a KirTAG correspondent under the rubric "The Elections for People's Deputies of the KiSSR and the Local Soviets on 25 February 1990": "What the Nomination Showed"]

[Text] Important steps in the electoral campaign have taken place—the nomination and registration of candidates for people's deputies of the KiSSR [Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic] and the local soviets have been completed. What are the results, and who has entered the subsequent election contest? A KirTAG [Kirghiz Telegraph Agency] correspondent talks with M.F. Vasilenko, USSR people's deputy and head of the Party Building and Cadre Work Department of the Communist Party of Kirghizia [CPKi] Central Committee.

[KirTAG] Mikhail Fedorovich, describe today's candidate to us.

[Vasilenko] As the press has already reported, 1,049 candidates have been nominated for election to KiSSR people's deputy in 350 electoral districts, or an average of 3 aspirants for each deputy's position. The situation is similar for the local soviets: As for the oblast soviets, 728 candidates have been nominated in 290 electoral districts, or 2.5 candidates per seat; 2239 candidates to the city soviets in 1160 districts, or 1.9 candidates per seat; and 4259 candidates to the rayon soviets in 2573 electoral districts, or 1.7 candidates per seat. And 13,313 people have been nominated to village and settlement soviets as well as city soviets under rayon authority in 9,136 districts, or 1.5 candidates for each deputy's position.

In general these people are active advocates of perestroika and representatives of various branches of the national economy and of all the levels and social groups of the republic's population.

Almost a third of the candidates to the republic's higher organs of power are workers in industry, transport, and construction, a quarter are from the agricultural sector, and a sixth are representatives of science, cultural, public education, and public health. One-third of the candidates for deputy in the Supreme Soviet are common workers, one-sixth are women, and one-twelfth are young people. Their representation in the local soviets is somewhat higher. Workers and collective farmers there make up 40 percent, women—27 percent, and young people—30 percent.

[KirTAG] What are the reasons, in your view, for the lack of representation by one or another social or national group?

[Vasilenko] There are many reasons. First of all, social organizations including the Komsomol and women's councils have not been taking advantage of the right granted to them to nominate their own representatives as candidates for people's deputy.

Nor have they been nominating candidates at their place of residence. For instance, the Komsomol and women's soviets only nominated 22 and 18 people respectively at the plenums of the rayon and city committees.

One must also consider that when many women, workers, and collective farmers were nominated for

candidacy they refused the honor. The reason was that public activity would negatively influence their work and family life, and they did not want to give up these things.

Unfortunately, a stereotype that has formed in the voters' thinking has also had an effect. The opinion exists that the worker's place is behind the lathe and in the field and that the woman's place is in the family, and neither of them is a politician. But that is incorrect.

And there are other objective reasons. But the main problem, I believe, lies elsewhere. There are still many problems in the organizational and political work of a number of party organizations in the course of the election campaign. And it is important for their representation to be maintained now at the time of voting.

As for the lack of representation by national groups, you are incorrect. Among the candidates for KiSSR people's deputy there are representatives of 25 nationalities and peoples residing closely together in the republic. They represent an overwhelming majority in the local soviets. It seems to me that there are no problems here.

[KirTAG] Are that many districts in the republic where candidates are running unopposed, and who in general is running for deputy?

[Vasilenko] The numbers of uncontested districts for elections to people's deputy are as follows: To Supreme Soviet—12 percent; to oblast soviets—18.3 percent; to city soviets—31.3 percent; to rayon soviets—41.2 percent. Various types of workers have been nominated. For elections to KiSSR people's deputy, 42 districts have a single candidate. These candidates include 12 workers and collective farmers, several party and soviet workers, public health and cultural representatives, and there is a journalist. I wish to stress that there have not been any violations of the Law on Elections here. It is the business of the voters themselves to decide how many candidates to nominate in each electoral district and to dictate or to point out in this regard rights that have not been given to someone. Although it should be noted that the CPKi, in its Address to the Voters, emphasized multicandidate elections.

[KirTAG] We know that most of all you "got lucky" in the nomination of leaders. How did it happen?

[Vasilenko] Many labor collectives in fact showed their trust in their leaders. Among the candidates there are 86 directors of industrial, transport, communication, and construction enterprises, 87 leaders of collective farms, state farms, and other APK [agro-industrial complex] enterprises, 27 public health leaders, 28 public education leaders, 19 leaders of scientific research institutes and educational institutions, etc. In all, 298 leaders are vying for deputy positions.

It is good that the leaders enjoy respect and trust in the collectives. But unfortunately there are those among them who do not pay carry out the duties they have been

entrusted with or ensure the fulfillment of the government's plan, they do not devote enough attention to improving labor and living conditions for the workers, they evaluate their own work uncritically, and they show personal immodesty. I would recommend that such leaders think first of all about pulling their enterprises and farms out from behind and not waste time running for a position. Several of them, by the way, have already done just that. I think that they were right to do so.

[KirTAG] Are you troubled, Mikhail Fedorovich, by the fact that members and candidate members of the CPKi Central Committee have been nominated in remote electoral districts? As a guarantee?

[Vasilenko] Your information is not entirely correct. We have analyzed this issue. Of the 190 members and candidate members of the Central Committee, 62 have been nominated as candidates for KiSSR people's deputy, and 38 of these have been nominated in electoral districts situated on the territory of the cities and rayons where they live and work. Five people have been nominated at their former place of work. And only 8 people living in Frunze were nominated in other regions of the republic.

If we examine the question more broadly, more than 80 inhabitants of Frunze were nominated in districts beyond the city's borders. This includes scholars, writers, servicemen, leaders of party, soviet, trade union, Komsomol organs, and public organizations, officials of ministries, bureaus, and Frunze's city and rayon soviet executive committees, etc. So there is no sense, in my opinion, in talking only about members of the Central Committee.

As for the reasons why these districts nominate candidates, including leaders, I believe it would be more correct to ask the representatives of those labor collectives that proposed them.

But one circumstance is absolutely certain: Many of the deputies of the current KiSSR Supreme Soviet, who have conscientiously executed the voters' instructions, were nominated repeatedly by these electoral districts. So they have earned the confidence of the people through their practical deeds.

I believe it is important to stress that the "guarantees" which you apparently have in mind are not at all applicable here.

[KirTAG] All power to the soviets—this is the slogan of the day. In light of this slogan, how correct was the decision of the bureau of the Sverdlovsk rayon party committee defining a "ceiling" on nominations—the first secretary to the republic soviet, and the chairman of the soviet executive committee no higher than the city soviet.

[Vasilenko] I am having trouble figuring out which of the bureau's protocols you are referring to. We are analyzing all the protocols of the rayon and city party committees,

but I have not come across such a decision. And by its very nature there could not be such a decision concerning specific people, especially as the first secretary of the rayon party committee and the chairman of the rayon soviet executive committee have been nominated and are registered candidates for KiSSR people's deputy.

In general, 22 chairmen of city and rayon soviet executive committees and 10 chairmen of village and settlement soviets have been nominated candidates for the republic's soviet. This shows great confidence in the representatives of the soviets. It reflects the level of their competency and initiative in the resolution of the workers' vital needs.

[KirTAG] The party committees and the district electoral commissions do not always work in close contact. There are examples of administrative pressure on the commission. What is your opinion of this?

[Vasilenko] I do not have any information about any sort of administrative pressure on the part of the party committees. The powers of the electoral commissions are defined in the Law on Elections, and they are not accountable to party organs. On the other hand, the level of knowledge and competency of some of the members of the electoral commissions unfortunately is not very high, and they have few lawyers on their staffs. And here we are simply required to conduct training with them and, in the event of disputes, enlist experienced jurists for consultation so that no violations of election laws are permitted.

In conclusion I will add that the CPKi Central Committee's Address to Party Organizations, Communists, and the Republic's Voters prominently features the thought that in the course of the electoral campaign the party organizations must step up its political work among the masses. As I already stressed, there are still many defects in this work.

Plenum of Kirghiz CP Central Committee Held on 13 January

Information Report

90US0543A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 14 Jan 90 p 1

[“Information Report on the Plenum of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee”]

[Text] A plenum of the Kirghiz Communist Party [CPKi] Central Committee took place on 13 January 1990.

The following issues were introduced for consideration by the plenum:

1. Convocation of the 19th Congress of the CPKi.
2. Tasks of the republic's party organizations concerning implementation of the resolutions of the September

(1989) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Party's Policy on Nationalities Under Current Conditions."

3. Annulment of the resolution of the 7th Plenum of the CPKi Central Committee.

4. Organizational questions.

Regarding the first issue, the plenum heard a speech by A.M. Masaliyev, first secretary of the CPKi Central Committee and passed the appropriate resolution.

Regarding the second issue, A.M. Masaliyev, first secretary of the CPKi Central Committee gave the report of the bureau of the Central Committee, "Tasks of the Republic's Party Organizations Concerning Implementation of the Resolutions of the September (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee 'On the Party's Policy on Nationalities Under Current Conditions.'"

The following took part in the discussions: R.S. Kul'matov, first secretary of the Osh party obkom; T.Ya. Lakman, chairman of the "Pobeda" agricultural firm in Kalininskiy Rayon; T.M. Alymbekova, shepherd at the "Pogranichnik" collective farm in At-Bashinskiy Rayon; V.K. Kandakov, chairman of the KiSSR Committee of People's Control; A.K. Abdukadyrov, foreman in the breaking face of the mine imeni Leninskiy Komsomol of the "Kyzyl-Kiyskoye" Mine Administration; I.S. Muratalin, chairman of the KiSSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature; A. Isabayev, first secretary of the Aravanskiy party raykom; K. Usenbekov, chairman of the republic's council of veterans of war and labor; A.M. Tarakanov, first secretary of the Kantskiy party raykom; T.M. Chaplinskiy, lathe operator at the ship-repair and shipbuilding factory in Issyk-Kul; K.A. Turganov, first secretary of the Sokulukskiy party raykom; M. Sydykova, leader of a team of tobacco growers at the "Pervomayskiy" state farm in Batkenskiy Rayon; D.B. Amanbayev, first secretary of the Issyk-Kul party obkom; T. Tabylidiyev, first secretary of the Kirghiz LKSM [Komsomol] Central Committee; U.Sh. Orozova, chairman of KiSSR Gosteleradio [State Television and Radio]; S. Boboyeva, foreman of a field team at the "Ak-Suu" state farm in Lyaylyakskiy Rayon; U.K. Chinaliyev, first secretary of the Frunze gorkom; M. Bazarkulov, KiSSR minister of public education; A. Akayev, president of the KiSSR Academy of Sciences; A.K. Sultanov, deputy chairman of the KiSSR Goskompriroda [State Committee for the Protection of Nature]; B. Ryspayev, chairman of the KiSSR Goskomizdat [State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade]; S.B. Daniyarov, academician at the KiSSR AN [Academy of Sciences]; and V.G. Luk'yashchenko, editor of the SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA newspaper.

A resolution was passed concerning the issue under discussion. A plan of practical activities for the CPKi Central Committee regarding implementation of the CPSU platform "The Party's Policy on Nationalities Under Current Conditions" was approved.

The plenum annulled the resolution of the 7th plenum of the CPKi Central Committee "On the Work of the Party Organizations of Kirghizia Concerning Party Enrollment and Consolidation of Party Ranks in Light of the Requirements of the 27th CPSU Congress."

Organizational questions were considered.

The plenum released N.I. Semenov from his responsibilities as member of the bureau, secretary of the CPKi Central Committee, and chairman of the Central Party Commission on Questions of Socioeconomic Development in connection with his confirmation as sector head of the Party Building and Cadre Work Department of the CPSU Central Committee.

Then the plenum discussed the candidacy of M.I. Paryshkura, general director of the "Stankostroitel'nyy Factory" production association imeni V.I. Lenin, for the position of secretary of the CPKi Central Committee. The following took part in the conversation: A. Akayev, president of the KiSSR AN; O. Sultanov, secretary of the board of Kirghiz Union of Writers; K.B. Khuriev, chief of the directorate of "Naryngidroenergostroy"; A. Erkebayev, director of the Institute of Language and Literature at the KiSSR AN; Zh.I. Kazakbayev, chairman of the Kara-Balta gorispolkom; R. Achilova, rector of the Kirghiz Women's Teachers Institute imeni V.V. Mayakovskiy; E. Kutmanaliyev, chairman of the KiSSR State Committee on Physical Training, Sports, and Hiking; G.A. Manuylova, leader of a team of painters at the "FrunzeKPDproyektstroy" association; S.A. Ismailova, secretary of the Frunze party gorkom; N.I. Baylo, secretary of the party committee of the "Stankostroitel'nyy Factory" production association imeni V. I. Lenin; and A.A. Iordan, deputy chairman of the KiSSR Council of Ministers.

After a closed (secret) ballot, the plenum elected M.I. Paryshkura member of the bureau and secretary of the CPKi Central Committee. He was also confirmed as chairman of the Central Committee Commission on Questions of Socioeconomic Development.

The plenum released T. Chyngyshev from his duties as head of the Socioeconomic Department of the Central Committee with his election to first secretary of the Tokmak party gorkom.

A. M. Mamyrov, who had been working as first secretary of the Tash-Kumyr party gorkom, was confirmed as head of the Socioeconomic Department of the KiSSR Central Committee on an alternative basis.

At his request, the plenum released P.T. Ekhtov from his duties as candidate member of the CPKi Central Committee in connection with his transfer to other work and his departure beyond the republic's borders.

The plenum released T.B. Chilebayev from his duties as member of the Central Committee Commission on

Questions of Socioeconomic Development in connection with his confirmation as chairman of the CPSU Committee of People's Control.

The plenum unanimously approved a letter to the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, to the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU platform), and to all Lithuanian communists.

Senior officials of the CPSU Central Committee V.I. Ivanenko, A.A. Makhordin, and V.T. Syzrantsev took part in the work of the plenum.

The CPKi Central Committee finished its work for this plenum.

Decree on September Congress

*90US0543B Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 14 Jan 90 p 1*

[“Resolution of the 14th Plenum of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee of 13 January 1990 on the Convocation of the 19th Congress of the Kirghiz Communist Party”]

[Text] I. To convene the 19th Congress of the Kirghiz Communist Party (CPKi) in September 1990.

II. To approve the following agenda:

1. On the course of perestroyka and the tasks of the republic's party organization. Account of the CPKi Central Committee.

2. Account of the CPKi Auditing Commission.

3. On the CPSU Rules.

4. Elections to the CPKi governing organs.

5. Elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress.

III. To charge the bureau of the CPKi Central Committee with preparing resolutions on a quota for representation and a system for electing delegates to the congress and to submit them for the consideration of the Central Committee plenum.

Masaliyev on Plenum Date Change

*90US0543C Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 14 Jan 90 p 1*

[Speech by A.M. Masaliyev, first secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee: “On the Convocation of the 19th Congress of the Kirghiz Communist Party”]

[Text] Comrades! As you know, the September (1989) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee passed a resolution to convene the 28th Party Congress in October 1990. This is a fairly early date for conducting the congress compared to the usual way of doing things. Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's report at the plenum made

detailed mention of the need for such a decision. You are aware of this and I think that there is no need to repeat it.

But I will say that in this complicated period of our development the uniting, consolidating role of the Communist Party and its ability to take charge of the processes of renovation have become more important than ever before. You and I know what kinds of attacks there have been on the party and its unity, and they are not over yet. Therefore in the course of preparations for the upcoming CPSU congress there is a need for an intensive collective analysis and the development of new approaches and solutions to speed up the transformation taking place in the socioeconomic, ideological, and spiritual spheres. There is a need for serious consideration of current and future activities of the party itself and a more precise definition of the party in accordance with the processes of perestroyka.

The precongress report-and-election campaign in the party organizations has greater meaning on this level. Specific dates for the campaign will be considered at one of the approaching CPSU Central Committee plenums. As for the 19th Congress of the Kirghiz Communist Party [CPKi], the bureau of the Central Committee will propose that it take place in September of the current year.

Accounts of the Central Committee and the CPKi will be heard and discussed at the congress, and the tasks of the republic's party organization for the upcoming period will be defined.

The question of the draft CPSU Rules will be discussed.

The governing organs of the CPKi will be elected—the staff of the Central Committee as well as the delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress.

This agenda is, in our view, acceptable. If there are other opinions in this matter, we can discuss them.

And now about the quota for representation at the 19th CPKi Congress. There were 951 delegates elected for the 18th Congress. I believe that it would be correct, considering the growth in the numbers of communists, if we were to elect a few more, let us say 975 delegates. We were able to consider the quota for representation and the system of electing delegates to the congress in concrete fashion at a regular plenum of the Central Committee. If there are no objections, then a proposal is introduced to adopt the resolution on this issue.

Kirghiz CP CC Plenum on Interethnic Relations, Language Issue

*90US0544A Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 17 Jan 90 pp 2-3*

[Debate at the Plenum of the Communist Party of Kirghizia Central Committee on 13 January 1990: “Unity Is Our Strength”]

[Excerpts][passage omitted] The debate was opened by First Secretary of the Osh Oblast Committee of the party R.S. Kulmatov. [passage omitted]

However, we do not at all minimize our problems. At present, 37,000 people in our oblast are not involved in social production. These are mainly rural dwellers, especially young people of the indigenous nationalities. The role of inter-republic, inter-regional, and inter-branch contacts is particularly significant within the unified complex of the national economy. However, many complications have developed recently. We receive more than 66 percent of the refinery products used in the oblast from the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Goskomnefteprodukt [State Committee for Refinery Products]; however, deliveries are continuously disrupted. The economy of the oblast is in a difficult situation. There is no transportation for hauling fodder, fuel, and foodstuffs to remote pastures. Bus traffic in the cities is virtually paralyzed. The position of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] and Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supplies] is hard to understand. After all, the farms of the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan receive a lion's share of their own refinery products from other regions of the country whereas giving their products to another republic is foisted on them. This causes tension in relations between the two republics. [passage omitted]

Brigade leader of stope workers of the imeni Lenin Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Youth Communist League] Mine of the Mine Administration Kyzyl-Kiyskoye A.K. Abdukadyrov took the floor. [passage omitted]

Work at the place of residence has become noticeably more vigorous. Meetings of the party and soviet aktiv with the residents of microrayons and representatives of the national minorities at their place of residence facilitate a profound understanding of processes under way in the sphere of ethnic relations. Thus, during the Fergana events a headquarters established here operated with dispatch; all the public was mobilized; the mass media were enlisted. The populace of the city was informed periodically about the measures taken. The work of enterprises and organizations in the city was not halted. The population continued to be calm. [passage omitted]

Chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Goskompriroda [State Committee for Environmental Protection] I.S. Muratalin stressed in his speech that present-day reality reveals serious problems in interethnic relations. [passage omitted]

In our republic, conditions for a conflict on interethnic grounds are sometimes created artificially. The fact that officials who make unreasoned, irresponsible decisions sometimes become the culprits in this gives rise to concern. For example, the Sokulukskiy Rayon Executive Committee allocated lots on the flood plain of the river Zhylamys to a gardening association of the organizations and enterprises of the rayon and the city of Frunze.

However, their saturation with springs which the local populace has long protected as sources of drinking water was not taken into account. On top of this, the area of traditional pasture for private cattle was to be diminished. Only through the efforts of the government was the imminent conflict averted. However, it could have been prevented altogether. [passage omitted]

First Secretary of the Sokulukskiy Rayon Committee of the party K.A. Turganov was given the floor. He noted with satisfaction that in the rayon there are no distortions or conflicts of any kind on the grounds of interethnic relations. [passage omitted]

At the same time, there are problems and unresolved issues in this sphere. The incorrect interpretation of the notions "unified Soviet people," "unified national economy" brought about ignoring the interests of the local population in its native republic. This is shown by the difference in the standard of living in the villages of the mountain and foothill zones of the Chu Valley. Difficulties are encountered in the process of selecting and electing cadres from among the local populace which also brings about tension in interethnic relations. In conjunction with this, the speaker suggested that the Council of Ministers of the republic be entrusted with taking specific measures in order to equalize social conditions for the residents of these villages. [passage omitted]

All of us have branded the epoch of Stalinism. At the same time, unfortunately, scientists and journalists in the press are turning less and less to Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Meanwhile, there are no novelties in the theory of the ethnic issue which would be in line with the current stage of life. It turns out that we are rejecting the old without creating the new. A certain category of people is at a crossroads as to whether they should approach a propagandist or priests and mullahs. [passage omitted]

Brigade leader of tobacco growers from the Pervomayskiy State Farm M. Sadykova referred to complex problems associated with the use of land and water on lots adjacent to neighboring Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

All of us remember the events which occurred in the spring and summer on the border of Batkenskiy and Isfarinskiy Rayons. Due to the timely measures taken, the situation has stabilized. However, all of the issues which have arisen should be resolved swiftly and with dispatch so that nothing will be able to mar the traditional friendship of our peoples.

The speaker went on to mention that the Sokh Reservoir is under construction in Ishtanskiy Rayon of the Uzbek SSR. Due to this, the village of Kara-Tokoy which consists of 220 farmsteads is to be flooded. The erection of the new village Aygul Tash with all social and cultural facilities and houses for the residents was entrusted to the construction organization Golodnosepstroy of the Uzbek SSR.

However, until now work on building the residential houses in the new village of Aygul Tash has been proceeding at a snail's pace whereas the Sokh Reservoir has been built very fast. Three years ago, I raised this issue at a Central Committee plenum. However, there have not been any positive changes until now. In this reference, we should note that departments of the Central Committee monitor poorly the course of execution of the suggestions and critical remarks voiced in party forums. [passage omitted]

Secretary of the Issyk Kul Oblast Committee of the party D.B. Amanbayev came to the speaker's stand. [passage omitted]

The speaker went on to discuss distortions in the policy of locating productive forces which have brought about the current economic and social backwardness of the oblast which may become the nutritive environment fuelling the feeling of social injury of the indigenous nationality.

For example, they made the oblast develop as a markedly sheep-breeding one from the top, with no regard for the principles of comprehensive development of territories and for the presence of abundant water, energy, mineral, resort, and other natural resources within the oblast. At present, the oblast which accounts for no more than 15 percent of the population of the republic has almost 50 percent of the herd of sheep in the republic.

What has this lopsided economic development brought about? The oblast ekes out a miserable existence given the current excessively low procurement prices for the products of sheep breeding. The oblast budget for 1990 comes to 170 million rubles, of which over 70 million rubles are subsidies. Due to our economic backwardness, we cannot take advantage of the beneficial opportunity to acquire economic independence and switch to economic accountability and self-financing which is given to us by perestroika.

The lopsided development of the economy in our oblast has brought about social injustice. The shepherds are doomed to poverty, squalor, and premature old age due to unbearably difficult social conditions and extremely low wages. They are isolated from culture and civilization for a considerable part of their lives. This is why it is not surprising that there are few young people among the shepherds, and no representatives of other nationalities at all. [passage omitted]

The floor was given to Chairman of the Kirghiz SSR State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting U.Sh. Orozova.

She discussed how the topic of internationalist conditioning of the toilers is covered by the radio and television. For many years, radio broadcasts have been aired in the Kirghiz, Russian, Dungan, German, and Uzbek languages. The speaker noted that recently we have begun to cover increasingly often the life and labor of the Uighurs, Koreans, Karachay, Kurds, and Meskhetian

Turks residing in Kirghizia. Translations of the materials broadcast are made, programs of broadcasts and concerts are compiled, anchormen are selected, and collectives of authors are expanded with the help of volunteer editorial boards consisting of the representatives of the intelligentsia of these nations.

In conjunction with the adoption of the Law on the State Language and taking into account the desire of the public, we have increased substantially the volume of broadcasts in the Kirghiz language. We systematically discuss the spiritual riches of the nation, history and peculiarity of the Kirghiz language. The TV and radio offer Kirghiz lessons in order to help the Russian-speaking populace. At present, we are working on the issue of starting a second republic TV channel together with the Ministry of Communications of Kirghizia which will make it possible to allocate one channel in full for TV broadcasting in the Kirghiz language, and the second channel for programs in Russian, Dungan, German, Uighur, and other languages, that is, make it a channel of interethnic communication. To be sure, this is a difficult undertaking, and we cannot do without a government resolution on this issue.

A year ago, the USSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] announced the opening of a special channel for interethnic communication on the central TV. However, the issue has been under discussion for too long; half-measures have been taken, that is, the volume of broadcasts from union republics has simply been increased.

The speaker said that this cannot by any means satisfy us. What we need is not to open a regular TV channel of which the Central TV already has many but to set up along with channel 1 the powerful program Soyuz with an equal status which would cover the life of all union republics and the peoples residing in them on a daily basis rather than from time to time. Representatives of republics—consultants, commentators, anchormen, announcers—should work at the Central TV and the All-Union Radio. Starting the Soyuz program would only benefit our common cause. For now, tremendous opportunities for ideological influence remain unused. [passage omitted]

The actions of activists of a number of informal groups and movements in both the country and the republic were criticized in the speech by First Secretary of the Frunze City Committee of the party U.K. Chinaliyev. The speaker stressed that he was convinced that the departments of the CPSU Central Committee and the CPKi [Communist Party of Kirghizia] Central Committee should take a consistent, uncompromising position with regard to a number of political actions conducted by such groups—there is no way to view this as anything but political actions.

The speaker asked whether everything in the activity of our registered and unregistered formations—"Memorial," "Ashar," "Akyykat," "Ekolog," and the

City Club of Voters—is constructive, whether they are prepared to engage in a dialogue and cooperate with the local party organs. The answer is obvious: Not all of them are. While discerning progressive elements in their aspirations we, however, cannot fail to see the slanderers who are setting public opinion against the party. The time has come to draw a line between a plurality of opinions and the lack of principles. Social movements created under the banner of perestroika should not turn into camps opposing the CPSU and the soviets. It would be proper to discuss at the current plenum the following proposal: With a view to counteracting more vigorously the fueling of interethnic enmity and attempts to destroy our federative union and the unity of the party from the inside, instruct communist-USSR people's deputies from Kirghizia to ensure the development and adoption by the Supreme Soviet of the country of legislative acts setting forth conditions for disbanding and banning nationalist, chauvinist, and other anti-social, anti-party, and extremist organizations and groups. Respective changes should be made in the Main Law of the Kirghiz SSR. We cannot build a law-governed democratic state by trampling on the Constitution due to loopholes in the mechanism of administering justice. Confrontation is a poor way to the truth.

Referring to a recent debate concerning the adoption of the Law "On the State Language of the Kirghiz SSR," the speaker said that in the course of an extensive democratic discussion of the draft most varied, at times diametrically opposite, tendencies, approaches, and points of view came to the fore. On the one hand, voices were heard which denied the feasibility of giving the Kirghiz language the status of a state language. On the other hand, there were attempts to set up a committee for its defense. As is known, common sense rather than the emotions inflamed by certain people prevailed. We could stop dwelling on this topic, all the more so that the law has already become full-fledged, if it were not for certain coolness and alienation in mutual relations between the people of different nationalities which remain.

I think that the leadership of the party and the soviets, their local organs, and all of us are partially to blame for failing to impart relevant explanations specifically to individual people in a timely manner, pull the rug out from under the extremist segment of the populace, and anticipate the eventual opposition on the grounds of the draft law under discussion. We should note that the slow implementation of the set of measures regarding the execution of the well-known resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirghizia on the development of national-Russian bilingualism has not facilitated relieving the tension.

The speaker supported the creation of a special sub-department within the framework of the Central Committee which would directly steer and coordinate all work on harmonizing interethnic relations in the republic.

The speaker went on to say that phenomena which are rooted in the social rather than ethnic sphere, primarily the failure to resolve a number of socio-economic issues and violations of elementary rights of citizens, are frequently expressed in the form of interethnic contradictions. At present, the Frunze City Party Organization is markedly emphasizing urgent measures aimed at carrying out the foodstuffs and housing programs and saturating the consumer market. The steps taken should help us create an economic and moral environment for advancing further and achieving the actual social equality of the people of various nationalities. [passage omitted]

In summation, the speaker dwelled on the issues of preparing working-class cadres from among the individuals of the indigenous nationality. They account for only one-fifth of the workers employed in industry of the capital city which is definitely a shortcoming of the city party organization. The process is hampered by a number of circumstances, from the insufficient career attraction of industrial occupations for the Kirghiz young people to the absence of social conditions. The main point in this sphere is that there is no relevant state program embracing all elements of the national economy, from a specific labor collective and to the Council of Ministers of the republic. Communist-leaders must consider work on the development of the national working class their party duty, a truly international duty.

Kirghiz SSR Minister of Education M. Bazarkulov went up to the podium. [passage omitted]

Recalling heated discussions held in recent past concerning the opening of Kirghiz-language day-care centers and schools, especially in Frunze, the speaker stressed that the issue began to be resolved only when passions became extremely inflamed. Whatever the explanation, they failed to anticipate the development of public opinion, predict the course of events, and remove the issue from the agenda in a timely manner. Now, the issue is no longer acute; schools and day-care centers have been opened, and this has not hurt mutual understanding and harmony. [passage omitted]

There are serious problems with the course of history of the USSR. Mutual relations of the peoples of our country, their mutual influence and enrichment are not treated in sufficient detail in school textbooks. There is no justification for the past epochs in multinational republics being considered from the point of view of one nation with others sort of being omitted from the historical process. The school will help children see the history of peoples at all levels: the local, regional, republic, union, and world levels.

Further on, the speaker invited the attention of participants in the plenum to a problem associated with the large influx of young people from rural areas to the cities in order to study at vocational technical schools. Measures taken by the ministry with a view to attracting young people from remote rayons do not produce the

desired effect due to either the absence of dormitories or constraints on them. We count on the managers of enterprises reporting to the union appreciating the significance of the issue of forming the national working class in the republic and contributing to resolving it. [passage omitted]

President of the Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences A. Akayev referred in his speech to the origins of the friendship of the Kirghiz and Russian peoples. [passage omitted]

Having touched on the issue of migration, the speaker stressed that virtually no adjustment of the demographic situation in the republic is being practiced. There is no appropriate control over external migrations by the soviets of people's deputies.

If we look at the economic, ecological, social, and demographic situation in the republic as a whole, it is feasible to regulate external migrations through legislation and restrict the influx of population from outside the republic taking into account restricted opportunities for providing foodstuffs and social benefits for the populace of the republic and the ecological condition.

In the future, it is necessary to make up for the shortage of labor resources in Frunze and other cities of the republic exclusively by means of surplus labor resources available within the republic itself, by creating conditions for their occupational training and, if necessary, retraining.

The social sphere of the city of Frunze is no longer able to handle additional loads. From the ecological point of view, the city is beginning to pose a danger to the health of residents. Given this, it is time to stop commissioning additional production capacities in Frunze. Moreover, some facilities should be moved from Frunze to other rayons of the republic, and some should be altogether closed down. It is feasible to develop Frunze as the political, cultural, scientific, and educational center of the republic.

Measures aimed at developing industry in the zones of settlement of the Kirghiz population, in small towns and in rural areas, which will facilitate the formation of the national working class appear to be rational. It is necessary to reinforce the production and technical orientation of the Kirghiz young people, perhaps, by moving some technical and vocational schools to rural areas or to small cities and equipping the training establishments and production facilities with the most up-to-date machinery. For the 13th 5-year plan, the Council of Ministers and the State Planning Committee of the republic should develop a special republic program for locating in rural areas enterprises, shops, and lines for processing agricultural products and consumer goods on the basis of new equipment and technology, including microelectronics. In conjunction with this, the Ministry of Education should develop a new system for training and retraining worker cadres and specialists geared to the young people of rural areas. Ensuring a high level of

employment is a guarantee of peace and well-being in rural rayons with a labor surplus.

[First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kirghizia Central Committee] A.M. Masaliyev responded to the speech by President of the Academy of Sciences of the republic with a short rejoinder.

Comrade Akayev, he said, spoke very well and confirmed what we said in the report. However, it would be desirable for the scientists to say what the Academy of Sciences is planning to do and how it will solve the problems of, say, ecology in the city of Frunze.

It is not too difficult to propose that production be closed down and moved outside the city. However, what is to be done about the workers of these enterprises? What do the scientists think about this? Your proposals should be argued in more detail, you should help specifically and make your contribution. It would be nice if Comrade Akayev said that the scientists intend to do this or that. Now we can talk about everything, but who is going to handle specific matters? This is food for thought for all employees of the Academy of Sciences.

Deputy Chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Goskompriroda A.K. Sultanov shared with the audience his impressions of the course of work of the plenum and speeches by a number of participants. [passage omitted]

Referring to some tension in interethnic issues, the speaker stated that, as he thinks, it began to be created in 1985 and 1986 when some functionaries were sent to the republic from the center in order to reinforce party and state organs.

They began a purge of the cadres; however, excesses were allowed to occur in the course of it. All of this was done in the period of perestroika, under the banner of democratizing our society.

The speaker went on to say that many comrades were defamed through the efforts of the functionaries sent from the center. They include the now former Chairman of the Osh Oblast Executive Committee Comrade Tadzhibayev, Chief of the Civil Aviation Administration Comrade Alymov, Kirghiz SSR KGB Department Chief Comrade Rumyantsev, and many others.

The speaker said further that he also ended up among those defamed only for criticizing the actions of the former Member of the Bureau of the Communist Party of Kirghizia Central Committee, Chairman of the Kirghiz SSR KGB V.A. Ryabokon.

As the speaker maintained, some KGB functionaries rendered illegal services to Ryabokon and members of his family. However, he did not put an end to these actions in his capacity as a communist, member of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirghizia. An elementary party penalty still has not been imposed on the people who allowed these services to occur.

It is time for all of us to understand that not only the direct effect of lawlessness is frightening but also the fact that it cripples conscience and creates situations when amorality begins to be considered the norm, said the speaker. We need to change our attitude toward the people who have been persecuted or relieved of their responsibilities due to their truthful and public statements. The sooner we rehabilitate these comrades the sooner we eliminate the doubts some people are beginning to have about the democratization of our society.

The speaker went on to discuss the issues of selection and assignment of cadres on the basis of ethnicity. Finally, he expressed his bewilderment as to the fact that some leaders transferred to other posts, among whom he mentioned Comrades Ryabokon, Kiselev, and Semenov, have failed to find an opportunity to express their attitude toward the collectives where they worked after their departure.

Turkmen Supreme Soviet Session Held

18 January Information Report

90US0468A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 19 Jan 90 p 1

[TURKMENINFORM report: "Information Report on the Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Turkmen SSR"]

[Text] On 18 January, at 10 o'clock in the morning, in Ashkhabad, in the meeting hall of the Supreme Soviet, the first session of the 12th Supreme Soviet of the Turkmen SSR began its work. In accordance with the Constitution of the TuSSR the session was opened by the chairman of the republic's select commission on elections for people's deputies of the TuSSR K. M. Orazov. After an exchange of opinions, the session approved the following agenda:

1. Selection of a Mandate Commission of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet.
2. Election of a chairman of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet.
3. Election of a first deputy and a deputy chairman of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet.
4. Formation of committees of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet.
5. Election of a Presidium of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet.
6. Appointment of a chairman of the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers.
7. On the Regulations of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet.
8. On a draft law on constitutional oversight for the TuSSR.
9. Election of a Constitutional Oversight Committee of the TuSSR.

10. Formation of the membership of the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers.

11. Election of a TuSSR People's Control Committee.

12. Election of a TuSSR Supreme Court and of judges for the oblast courts, for the Ashkhabad City Court, and for the rayon and city courts of the rayons and cities subordinate to the republic.

13. Appointment of a chief state arbitrator of the TuSSR.

14. On the draft law on the status of people's deputies in the TuSSR.

15. On the draft laws of the TuSSR on languages and on the state program for the development and broadening of the sphere of function of the Turkmen language and the improvement of the status of Russian and other languages.

16. On immediate measures for safeguarding the quality of the drinking water for the republic's population and the further improvement in the provision of gas and electricity to inhabited locales of the TuSSR.

17. On confirming the decrees of the Presidium of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet

In accordance with the approved work agenda, the plenary sessions of the Supreme Soviet are scheduled for 18 and 19 January, then until 24 January the Supreme Soviet committees formed are in their sessions going to examine and prepare conclusions on the draft laws, resolutions and candidacies proposed for positions elected and appointed by the Supreme Soviet. It is expected on 24 January to reconvene the plenary sessions of the Supreme Soviet in order to examine agenda issues in light of the committees' opinions.

A Tabulating Commission was selected to conduct the secret and open voting at the first session. A Mandate Commission of the Supreme Soviet was formed.

After the speech by Mandate Commission Chairman S. Motayev on the results from the verification of the authority of the people's deputies elected on 7 and 14 January 1990, a discussion of the speech began. Participating in it were USSR People's Deputy S. Atayev; Deputy P. Tangrykuliyev, director of the Turkmen branch of the Stomatologiya All-Union Scientific-Production Association, Khodzhambasskiy electoral okrug no. 168; Sh. Arbadov, senior economist of the Kazandzhik sovkhoz, Kazanikskiy electoral district no. 60; O. Khodzhaberdiyev, director of high school no. 2, Dargan-Atinskiy electoral okrug no. 152; N. M. Novikov, serviceman, Kongurskiy electoral district no. 78.

The Supreme Soviet passed a resolution recognizing the effective authority of all 169 elected people's deputies of the TuSSR.

Then the Supreme Soviet turned to an examination of the issue of electing a chairman of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet. After a thorough discussion, the candidacy of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Turkmen CP, S. A. Niyazov, was put on the ballot for a secret vote.

According to the results of the secret vote, S. A. Niyazov was elected chairman of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet with one vote against.

S. A. Niyazov delivered a speech to the deputies.

At the suggestion of S. A. Niyazov, two alternative candidacies were introduced for inclusion on the secret voting ballot for the post of first deputy chairman of the TuSSR: G. Myalikgulyyev, rector of the A. M. Gorkiy Turkmen State University, and S. N. Muradov, rector of the Turkmen Polytechnic Institute. S. N. Muradov was elected first deputy chairman of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet by a majority of the votes.

L. V. Potapov, who has worked as chairman of the ispolkom of the Maryyskiy Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, was elected deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet in an open vote. Ten standing committees of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet were created to carry out the work on bills, to do a preliminary examination and preparation of questions relevant to the conduct of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet, and to oversee the activity of state organs and organizations, and their chairmen were elected.

The resolutions on this question are being published in the press.

The Supreme Soviet examined an application received from the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers on constituting their authority and took it under advisement.

Exercising his constitutional right, TuSSR Supreme Soviet Chairman S. A. Niyazov brought up for examination by the people's deputies Kh. Akhmedov's candidacy for the appointed post of chairman of the republic's Soviet of Ministers. Kh. Akhmedov gave a speech and responded to the deputies' numerous questions.

By open vote the Supreme Soviet appointed him chairman of the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers. He was instructed to present the TuSSR Supreme Soviet with personnel suggestions for the republic's administration.

With this the first day of work of the session of the 12th TuSSR Supreme Soviet came to a close.

On 19 January the session will continue its work.

19 January Information Report

90US0468B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 20 Jan 90 p 1

[TURKMENINFORM report: "Information Report on the Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Turkmen SSR"]

[Text] On 19 January in Ashkhabad, in the meeting hall of the Supreme Soviet, the work of the first session of the 12th Supreme Soviet of the Turkmen SSR continued.

The session was led by TuSSR Supreme Soviet Chairman S. A. Niyazov.

The Supreme Soviet heard a report by First Deputy Chairman of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet S. N. Muradov on the draft regulations for the Supreme Soviet and instructed the Supreme Soviet committees to prepare a conclusion on this draft for examination by the first session of the Supreme Soviet.

Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman L. V. Potapov delivered a report on the draft law on constitutional oversight in the TuSSR. The bill was also transmitted to the Supreme Soviet committees to prepare a conclusion.

Then the session participants entered into an examination of the issue of forming a republic Soviet of Ministers. According to the presentation of TuSSR Soviet of Ministers Chairman Kh. Akhmedov, the Supreme Soviet after thorough discussion lasting several hours appointed: A. Charyev as first deputy chairman of the Soviet of Ministers, Yu. K. Mogilevets, B. Annayev, and T. Amangel'dyyeva as deputy chairmen of the Soviet of Ministers, and M. Razhapov as deputy chairman of the Soviet of Ministers and chairman of Gosplan of the TuSSR. The corresponding committees of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet were instructed to examine and submit conclusions on the candidacies proposed by the chairman of the Soviet of Ministers for the republic's administration.

At the session the members of all ten committees of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet were selected.

According to the presentation of Supreme Soviet Chairman S. A. Niyazov, the following candidacies were considered: V. S. Chertishchev for the position of chairman of the TuSSR People's Control Committee, N. M. Yusupov for chairman of the TuSSR Supreme Court, and B. K. Nurmukhamedov for chief state arbitrator of the TuSSR.

The committees of the Supreme Soviet were instructed to consider and submit their conclusions on the announced candidacies for the positions of directors of the indicated organs as well on the candidacies proposed for the members of those organs.

With this the plenary sessions of the first session of 19 January came to an end. On 20 January the work of the session will continue in the committees of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet.

Government Officials Appointed

90US0468C Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 20 Jan 90 pp 1-2

[TURKMENINFORM report: "The Government Is Formed: The First Session of the 12th Supreme Soviet of the Turkmen SSR"]

[Text] On 16 January at an evening session of the first session the TuSSR Supreme Soviet examined the application submitted by the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers to constitute its authority and took it under advisement.

Exercising his constitutional right, TuSSR Supreme Soviet Chairman S. A. Niyazov brought up for consideration by the people's deputies the candidacy of Kh. Akhmedov for the post of chairman of the republic's Soviet of Ministers. Kh. Akhmedov delivered a speech to the deputies in which he discussed the republic's socio-economic development as well as the basic directions in which the future government should go. Then Kh. Akhmedov answered the deputies' numerous questions. In particular, questions were posed concerning his perspective on the development of the economy, agricultural production, improving the state of affairs in the social sphere in Kizyl-Arvatskiy, Turkmen-Kalinskiy, and several other rayons in the republic. The deputies pointed up the necessity of a speedy resolution to the question of creating new jobs for workers in those places that enjoy a surplus of labor resources, increasing the production of consumer goods, organizing new building industry enterprises, which will allow for an increased tempo in the construction of housing and points of sociocultural significance.

Responding to the deputies' questions, Kh. Akhmedov emphasized that the republic's administration had worked out a whole series of complex programs for the development of the oil and natural gas industry, housing construction, children's day care centers and schools in rural localities, and increasing production of agricultural products. Now it is a matter of actually carrying them out.

Deputy S. Nuryev addressed the Supreme Soviet with a proposal to support the candidacy of Kh. Akhmedov for the post of head of the republic's government. In an open vote the Supreme Soviet appointed Kh. Akhmedov chairman of the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers and instructed him to present names for the republic's government.

The second day of sessions was opened by Chairman S. A. Niyazov. On the agenda was a discussion of the draft regulations for the TuSSR Supreme Soviet, which are supposed to set out in detail the procedures for the highest of organ of state power in the republic and all procedural issues. It covers all the norms of the TuSSR Constitution on the work of the Supreme Soviet as well as the rules proceeding therefrom. In accordance with the chairman's suggestion, the draft regulations were given to the committees of the Supreme Soviet for further work and submission to the session for examination at a subsequent session.

Then the deputies moved on to examine the question of the draft law of the TuSSR on constitutional oversight. TuSSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman L. V. Potapov delivered a report on this question. He noted the introduction of constitutional oversight in our republic is

provided for by article 112 of the TuSSR Constitution, established in the goals for guaranteeing a correspondence between the acts of the state organs and public organizations and the TuSSR Constitution and for protecting the constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals, the rights of the peoples of the TuSSR, and the democratic foundations of Soviet society. The Constitutional Oversight Committee of the TuSSR is independent and not under the control of the Constitutional Oversight Committee of the USSR.

In outlining further the fundamental propositions of the draft, the speaker noted that in it are formulated the fundamental principles of functioning for the organs of constitutional oversight, as well as the legislation on constitutional oversight. The bill provides detailed information on the propositions relating to the activity of the Constitutional Oversight Committee of the TuSSR. It also defines the body of legal acts that are in the purview of the committee, which, besides the legal acts of higher organs of power in the republic, also includes acts of public organizations, including party organs, the decisions of local soviets of people's deputies, and the resolutions of the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers, which, as practice attests, most often violate or willfully distort the Constitution and Laws of the Turkmen SSR.

Passage of the constitutional oversight law by the TuSSR Supreme Soviet, the speaker said in conclusion, will play an enormous role in forming a socialist, law-governed republic, in perfecting Soviet legislation, and in strengthening the rule of legality and law and order therein.

A suggestion was made to examine the draft at the commission and approve it in the session in light of that discussion. The deputies voted unanimously for this suggestion.

Then the chairman moved on to the question of naming the first deputy and first deputy chairman of the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers. Kh. Akhmedov took the floor. "Having conferred with the former members of the Soviet Ministers and also having discussed this question in our own Presidium, we have decided to combine the two positions of first deputy chairmen into one, which will have the effect of concentrating forces on resolving the strategic problems of the economy, especially industrial and agricultural construction."

A. Charyev was suggested for the position of first deputy chairman of the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers. The chairman of the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers acquainted the deputies with the candidate's biography and set forth his professional qualities.

Answering the deputies' questions concerning his perspective on economic recovery and especially its social sphere, the candidate-member of the government reported that there are large reserves in the material-technical support of the government's programs. He sees his principal task in holding to a firm and logical course toward satisfying the essential needs of the opulation, which means first of all guaranteeing pure drinking

water, supplying natural gas, and creating decent living conditions for people residing in ecologically polluted localities. Many questions were addressed to A. Charyyev with respect to his work as chairman of Goskomvodselstroy [State Committee for Water and Agricultural Construction]. Some deputies saw a direct link between the unsatisfactory state of affairs in that branch and the activities of its director. A direct reproach was directed to him—for all the negative consequences arising from the plunderous exploitation of the Karakumskiy Canal.

In this regard Chairman S. A. Niyazov explained that it would be wrong today to ascribe all the mistakes of the republic's past leadership to the activities of one man. The severe centralization of party power and the absence of economically literate leadership in the republic could not help but engender all of today's consequences. Millions were spent constructing the canal, meaning the complex process of opening it up, but in fact they flogged that canal, just as they flog gross output everywhere. All this must be corrected on the basis of fundamentally new forms of economic conduct. We have to utilize all the experience of our cadres, and that includes learning from our mistakes. Participating in the discussion of A. Charyyev's candidacy were deputies B. Meredov, P. Tangrykulihev, I. Berdyyev, S. Dzhumakulihev, and S. Gaipov.

Most of those who spoke commented on A. Charyyev's competence, his rich work experience, his ability to orient himself in the principal tasks.

In addition, concrete suggestions and wishes were expressed. A. Charyyev was appointed first deputy chairman of the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers by an overwhelming majority of votes. A proposal was made to appoint Yu. K. Mogilevets to the post of deputy chairman of the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers. Participating in the discussion of his candidacy were deputies P. Tangrykulihev, Sh. Arbadov, Kh. Kichibayev, O. Tacheva, G. Igdyrov, A. Dzhumadurdyev, M. Sopyyev, and G. Geldyyeva. Their statements, while recognizing Yu. K. Mogilevets's merits, his dedicated activity as chairman of TuSSR Gosagroprom [State Agricultural Industry], hinted at concern over the general state of affairs in the republic's agriculture. Concrete suggestions were expressed on improving the work of the refinery industry, including the creation of a program for each rayon; desires were expressed to revive the prestige of the shepherd profession, especially among young people, and to improve the activity of the agricultural industrial services in the localities.

After a break the discussion continued on the the candidacies for the post of deputy chairman of the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers. Deputy Kh. Akhmedov proposed that the Supreme Soviet appoint B. Annayev as deputy head of government for trade, cooperation, and consumer services. At the present time, explained the speaker, B. Annayev is located in Krasnovodsk, where he

directs the organization receiving and relocating Armenian refugees forced to leave Baku due to the interethnic clashes.

In this regard Chairman S. A. Niyazov reported that virtually all the victims, after being rendered the necessary assistance, were at their own request sent by plane to Yerevan. "Certain unsavory elements have been spreading rumors—with the goal of destabilizing the situation in our republic—to the effect that the refugees are being provided housing and work at the expense of the residents of our republic. These rumors are groundless. In my speech at the session I already spoke about this," noted S. A. Niyazov, "but I want to emphasize once more that we must all cut off decisively any actions that might lead to a rise of interethnic disharmony. The people's deputies too, whom our voters have entrusted with the right to defend their interests in the republic's highest organ of power, must actively oppose such attempts. At the same time, however, it is important to remember that helping people out who have fallen into misfortune is our international duty. We offer such help now, and we will do so in the future as well."

S. A. Niyazov proposed supporting the candidacy of B. Annayev. The Supreme Soviet unanimously appointed B. Annayev deputy chairman of the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers.

The candidacy of T. Amangeldyyeva was proposed for the position of deputy chairman of the republic's Soviet of Ministers charged with the development of the socio-cultural sphere. Speaking before the deputies, she said that in this area there are still many unresolved problems. These are conditioned above all by the fact that for so many years the health care, popular education, and cultural-enlightenment sphere was paid very little attention.

"Therefore, in the coming five-year period it is essential that we make a serious and decisive breakthrough in the development of the material-technical base of health care, popular education and culture, which will require a significant increase in the appropriation of means and resources for the social sphere and increased control and responsibility for implementing approved decisions."

T. Amangeldyyeva answered the deputies' many questions. Those participants in the Supreme Soviet session who spoke in the discussion of her candidacy proposed appointing T. Amangeldyyeva deputy chairman of the republic's Soviet of Ministers and assigned her a series of tasks.

Deputy Kh. Akhmedov proposed the candidacy of M. Razhapov for the post of deputy chairman of the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers, chairman of the republic's Gosplan. After answering the deputies' questions, M. Razhapov laid out his program. The decisive aspect in it, in his opinion, must be the continuation of the elaboration of the republic's shift to regional self-financing and self-administration and the economy's social reorientation. The economic plan must have a new conceptual content

directed at doing away with the present disproportions, attaining a balanced economy, and lowering the republic's budget deficit. Significantly greater attention must be paid also to the systematic safeguarding of environmental protection enterprises, to the elaboration and introduction of the achievements of scientific-technical progress. The republic's successful shift to new methods of economic management must be aided by a reexamination of the purchase prices for raw materials produced in the republic.

The Supreme Soviet appointed M. Razhapov deputy chairman of the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers, chairman of the republic's Gosplan.

Then Deputy Kh. Akhmedov proposed that the people's deputies examine the structure and makeup of the TuSSR Soviet of Ministers, which after discussion was unanimously approved by the Supreme Soviet. A list of ministry and department directors was also presented and submitted for examination by the corresponding committees of the Supreme Soviet.

At the suggestion of session chairman S. A. Niyazov, the Supreme Soviet selected V. S. Chertishchev to be chairman of the TuSSR People's Control Committee, N. M. Yusupov to be chairman of the Supreme Court, and B. K. Nurmukhamedov to be chief state arbitrator of the TuSSR. A proposal was introduced on the selection, in accordance with the TuSSR Constitution, of a 17-member Supreme Soviet Presidium. At the current session it was proposed to elect deputies M. Aymedova, G. Gelyyeva, K. Kerimov, S. Nuryyev, S. Rozmetov, and N. Yalkabov. It was decided to elect the remaining Presidium members at the next session. The president of the TuSSR Academy of Sciences, Deputy A. G. Babayev, delivered a report on the draft law of the TuSSR on languages and on the state program for developing and broadening the sphere of application of the Turkmen language and on improving the study of Russian and other languages. He informed the session of the kind of work that had been done between sessions of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet by the commission preparing this bill and submitted a proposal that noted comments and additions introduced by the republic's public for examination by the corresponding committees of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet.

With this the plenary session of the first session of the TuSSR Supreme Soviet came to a close. They will resume work on 24 January.

Uzbek CP Faults Pace of Republic's Education Reform

90US0520A Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian
13 Jan 90 p 1

[Uzbek CP Central Committee Press Release: "In the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Central Committee"]

[Text] The Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Bureau examined the matter "On the Role of the Uzbek

SSR Ministry of Public Education's Communist Administrators in Carrying Out the School Reform and Ensuring the Training and Education of Personnel for the National Economy." It was noted in the bureau's session that the reorganization of the body administering the republic's public education, carried out in July 1988 without extensive consultation with specialists and consideration of public opinion, proved to have been ineffective. A cumbersome, hard to administer system was formed, incorporating 13,700 institutions with various functioning and financing characteristics and, as it has turned out, incapable of ensuring major changes.

It was stressed that the reform's unsatisfactory progress has also been due to serious shortcomings in the work of the newly created Ministry of Public Education and its administrators. There are no significant changes in the continuous education system's makeup, and the mechanism for integrating the higher school, industry, and academic science, and for training and retraining personnel, with aptitudes and specific regional characteristics, scientific-technical progress requirements, and Uzbek SSR socioeconomic development trends taken into account, has not begun to operate. The work to create educational institutions of a new type is being organized slowly, the agreements between educational institutions and enterprises for personnel training have a perfunctory nature, and the amount of the ministries and departments' shared participation in financing the republic's higher education institutions has dropped from 25 to 5 million rubles during recent years. Young specialists' employment problems in their postgraduation work-assignment jobs have been let slide. The industrial-type educational institutions are poorly oriented for work with young people of the indigenous nationalities. The ministry is not seeking out opportunities for enhancing the more highly qualified specialists' and science-teaching personnel's training in central and foreign scientific and higher education centers.

The examination's materials attest that serious mistakes were made in the ministry's formation stage. The matters of increase in the educational institutions' independence and delimitation of the ministry's and the local public education agencies' rights and duties were not resolved. As a result, the ministry busies itself with current and trifling matters, rather than with profound analytical work and the development of conceptual matters. Over 20,000 reports and accounts, in many cases not called for by the State Committee for Statistics [Goskomstat], were obtained from the field during 8 months of last year, and about 40,000 units of decrees, instructions, and directives were sent to the field. The ministry's organization is inefficient, and some elements duplicate each other. Serious mistakes have been made in personnel selection and placement.

Particular attention was called to the slackening of work on ideological and political indoctrination of personnel. A great many law and order violations and instances of drunkenness continue to occur among teachers and students. Some educational institution administrators

do not have a clear-cut and rational party outlook, and fail to exhibit adherence to principles in evaluating negative occurrences. The ministry is not exerting the proper influence on indoctrination work's organization in the higher educational institutions, the specialized educational institutions [tekhnikumy], and the vocational-technical schools, and is not conducting determined work to form a well-rounded personality and instill senses of patriotism and internationalism in the students.

It was noted that the apparatus' party organization has not played its proper part in shaping the ministry. The party organization's role in establishing businesslike and demanding conditions and selecting and placing personnel is insignificant. The reports of the ministry's communist administrators on their performance of position and party- regulation duties are not acted upon in the party bureau's meetings and sessions. The party bureau tolerates instances of communists' party- discipline violation and passiveness.

The Uzbek SSR Ministry of Public Education's work in directing the course of education reform in the republic and implementing the February 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum decrees was appraised as unsatisfactory in the resolution adopted by the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Bureau. The work of the ministry's communist administrators was deemed inadequate and unresponsive to present-day requirements. It was noted that the minister, CPSU member Comrade M.A. Zaidov, still has been unable to create, within the ministry apparatus, a state of solidarity and businesslike efficiency, good organization and discipline, exactingness toward personnel, and determination to achieve real changes in the sector. The minister's deputies—the communists, Comrades S.G. Makhnenko, N.M. Naumenko, A.Kh. Nuritdinov, U.A. Usmanov, and Kh.K. Yuldashev—lack initiative, do not look for unorthodox solutions to crucial problems, and, seeing the numerous shortcomings in the ministry's operating style, fail to show adherence to principles by eliminating these.

The Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Bureau tasked the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers with considering the matters of abolishing the ministry, creating a new body for administering the public education system, and making the sector administration's personnel more reliable.

The Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers was charged with forming a commission, composed of leading specialists, to work out a conceptual scheme for development of the republic's public education system to the years 2005 and 2015, the personnel training appropriate to existing requirements, the fundamentals of a statewide public system for discovering and singling out talented young people, and the work with this system, taking into account that the situation which has arisen in public education demands new approaches and major changes in the level of young people's education and vocational training.

It was deemed advisable to consider the matter of creating a branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute for Sociological Research in the city of Tashkent for purposes of intensive study of the processes in social consciousness, and, above all, in the youth environment.

Quotas for increasing the sizes of doctoral-candidate, graduate-student, intern, and student contingents being sent to leading academic and scientific centers of this and foreign countries were given to the appropriate ministries and departments in the resolution.

The party's oblast committees were tasked with working out, and implementing in 1990, measures aimed at achieving real changes in public education, starting with analysis of the progress in implementing the February 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum decrees. Particular attention was called to the need for eliminating broken-down and dilapidated schools in abbreviated time frames, devising and putting into effect a system for discovering gifted students and developing their aptitudes, and introducing, especially in rural areas, new forms of preschool institutions—kindergartens at home, and branches of preschool institutions formed by using part of the housing fund.

It was deemed important, for purposes of increasing student accommodations and attracting the supplementary resources of production units, to ensure priority construction of low-enrollment and primary schools in rural localities, create and designate sections and workshops at enterprises for the manufacture and repair of school equipment, stimulate cooperatives' involvement in this activity by the establishment of tax benefits, and propagate the experience of the city of Tashkent's Kuybyshev Rayon in creating a rayon childhood assistance fund by means of contributions from labor collectives and citizens.

The mass information media's attention was called to the need to publicize public education's problems, teacher-innovators' work experience, and the better educational institutions, and to provide for public verification of the progress in implementing party and government decrees on secondary and higher school perestroyka matters.

Trends in Local Uzbek Election Campaigns Analyzed, Faulted

90US0521A Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian
12 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by correspondent N. Iskanderova: "The Election Campaign: A New Spiral"]

[Text] On returning from a business trip I found a note stuck in the door by an initiative group inviting me to a meeting for nomination of a candidate for deputy to the Karshi City Soviet from the 79th Sadeyevskiy District. I must admit that this pleased me: Things were finally beginning to move here. On the appointed day I came to

School No 15. And alas, I was annoyed no less than the initiative group—the nomination did not occur. Only a few dozen residents from the microdistrict of Pakhtazor responded to the invitation, while not less than 300 were needed.

"It seems to me that we had foreseen everything: We went door-to-door, we talked with the people, and we toured the microdistrict with a vehicle from which we announced the meeting with a loudspeaker," said one of the members of the initiative group. "And here's the result...."

It is a pity that having been unable to find support, the folks did not make another attempt. This example once again confirmed to me the idea that voters organized by place of residence are much more passive than those brought together into labor collectives. The alienation and apartness of the people had an effect. It is no accident that nominations based on place of residence are rare in cities. The population of rural regions, in which neighborly ties are still strong and in which the makhallya [translation unknown] plays the role of a unique cell of society, is somewhat more active. Nonetheless the overwhelming number of deputy candidates are nominated by labor collectives.

Also typical is the fact that in most districts, several candidates vie for the seat of a republic people's deputy. Though sometimes their strength is clearly unequal. Things will be difficult, for example, for fitter R. Kudratov of the Kasan Oil Extraction Plant: His rivals in Kasan's electoral district No 218 include the general director of the Uzbekgazprom Production Association, the chief of an oil exploration expedition, the director of a motor vehicle enterprise, and the directors of the oblast public health administration and the city department of public education. And two well-known shepherds are squaring off in the 211th Dekhkanabadskiy District—S. Samadov from Akrabad Sovkhoz and R. Baykuvatov from Dekhkanabad Sovkhoz. The situation is entirely different in the districts in regard to elections to the local soviets. Here the struggle is not so acute. The overwhelming majority of the candidates for deputy to the Karshi City Soviet, for example, are running unopposed.

There are unprecedented numbers of self-nominations as well. The relationship to them is complex. We have not yet become accustomed to this; they do not yet fit within the established framework. It would hardly have been possible in former times, as an example, for a sovkhoz director to dare to announce his candidacy in opposition to the first secretary of a party raykom, as happened in Nishanskiy Rayon. I believe that these are the sprouts of a new, democratic beginning, of a changed political atmosphere.

With what goals and designs is another matter. In some districts we can clearly see attempts by certain groups to "press forward" at all costs their own candidate, even one with a blemished reputation, from the very first steps. Precedents are also being established in which

people who had formerly discredited themselves and are known in the oblast for unseemly acts are stubbornly striving to become deputies, putting any and all methods into motion.

A special stir occurred around the election of people's deputies of the Uzbek SSR. One hundred five persons are vying for 36 seats, and six of them have already been denied registration.

The election campaign is also encountering thoughts such as these: Having an opposing candidate is a fine thing. But it is becoming "a matter of honor" among some executives to attain the title of deputy. Concepts such as ethical conduct, modesty and personal capabilities commensurate with state affairs are tossed away.

Of course, there is the hope that the voters will be able to distinguish the grain from the chaff. They already do have some experience, after all. Among the deputy candidates we encounter names already known, such as leaseholder Kh. Eshankulov from Ulyanovskiy Rayon, vegetable grower P. Tursinov from Karshinskiy Rayon, cotton grower U. Radzhabova from Kamashinskiy Rayon and many others. It was not that long ago that they were nominated for USSR people's deputies. And it was only stiff competition that left them out of the running. However, the voters were able to get to know them better, and to evaluate each of them better. But will the campaigners for these office-seeking executives be more persistent and active this time, will past errors not be repeated? It is no secret, after all, that the stereotype of the deputy as an omnipotent ramrod has still not given way to the image of the deputy-lawmaker. And this means that the people might vote once again for those who in their opinion would solve their municipal and personal problems faster. The main thing is not to allow the people to be deceived for the sake of a seat.

There are many CPSU members among those nominated. Thus if all nominees are registered, 88 communists will fight for the right to call themselves people's deputies for the republic. Meaning that mistrust of communists is not a topic of discussion. But the way the voters will relate to the actions of party committees depends on themselves alone, on their methods and tactics. Presently the committees can be observed to have a polarized relationship to the elections: In some places they prefer not to involve themselves in the election campaign at all, fearing that their actions would be interpreted as pressure. On the other hand attempts at acting in the old ways are encountered among others. Both extremes are bad. The specific embodiment of new laws locally, improvement of the economy and other vitally important matters depend on the composition of the local and republic soviets. This is why it is so important to fight social demagoguery, and to help people determine who is ready and able to work in the interests of the rayon, the oblast and the republic, and who is not.

At the same time I think that party organs will also account for the lessons of previous elections, in which official agitation produced the reverse effect. Conflicts and dissatisfaction are possible now in the period of candidate registration. Efficient work by the electoral commissions, precise observance of the Election Law and tactful explanation of its provisions will be an aid in honorably resolving difficult situations.

**Uzbek CP First Secretary Karimov Outlines
Republic Party Tasks**

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[Speech by I.A. Karimov, First Secretary of Uzbek CP Central Committee, at the 30 December 1989 Meeting of the Republic Aktiv: "Together with the Nation—On the Perestroyka Course"]

[Text] Comrades!

December 1989 was replete with events of tremendous sociopolitical importance. On 9 December the CPSU Central Committee Plenum was held. That Plenum discussed questions linked with the conducting of the 2nd Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The Congress itself ran from 12 through 24 December and was marked by the increased pitch in the struggle, and a large number of important decisions were made. On 25-26 December the CPSU Central Committee Plenum was forced to convene again in order to discuss the unprecedented situation in the party that had been caused by the decision made by the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party to leave the CPSU.

Those events became the concentrated expression of those complicated, strained, contradictory processes that are occurring in the life of the party and the nation at this new and critical stage of perestroyka. Especially since they are developing against a background of stormy and at time dramatic events in the East European countries, as well as in other parts of the world.

Therefore there is a persistent need to follow the hot trail of what has been occurring, to analyze those events, to make the first conclusions from them, and to learn the proper lessons. And also to determine for ourselves those vitally important emergency tasks that are dictated by these extraordinary circumstances.

Taking into consideration the strained situation in the country and the increasing pitch of the political struggle, it is necessary to refine the fundamental positions of the republic's party organization, the program of actions of all the party, soviet, and economic agencies, and public organizations of Uzbekistan, and to consolidate and mobilize all the healthy forces for the resolution of the urgent tasks.

There is no need to paraphrase the contents of the heated discussions that occurred at the Congress or the documents adopted by it. The course of the Congress was

broadcast over television and radio, stenographic records were published in *IZVESTIYA*, and the work of the Congress was completely analyzed and is currently being widely commented on by the mass media. Thus, everything that occurred there is well known.

The 2nd Congress became a new and important step on the path of perestroyka, a breakthrough toward further radical changes and the renewal of our society. But it also demonstrated even more graphically those tremendous difficulties, complexities, and serious dangers that lie in wait along that path.

That is why it is important to analyze what has caused such fierce arguments, what forces were in operation and in what interests, and what was the true meaning of various heated verbal battles that broke out with regard to questions that, at first glance, appeared to be formal or even procedural ones. And to analyze what varied consequences all this has and can have in the present and future.

Our society is living through a complicated time, and perestroyka has not been proceeding easily. Today life requires every Soviet citizen to make the choice of what platform to follow, whom to follow and where to go, whose slogans to support, and what to fight for. It is precisely the personal position of each individual that determines how the further development of events will occur: along the difficult but only true road of perestroyka and renewal on the basis of choice, or, as certain people propose, the rolling back to the initial stages of capitalism, in order to begin anew the tortuous path of ascent, to cross out everything that was paid for by the blood and sweat of many generations.

There is no other alternative. At the present time each person must make his own choice. Life itself no longer accepts vagueness or spinelessness. It rejects all attempts to wait things out, to remain silent, to hide behind other people's backs, to take cover behind authorities, old dogmas, and stereotypical quotations and slogans. Especially since they are unsuitable for Communists, for leaders who have been invested with power and people's trust.

The main requirement today lies in assuring that people have a complete knowledge of and their own opinion about all the vitally important problems that affect all of us collectively and each of us individually, can define precisely their own position with regard to them, and can act firmly to implement that position.

We have in mind, first of all, the place and role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the life of our society, in the management of perestroyka.

A question that evoked the broadest public response and divergence of opinions was the question of whether or not to include in the Congress agenda the discussion of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. People wondered what had caused such heated arguments, which began even before at the sessions of USSR Supreme Soviet.

Because all of us, in principle, are agreed that the party's authority and vanguard position in our society are determined not by formally recorded phrases or declarations, but by that very important actual role that is played by the party organizations and committees in the political, economic, sociocultural, and moral-ideological life of the country and each region.

The party wins its guiding and directing role in the vanguard primarily by its ideological positions, by its ability to implement them, by the ability to convince and attract people, to consolidate them in the name of attaining the goals that have been set, and by its moral authority. Therefore is it really so necessary to have that formal statement in the Basic Law, which statement, incidentally, did not exist in the USSR Constitutions that were in effect prior to 1977?

To the uninitiated person it is difficult to understand that the topic of discussion is the essence and complexity of the moment that is being experienced by the party and the country. Having begun the perestroika, and now guiding it, the party carries out sharp changes in the political structure and economic system of our society. These reforms are actually directed at guaranteeing the complete democracy of the soviets, at delimiting the functions of the party, soviet, and economic agencies, and changing over to the self-government and economic independence of the regions.

But for the time being the mechanisms for this complicated reform have by no means been completely worked out, the soviets have not yet formed structures for guaranteeing complete self-government, and there has not been any determination of the painful differences in the start-up economic and social level of the republics and regions, the transition of which to cost accountability will only aggravate the split between them.

Take the financial situation that is developing in the country on the whole and in the individual republics. Can one really speaking about equal initial positions when the union republics change over to cost accountability if, for example, in all the Baltic republics, because of the structure of the national economy that developed there and the price policy that was applied there, the income exceeds expenses and there are opportunities to use that excess for their own needs, while in Uzbek SSR, because of the disproportions and distortions in the branches and violations of the economic mechanism of price establishment, one has observed from year to year a deficit in the republic budget, that is, funds from the union budget have been regularly drawn in to cover the republic's expenses. Perestroika revealed—and the first steps to provide for the economic independence of enterprises and to create cooperatives increased—the social stratification of people on the basis of their income and standard of living. There was an intensification of the interethnic relations, the problems of which, during the years of stagnation, had been carefully concealed and driven in more deeply.

Under these conditions it is only the party, a party that unites in its ranks the representatives of all classes and social segments of the nation, all nations and nationalities of our multinational country, that is the only consolidating force that prevents the splitting of society on the basis of social or national features. The party today is the chief factor of stabilization, the chief obstacle on the path of the antisocial forces. And that is why such a massive attack is being conducted against it.

Article 6 of the Constitution is only the formal pretext for snatching the sociopolitical initiative from the hands of the party, first by squeezing in on it, and then by removing it from the political scene, turning our society onto a different, not socialist path. That is why our opponents are acting so hastily. It is important for them to remove Article 6 as quickly as possible, while perestroika, which was begun on the party's initiative, is experiencing its most difficult, most crucial time, before it has yielded any real results in the economic sphere, or especially in the social sphere. This is why we have seen the broad dissemination not simply of criticism of individual periods and errors of the party leadership, but also a frontal attack aimed at besmirching and discrediting the party as a whole, and all of its activities. That is what is actually concealed behind what would seem to be a strictly legalistic discussion about Article 6 of the USSR Constitution.

This also pertains completely to other items on the agenda. For example, a deputation from the Baltic republics, actively supported by an interregional deputy group, recommended listening to the findings of the commission to study and evaluate the 1939 Soviet-German negotiations (the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) before discussing the question of constitutional overview in the USSR. What is the sense of this reposing of the question?

The censuring of the treaties that the Congress gave, proceeding from our foreign-policy principles and positions with regard to ideological policy would have made it possible with even greater ferocity to place in doubt the constitutionality of the entry of the Baltic republics into the Soviet Union. And, consequently, to reject also the very idea of constitutional overview.

That, in its turn, would have lead to a situation in which today, when the Soviet Federation is being restructured and is being augmented by new content, when there is a process of redistribution of powers between the union republics and the center, we would not have an instrument for considering and resolving the numerous disputes and very complicated problems of state construction. This is necessary for those who are attempting to tear our union down, to drag it apart into separate national apartments, and to undermine the very foundations of our state.

Obvious or concealed springs were situated behind the disputes concerning literally every point on the Congress agenda. It took an entire work day to defend the agenda

that had been recommended by the Supreme Soviet. That annoys many people, and many others consider this to be a complete waste of time. But in order to guarantee the majority of the votes, it was necessary to convince the vacillating deputies, to show them the true plan behind the particular recommendation being made. But, most importantly, it was necessary to show the entire nation that this was an argument not between bureaucratic functionaries and free-thinking radicals, but an actual struggle to preserve the basic principles of socialism, of our social-state system.

This manifested itself most graphically during the discussion of the governmental program concerning measures to improve the economy, the stages of the economic reform, and the well-principled approaches to developing the 13th Five-Year Plan. Take, for example, the basic principles in N. I. Ryzhkov's report. Are they really insufficiently radical? On the contrary. Many deputies from our republic, for example, have some doubts about the government's planned denationalization of the form of ownership of producer goods: the plan, in the next five-year plan, to reduce the share of state ownership to 30 percent and to transfer the remaining producer goods to the ownership of joint-stock societies and cooperatives, to private use, and thus to eliminate the dominant importance of state ownership.

It is possible and necessary to argue concerning specific measures in the program. The main consideration here is how rapidly and effectively we will be able to stop the downward creep and to improve realistically the satisfying of people's basic everyday needs—food supply, the providing of them with consumer goods, housing, and the elementary facilities for social, recreational, and sport purposes. A question that is especially acute is the fight against inflation, the stabilizing of people's standard of living. This was mentioned by many deputies, including deputies from our republic. In this area there have been, and still are, things concerning which the government can be criticized. A large number of practical, constructive recommendations were made, and they were taken into consideration in the final version of the governmental program.

The deputation from Uzbekistan, like all the people's deputies throughout the country, acted in a more forceful and purposeful manner at the Congress. Attending a school of parliamentary activity, the deputies learned lessons from their work at the 1st Congress, for which they received a rather large amount of complaints, including from the voters. Therefore, on the eve of the Congress, first in Tashkent, and then, on 11 December, in Moscow, the deputies all gathered together and, in an atmosphere of complete frankness and openness, discussed all the main problems: both the general ones for the country as a whole, and the specific ones for the republic. And, despite the great variety of opinions and positions among the deputies, which were dictated both by their personal conviction and by the voters' mandates, they came to an understanding in principle

concerning the overall positions with regard to the basic questions on the Congress agenda.

The most important thing that united all the people's deputies from Uzbekistan is the passionate striving to defend the republic's positions, to show the entire country the very serious situation that the economy and the workers' welfare are in, and to express demands without the implementation of which it will be impossible to correct the situation.

For these purposes a message from the deputies of Uzbek SSR was prepared and sent to all the people's deputies and other participants in the 2nd Congress. That message stated the basic questions of principle that require their resolution in our republic.

That approach enabled the deputies to participate more productively in all spheres of the Congress work. Seventeen representatives of the republic were elected to form the Congress working agencies—a presidium, secretariat, editorial commission, and other commissions. Their activities were not shown on the television screens, but everyone who had direct contact with their work knows how strenuously they worked, sometimes until very late at night, formulating and refining the very important state decisions.

At the Congress, at section sessions, and also for voting purposes when making decisions, 26 deputies from the republic made statements. Three additional deputies who had registered to take part in the debate but who had not been given the floor handed over the texts of their statements for inclusion in the stenographic record of the Congress. Several dozen deputy inquiries were addressed to the Congress presidium and secretariat, as well as directly to governmental and other union agencies from our republic's representatives.

The meeting and conversation that our deputies had with N. I. Ryzhkov, Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers, was of special importance. Approximately 30 of our representatives participated in it. No other delegation managed to discuss at that high level the most acute socioeconomic problems in the development of the region.

The central press reported in general features about the content and nature of the conversation, and the "Vremya" television program reported about it on the same day. Certain deputies have already shared their impressions in the republic's mass media, and at meetings with their constituents and labor collectives upon returning from Moscow. It is necessary to work assiduously in order to make known to all the republic's working people that businesslike and constructive approach that we met in the chief of government with regard to all the most acute questions pertaining to the republic's life. In order to make this known to the broad public, it is necessary to include the mass media and the ideological aktiv.

This is especially so, in that within literally only a few days N. I. Ryzhkov signed the minutes summing up that

conference. That is a very serious document for the republic, a document that creates the necessary ground for resolving such fundamental problems as the establishment of objective, well-substantiated purchase prices for agricultural output, including raw cotton and silk cocoons. The appropriate union agencies have been given the following responsibilities:

- the consideration of a question that was raised at the meeting—the question of the level of the state production order for cotton fiber, the reduction of the volumes of oilcakes and oilseed meal that are shipped out of the republic, and the reduction of the use for technical needs of cotton husks that could be used for fodder purposes;
- the rendering of necessary assistance in developing and approving the technical-economic substantiation for the building of mainline collectors to remove mineralized drainage water;
- the taking of steps for the accelerated development of enterprises of light industry in the republic for purposes of improving the use of the cotton-fiber resources and increasing the employment rate for the able-bodied population;
- the careful analysis of questions of improving the status of women, the family, and the protection of motherhood and childhood, and the development, in coordination with the central economic agencies and the UzSSR Soviet of Ministers, of steps dealing with this question; the taking of them into consideration in the plan for 1991-1995;
- and many other measures.

There has been a positive resolution of the question raised by our deputies concerning the additional allocation of funds of certain types of food products, which is to begin in the first quarter of next year.

It would not be a bad idea if the government and other economic agencies in our republic could learn to be as time-responsive and businesslike as this. Today much depends upon us: how we will be able to substantiate and prove our recommendations. But one thing is clear—the party and the country's government are taking an understanding attitude toward our problems and are trying to meet us halfway.

But it was not these strictly businesslike considerations that determined the red-hot atmosphere at the Congress. The constructive search for ways to resolve the problems that are vitally important for the fate of the country and perestroika, and for the fate of socialism, constantly collided with the powerful wall of forces that were attempting to destabilize the situation both at the Congress itself and throughout the entire society that was keeping an eye on its work. The waves caused by the squabbles in the auditorium instantaneously reached the most distant parts of the country and kept the atmosphere at a fever pitch.

In the statements made by certain deputies, the least amount of attention was paid to the search for ways to resolve the urgent problems of political and economic reform, to achieve compromises in interethnic relations, etc. No, there were direct and unambiguous declarations about the renunciation of the fundamental principles of socialism and our political system, and the persistent raising of the question of the dismantling of our building, that had been erected in the course of socialist construction.

The statement that is most telling in this regard is the statement that was officially disseminated at the Congress and that had been made by a number of deputies who were members of the interregional group. In an unconcealed form, which frequently had the tone of an ultimatum, it takes a blow directly at all the basic principles of our society. It openly proclaims the rejection of socialism, and contains an appeal to turn back, to turn to capitalism. It completely denies the vanguard role of the Communist Party and declares the striving of various kinds of informal movements to seize the power. It denies perestroika and contains an appeal to the complete destruction of our entire social building. It proclaims private ownership of producer goods. It contains the complete denial of the national policy that was worked out by the September 1989 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and announces the disintegration of the USSR as a single multinational state.

The strained atmosphere during the vote on many politically significant questions indicates that these pseudorevolutionary phrases are exerting an influence on certain politically unsophisticated deputies.

What has been said allows me to make the following main conclusions.

At the Congress and in society there has been a further polarization of forces. The masks of demagogic debate under the cover of perestroika have been thrown aside. The antisocial forces have gone into a direct attack on the party, on socialism, on our system. For this purpose they are using all means—from the complete besmirching of the past and present of the party and the nation, to direct threats and ultimatums.

At the Congress it was possible to carry out the political line that had been defined at the 9 December Plenum. But in the course of the Congress there was a split in the party—the Lithuanian CP seceded from the CPSU. If this process is not stopped, this can change the placement of the political forces and, in the final analysis, can lead to the disintegration of the USSR.

Today the placement of forces looks as follows:

1. The deputies who stand firmly on party positions and consistently carry out the party line.
2. Forces that are hostile to socialism, which, by means of demagogic statements on the wave of perestroika, have received a vote of confidence, and which now have

cast aside their masks and are openly speaking out from antiparty, antisocialist positions.

3. The vacillating majority of the politically unexperienced people, who believe the party but who can also be swayed by a scathing demagogic phrase. Their votes are the decisive ones. Today, for the most part, they are with the party. Flesh and blood of the nation, they bring into the Congress auditorium those moods of impatience and dissatisfaction that live within the nation.

It is precisely by counting on those moods that our opponents are throwing around various ideas—the ideas of complete leveling of wages, the ideas of the redistribution of income—having in mind the turning of people's dissatisfaction against the party-soviet-state apparatus, acting in accordance with the principle: the worse the state of affairs is today with the providing of the population with food products and the basic necessities of life, the better. Why? Well, because people's dissatisfaction and indignation with today's difficulties and with the worsening of the situation in the consumer market will be directed, first of all, against the party and soviet agencies in the center and the outlying areas. It is chiefly the party committees that will have to answer for this. Consequently, by conducting this sly policy, all the antisocialist and antiparty forces are trying to achieve several goals: the destabilization of the situation, by parasitically feeding on the difficulties; the setting of people against the party and the soviet agencies; the discrediting of their authority; and on that wave the seizure of political power.

Whereas at the first stage of this struggle nothing at all was said about political slogans, but, instead, the basic things mentioned were the defense of history, language, and culture, the education and restoration of moral values, traditions, and customs of the nation, today all of this has retreated into the background. What used to be secret is now obvious. In the foreground we see the indomitable desire to move forward with political slogans and demagoguery, to win by means of criticism and fault-finding, without offering anything constructive, and to gain cheap authority and, in the final analysis, get the power. It might be small, but it is power.

Therefore, at this absolutely crucial turning point in our history we need—as essentially as we need air to breathe—the unity and solidarity of the party that, in 1985, proclaimed and began perestroika, and that has been leading that perestroika along the difficult, complicated road of fundamental reforms that penetrate deeply into all areas of life. Along this very difficult historic path that party has been experiencing pressure both from the left and from the right. Only unity, solidarity, and restraint will help us to remain firm. The major repair of our common home, a home that was built with crude deviations from the scientific Leninist blueprint, can be carried out only by coordinated actions and in accordance with a single plan. Otherwise it can simply collapse.

In this regard the CPSU Central Committee Plenum of 25-26 December unambiguously evaluated the decision of the Lithuanian CP Congress to secede from the CPSU and to form an independent party with its own program and rules as a schism, as an act that undermines the cause of perestroika.

This analysis and evaluation of a situation that is completely unprecedented in the history of the party were also contained in M. S. Gorbachev's report. One may also add that in the report of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee to the Congress, in the program and rules that were adopted by it, in the decree dealing with its status, in its appeal to youth, and in other documents there is a direct and open proclamation of a special kind of socialism, which is "painted in the colors of Lithuania," the entire past history of socialist construction is censured as a "pernicious practice" of a backward and undeveloped country, and the party's leading role is repudiated. The Lithuanian CP Congress actually departed from class positions, and rejected the "priority of any one class." The transition to private ownership and a market economy without any limitations was proclaimed. "Partnership parity relations" with the CPSU are made dependent upon a number of conditions, as are the economic relations with the other republics of the Soviet Union. There is complete repudiation of the party's Leninist national policy, which "failed to express and failed to protect the interests of Lithuanians." An inseparable Lithuanian state is proclaimed.

Various recommendations were made in the statements at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. But no final decision has yet been made. As you know, the Plenum did not complete its work. It instructed the Politburo members and the Central Committee secretaries to go to Lithuania and to discuss the situation with the Communists in the primary organizations and party committee. It was also deemed to be desirable to have CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev make a trip there. After that, the Plenum will continue its work and make a decision.

What has happened in the Lithuanian Communist Party should be viewed not simply as a sudden and isolated fact, but as an albeit extreme but conditioned manifestation of certain harmful tendencies that have recently appeared and that have far-ranging goals. At the Plenum, mention was made of an extended attack on the party and the need to reinforce its authority. It was categorically pointed out that the further passivity of many party committees and organizations is simply intolerable and dangerous. And that perestroika in the party cannot lag behind the processes that are occurring in society. As is well known, these and other very important questions pertaining to the party's activities and the preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress will be discussed at the Central Committee Plenum in January 1990.

The most important factor is that the confidence credit that the party received at the beginning of perestroika is

coming to an end. The time is coming when it will be necessary to pay on the promissory notes and to pay the interest. The nation, the workers, the poorly-provided segments of the population must sense the results of perestroyka—results which, although they are as yet small and only the initial ones, are nevertheless real plus results. The only deadline and the final one for this is the forthcoming year of 1990.

The first thing that must be done is to take a stand alongside of the person. Alongside of the worker and the engineer who creates material assets. Alongside of the peasant and the agronomist who feeds and clothes the country. Alongside of the scientist and researcher who, by the strength of his intellect, multiplies our opportunities along the path to a new quality of life. We must be imbued with the needs and concerns of the mothers of large families, retirees and disabled individuals, and all the poorly-provided segments of the population who today are living below the poverty line. We must draw on the wisdom that have been accumulated over the decades by old men, veterans, and respected *aksakals*—they have traveled a different path in life, by their labor and their struggle they have created and preserved what we have today, and they paid a heavy price for it. We must raise the aspirations and yearnings of the youth—that youth today largely determines the state of affairs and the social atmosphere in all spheres in the life of society, and tomorrow it will carry on its shoulders the complete load of concern and responsibility for the fate of the country and the fate of socialism.

It is only by absorbing all the difficulties that the nation is experiencing today, it is only by feeling with one's heart its yearnings, it is only by realizing with one's own unprejudiced mind the reasons for the dissatisfaction and the impatient hopes that ought now, finally, to come true—it is only then that one can count on people's understanding and support. It is necessary, together with them, to search the paths to the future, and together, without any social upheavals, to overcome the difficulties that are inevitable on the road of human civilization and progress.

It is only workers like that who can occupy today the managerial positions, it is only they who can count on the voters' support at the forthcoming election to the republic's Supreme Soviet and the local soviets. It is only they who will be followed by the nation.

Unfortunately, this organic and complete fusion with the masses is lacking in many managers of party, soviet, and economic agencies in the republic. Therefore, the very first concern of the party organizations and all the public forces that have been awakened to political life is the locating and promotion of new forces to head all the public cells and links in the political system—new, talented forces that are inseparably linked with the nation, that are imbued with their concerns, that are open to the new way of thinking, to new approaches and

unusual decisions that are based on the collective intelligence and collective will of the broad masses of the workers.

And here we must constantly remind our managerial cadres in the oblasts, cities, and rayons about the need to open the road to cooperation, to invite people to participate in the joint work, and to appoint to the appropriate positions all those honest people to whom the fate of the nation is not a matter of indifference, irrespective of whom those people represent: formal or informal organizations. It is only in this way that we can achieve the consolidation of all the healthy forces.

That critical line that our society has reached obliges us to do everything possible and impossible to assure that right now, literally today, people—each person by referring to the example of his own family, children, and close friends—can sense the real concern for themselves, can sense the improvement of life. It is only this that can convince people of the correctness of the chosen path of perestroyka, and the reality and the effectiveness of the governmental program that was approved at the 2nd Congress. It is only this that can give the masses the patience and strength to overcome the difficulties that are inevitably lying in wait for us on the path to the future.

What extraordinary measures will have to be carried out immediately?

First of all, we must stop the increase in prices and the decrease in the workers' standard of living, and we must stabilize the situation in the consumer market. For that purpose, starting with the first days of the year, we must take the most categorical—and perhaps emergency—measures to strengthen discipline and order, to put an end to speculation, the raising of prices, the disappearance of inexpensive commodities, short-changing, and kickbacks. It is necessary here not simply to intensify the ordinary work, but also to wage a real war, decisive combat.

The principle of social justice, the principle of the firm guarantee of the rights of each worker, of each citizen, the principle that the power and the administrative apparatus do not stand above, and especially do not stand against, the nation, but serve a person, defending his interests, is today taking of exceptional importance for our party and for the state. Therefore we view the fight against crime—especially organized crime—and the eradication of any malfeasances as the first-priority task, the most acute task of the day. In this regard there have been extremely alarming reports of extortion and kickbacks when allocating additional plots of land, granting loans, and selling building materials for individual construction, and reports of speculating with scarce commodities. In today's situation these crimes go beyond the confines of criminal cases and take on political nature.

The UzSSR Procuracy and Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the agencies of the people's party, workers', and

trade-union control have been assigned the task of carefully investigating each warning report and, in events when such a report is confirmed, taking the strictest—and one might even say cruelest—steps. It is necessary to do everything that is within our power to stop, by any means, the process when anyone can become rich from the misfortunes, difficulties, and shortages that the ordinary worker is experiencing today. Not a single incident of this kind can remain unpunished. Impunity today is that which deepens the already complicated, critical situation, and that causes a chain reaction of abuses and crimes. This must and will come to an end.

2. It is necessary to mobilize all the resources in order to improve the providing of food products to the population.

The chief reserve here is increasing the production of animal-husbandry products on the farms and in the individual sector. The year's preliminary results that were considered at the Central Committee Buro indicate that there have not yet been any substantial shifts. Many managers to this day have not understood the seriousness of the situation.

The special emphasis—and we have already mentioned this many times—is on increasing the farmstead plots as the chief and quick-acting means of resolving a series of the most acute social problems: improving the families' self-supply, saturating the market, providing earnings for the unemployed segment of the population, and accelerating the implementation of the Housing Program. Approximately 880,000 rural families have already received as their personal plot more than 95,000 hectares of land.

However, in Syr-Darya Oblast the requests for farmstead plots have been satisfied by slightly more than half; in Bukhara Oblast, by 62 percent; Andizhan and Namañgan oblasts, by 66 percent; and Samarkand Oblast, by 68 percent.

This cannot be evaluated as anything other than the ignoring and the deliberate discrediting of the decision made by the Uzbek CP Central Committee and UzSSR Council of Ministers. In this situation, the Communist Party Central Committee has nothing else to do than, literally from the very first days of the forthcoming year, to carry out everywhere a party inspection of this work in all the oblasts and rayons, and on all the farms. The measures applied to those who have taken the position of an inhibitor on the path of improving people's lives will be immediate and specific.

3. A problem that is very close to this one is the problem of rendering assistance for accelerating the construction of individual housing. During recent years in the republic, as is well known, there has been a sharp increase in the scope of individual housing construction. Whereas three years ago we erected 2.5-3 million square meters of housing, in 1988 we built 4 million square

meters. According to preliminary data, 4-8-4.9 million square meters will have been activated in the year that is coming to an end.

In order to render assistance to the public, credit and building materials are being allocated and plots of land are being set aside. The overall volume of resources for the granting of credit to individual builders in 1989 was increased by a factor of 1.5 and brought to 187 million rubles.

Many enterprises are rendering assistance to their workers by using the enterprises' own social-development funds. For example, on the basis of a decision by the labor collective at the Tashkent Aviation-Repair Plant, credit in the amount of 190,000 rubles was allocated for the construction of housing; at the Uzbek Chemical Machine-Building Plant, 74,000 rubles; and at the high-melting and heat-resistant metals combine, 108,000 rubles.

With a consideration of the increase in individual housing construction in 1990, the republic has raised at union agencies the question of allocating an additional 650,000 million rubles, of which, for the first quarter, it has been planned to issue credit amounting to 110,000 rubles.

Unfortunately, the planned activations of individual housing are as yet being poorly provided with building materials. The republic's need for plywood and lumber is being only half-satisfied; and the need for roofing slate and cement, by 70-80 percent. Therefore in 1990 it will be necessary to increase sharply the capacities at every enterprise that produces building materials.

At the same time, in the republic on the whole, poor use is being made of the opportunities for individual housing construction by the contract and in-house methods in executing the work orders of the agricultural agencies, according to the terms of which the material-technical support is carried out in a centralized manner on the basis of quotas for state housing construction.

In resolving these questions, one should support the initiative of a number of kolkhozes in Fergana Valley which have been giving the kolkhoz members home-building loans. Under the conditions of an acute shortage of building materials, there has been no application of the experience derived by the Khorezm Oblast Ispolkom, which concluded an agreement with the Irkutsk Oblast Ispolkom for the procurement and shipment of lumber products. It is necessary to make it a broader practice to barter our agricultural output for timber, metal, and cement, and this, incidentally, is already being done by individual rayons and farms in Fergana and Samarkand oblasts. It is also necessary to do some thinking about introducing a voucher system for distributing the resources among the market funds. The work experience of Tashkent, Fergana, and Khorezm oblasts indicates their high effectiveness.

Questions of providing the areas of individual construction with utility lines are causing serious alarm. For 1990 only the Tashkent City Ispolkom and the Andizhan, Bukhara, Namangan, Tashkent, Syr-Darya, and Khorezm oblast ispolkoms have submitted appropriate recommendations for the construction of utility lines.

It is necessary to provide the individual home-builders with assistance in preparing the design and estimate documentation and with the skilled manpower of construction workers and to guarantee the unconditional fulfillment of the plans for construction of housing and other structures for social, cultural, and recreational purposes by drawing on state capital investments.

4. We have not made complete use of the available opportunities for reducing the strained situation in the market with regard to consumer goods. Not all the capacities of our enterprises in light and local industry are completely loaded. The deadlines for activating a number of garment and shoe factories and other structures have been disrupted again. Direct ties between the farms and the industrially developed centers are being established slowly.

On the eve of the 2nd Congress of USSR People's Deputies, we signed in Moscow an agreement dealing with production, trade, and scientific-cultural cooperation between Uzbek SSR and Leningrad Oblast. We are establishing direct, businesslike barter ties with Tyumen Oblast. They possess a powerful industrial and scientific-technical potential. Direct ties with a consideration of our republic's rich opportunities can yield visible positive results. Especially with regard to the training of highly trained workers at modern production entities and of scientific cadres.

5. A problem that is taking on fundamental importance today, as has already been mentioned several times, is the problem of the employment rate, especially of young people. Essentially speaking, the task permeates everything that has ever been mentioned or decided in our republic. Without it there can be no serious consideration of any problem that pertains to Uzbekistan's today or tomorrow.

With regard to these questions the government is stipulating specific measures that were developed after the well-known Fergana events. The questions raised by the republic with regard to the immediate creation of additional jobs in the valley are being resolved with the participation of union ministries and departments. But it is necessary to assure that the planned programs, a rather large number of which were developed in the past, do not simply remain on paper. And especially to assure that they begin to be implemented right now, literally starting with the first days of the new year.

Today I would like to re-emphasize that a very important link in resolving this task is the question of training skilled cadres. This requires, first of all, the taking of a new approach to the problem of reinforcing the material-technical base of the entire system of public education,

and the transferring of it from the category of backward areas into the category of priority ones. This is the base, the foundation, on which it is necessary to build our entire cadre work. It is necessary, finally, to stop issuing declarations about the complete and harmonious development of the individual, which declarations have already set our teeth on edge, and to change over to specific practical matters. A person can master the fundamentals of modern knowledge, universal human culture, and physical improvement only when the necessary conditions for this are created in the general school, the vocational-technical school, the technicum, and the institution of higher learning. Large amounts of money are needed for these purposes, and we are obliged to locate them, both from the budget and from the enterprises, organizations, and farms. One must approach this matter not from narrowly pragmatic positions, but from long-term positions. We must all understand precisely that the funds that have been invested in education cannot produce an immediate benefit. But that benefit definitely will occur within 5-10 years. And the more we invest today, the greater that benefit will be. Otherwise the future is simply impossible.

It is necessary to increase the prestige, authority, and incentives for work as a teacher. It is necessary to take steps to assure that a teacher and an instructor become the most respected individuals both in the city and in the rural areas.

For purposes of improving the organizational structure of the system of instruction and education for the upcoming generation, the republic is resolving the question of dividing the Ministry of Public Education, the creation of which was carried out hurriedly and without sufficient substantiation. An important work area is the creation in the republic of an entire network of boarding schools for choosing children for the intensive study of the promising branches of science, culture, and modern production entities, and for guaranteeing the conditions for growing well-trained replacements.

A special fund will be created to provide material incentives to gifted young people so that they can obtain an education in the best scientific centers in our country and abroad. It is necessary to grow, literally to cherish, a new generation of scientists and instructors who would create our own scientific-methodology schools and would raise the job of cadre training to a qualitatively higher level. The resolution of these cultural and humanitarian tasks requires the mobilization of all of Uzbekistan's public forces. We are counting on the active participation of our scientists, writers, and the entire creative intelligentsia in this high mission of enlightenment.

Much in the sociopolitical life of the republic and in its further socioeconomic development will be resolved on 18 February at the election of UzSSR people's deputies and local soviets. On instructions from the Central Committee plenum, we developed and publicized the election platform of the Uzbek Communist Party. Its

main content, the very core of all the planned measures, is the real improvement of the population's life, an improvement that is differentiated by categories and social groups. Special attention was devoted to the intensifying of assistance to the poorly-provided segments of the population and to families with a large number of children, to retirees, to concern for the protection of motherhood and childhood, and to improving the conditions for developing the upcoming generation.

The platform was approvingly perceived by the republic's workers. Now it is up to them. It is extremely important for the first, albeit short steps of implementing that platform to be taken right now.

At the Central Committee plenum that was held in late November 1989 we spoke in detail about this. It is necessary to restate certain basic principles.

Despite the tension that has developed with regard to material and financial resources, we looked for an opportunity to divert, as early as 1990, into reinforcing the social protection of the low-income category of the population an additional 142 million rubles, to be taken from the funds of the republic and local budgets and the mobilizing of other sources.

For example, more than 100 million rubles are being allocated to organize free meals for schoolchildren in grades 1 through 5 of the general educational schools and to render assistance to pregnant women suffering from anemia. There will be a significant increase in the quotas of expenses for meals at boarding homes. In rural hospitals and kindergartens, kolkhozes have been authorized to make additional allocations of agricultural products into the state procurement account.

The material status of war and labor veterans, retirees, and single citizens will improve. There has been discussion of channeling into increasing the size of grants in aid and pensions more than 7 million rubles, which will make it possible to raise the standard of living for 55,000 persons. For these purposes it is necessary to introduce on a broader scale the experience of the Malinka Knitwear Association, the Kommunism Kolkhoz, and the Kyzyl-rabat Sovkhoz, Namangan Oblast, and other organizations in introducing increases to pensions and grants in aid by drawing on their own funds.

It is planned to improve the working and everyday living conditions of the workers in public education, public health, and social security. Starting with the current year, benefits to pay for municipal services for persons living in private apartments in cities will be extended to them. For acutely needy families of teachers and doctors, for medical personnel, and for young specialists it is planned to allocate, by special appointment, housing space and trip tickets to sanatoriums and health resorts. Approximately 78 percent of the students in higher and secondary special educational institutions who are living in apartments will receive definite compensation every month.

It is important now to take the next step. The Uzbek CP Central Committee is posing the task not during the next school year, but during the current one, of providing free lunches to all schoolchildren in the primary grades. This experience already exists in individual rayons of Syr-Darya and Samarkand oblasts. Contrasting situations exist, as has been shown by an inspection, in Karakalpak ASSR and Fergana, where even the fund-established products for children's meals are not being allocated. Situations such as this can no longer be tolerated.

In the broader view, the implementation of the election platform must become the basic content of the work performed by the republic's party, soviet, and economic agencies. Gosplan is obliged, within the first two ten-day periods of January, to develop a comprehensive working plan for the gradual fulfillment of the platform, having defined the specific assignments for the ministries, departments, and oblasts. And UzSSR Soviet of Ministers, in late January at an expanded session of the Presidium, must discuss and approve that plan, including its own departments and permanent agencies in that work.

In turn, the Communist Party's Central Committee, the commissions and departments, and all the committees have been called upon to guarantee organizationally and politically the execution and monitoring of what has been planned.

The year 1990 will largely be the decisive one in the life of the party and the nation, and in the fate of perestroika. It will be the year of the 28th CPSU Congress and the 22nd Uzbek CP Congress, the year of new congresses of USSR people's deputies, and the year of adoption of important fundamental decisions concerning ownership, the land, local government, and other decisions that have been called upon to change the outward appearance of our socialist society.

We have begun the process of democratizing our society and firmly intend not to turn off that path, but to develop it farther. It is precisely in the name of this that there is a persistent need to place the emphases correctly, to draw clear lines of demarcation between democracy and anarchy, between rights and discipline, between glasnost and order. The first steps along the path of self-government that have been taken by the cooperatives, despite all their progressive nature, have also given rise to such negative phenomena as group selfishness; the failure to meet planned and contractual obligations; the disappearance of inexpensive commodities and the artificial raising of the prices of commodities and services; the weakening of discipline in production; and the violation of public order.

Therefore it is necessary, over and over again, to mention the fact that it is only discipline and order that can help society in today's very serious situation to save the status and get out of the crisis. The increasing of responsibility, the reinforcement of discipline—labor, production, social, party, and state—must become a categorical

requirement for each worker, whatever job he has and wherever he works, and it must penetrate deeply into all links of our social organism.

Obviously, when resolving these tasks one should not turn back, as certain people are recommending, or put one's hope on work methods based on administrative fiat. That system considerably harmed our society, and we must take decisive steps to have nothing more to do with it. It must become irreversibly a thing of the past. We all are obliged to be completely aware that without democracy, without glasnost, without the freedom of all citizens, all social segments and groups, each individual and the nation as a whole to express their will, there is no movement forward and there cannot be any movement forward to renewal and the emancipation of our society's potential. We all must understand the simple truth: attempts to use old methods to resolve new tasks are doomed to failure before they start. Therefore the constant, daily asking of people for their advice, the search for new work paths and methods, must become the standard in the activities of all the party, soviet, state, and economic agencies and all the cadres.

The Central Committee asserts repeatedly the readiness of all the party committees for a dialogue and cooperation with all the public, spontaneous, informal organizations and movements. No one's position, no one's idea or initiative, no one's undertaking, however unexpected or unusual they may seem to be at first glance, can be rejected or censured ahead of time without the most attentive, most well-wishing study and acceptance of whatever constructive and beneficial ideas it contains. There may also be sincere delusions, or even errors. But we should not censure people for this, or hang labels on them.

Tolerance, and perhaps even compliance, in tactical questions, a well-wishing attitude, respect for other people's opinions, agreement, and the consolidation of all the self-interested forces in the name of overcoming difficulties—that is the persistent command of our time. And we will follow it unswervingly.

But there is also another old truism, to the effect that one cannot live in a society and be free of society. Therefore, democracy and glasnost cannot be carried out without discipline and responsibility. And, of course, any society, if it wants to live normally and develop progressively, is obliged to fence itself off from all kinds and adventurers and political demagogues who attempt to use the perestroika situation in order to break through to power—whether it be large power in the center or small power in the outlying areas. We do not agree with those who assert that socialism has exhausted its capabilities. We do not reject communist ideals or principles. We are ready to defend them in arguments with any opponents. We shall work decisively to stop the criminal actions aimed at destabilizing the situation, at using disorders and victims to open up for political careerists the path to power, and at driving the nation into the abyss of chaos, social and national hatred, and calamities. This must be prevented in the name of our nation's present and future. And we cannot walk beside those who are deliberately pushing people in this direction.

There has been talk of people's moods at the beginning of the new year. Essentially speaking, this is the chief, determining, and motivating factor according to which we must construct our orientation markers and, each one of us in his place, evaluate our work. Today every manager, large or small, to whom people have given their trust, must necessarily evaluate himself specifically from these positions. Nothing must be above that evaluation.

Like the rest of the country, our republic has experienced and is experiencing many difficulties, adversities, and tribulations. But man, by his nature, has always, even at the most difficult moments, lived by his hope, by his faith in the future. This optimism, this love of life, are to a large extent typical of our industrious and kind-hearted nation. It is necessary to apply all efforts, to carry out any steps, even those which at first glance appear to be impossible, to reinforce by concrete, practical deeds this faith that our workers have. The new year of 1990 must become a major step in this important sector.

Alternative Proposal Drafter Views Armenian Language Legislation Status

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[Interview with Ovanes Zakaryan, section head at the USSR Armenian Academy of Sciences Language Institute, and Alvard Barkhudaryan, scientific associate at this same institute, conducted by KOMSOMOLETS correspondent G. Rubinyan: "In The Beginning There Was the Word"]

[Text] Perhaps there is nothing paradoxical in the fact that, with the growth of national self-awareness throughout our entire country and in our republic in particular, it is specifically the linguistic problem which has come to the forefront from among a number of others. Being one of the most important components in the concept of nationality, language today has become that very point of departure with which the process of spiritual rebirth of any people begins. Rebirth—the need for which is obvious. And it is no accident that the Laws on Language adopted in many Soviet republics have the task of protecting languages in a legal manner, thereby securing for them the status of a state language.

In Armenia, although there is an appropriate article in the Constitution of the Armenian SSR which confirms the state status of the Armenian language, as yet there is no such law. However, several collectives and individual authors are working on its alternative draft proposals. Thus, what will the Armenian Law on Language be like? Our correspondent G. Rubinyan talks with the author of one of the alternative proposals, Ovanes Zakaryan, section head at the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences Language Institute, and with Alvard Barkhudaryan, scientific associate at this same institute.

[Correspondent] Unlike many other languages of the USSR peoples, the Armenian language has already had a state status secured by the constitution. Thus, it should have enjoyed a certain state protection de-jure. Yet de-facto...

[Zakaryan] Yet de-facto the picture was entirely different. The Russian language in fact has many more rights than Armenian. For example, parents of even Armenian nationality may excuse their children from studying the Armenian language in the republic's Russian schools if they wish to do so, while Russian is mandatory for all. A similar situation was observed also in state institutional business correspondence—the overwhelming majority of it was conducted in Russian. It was permitted to translate certain works of world literature into Armenian only after Russian translations were made, and not the other way around, and most often—through them. Need we mention the losses with which this double translation was fraught?

I remember, even in the so-called "pre-perestroika" years I spoke at one international symposium, where I talked about the discrimination to which the Armenian

language is subjected. At that time anyone who spoke about such things risked invoking upon himself a veritable torrent of accusations of nationalism. That is how it turned out: I later had to answer for the fact that I had dared to publicly raise this problem. Today, of course, everything has changed. The changes in society have led to the situation where we have begun to deal with national problems, and specifically with the language question.

Many republics have adopted Laws on Language... In our republic, however, everything for the present day is still merely declarative, and moreover the constitutional article, which has proved its ineffectiveness, is formulated in a contradictory manner.

[Barkhudaryan] In fact, the goal-oriented dehumanization and dehumanitarization of our society have led to the situation where the need for studying languages has disappeared altogether and, most frightening of all—not knowing one's native language has become a commonplace occurrence. One-sixth of the world—our country, which includes over 100 peoples in its make-up, has begun to content itself with only one language.

In every multi-national state, be it an empire or, as in our country, a federation, there are certain relations established between the mother country and the province. The less independence and freedom there is in the province, the lower the level of national self-awareness of its citizens, and the more subject it is to processes of assimilation and unification. And whether we like it or not, these processes also affect us, giving rise to a psychology of subjects, in its essence—a slave psychology. First of all, it is expressed in the lack of desire to know one's own language, history and culture, and in ignoring everything native. As a result of this, national schools and theatres were closed, the national language was taken out of many spheres of application and turned into a household, "menial", language. After all, it is no secret that the main argument in favor of the so-called "Russian" schools is the conviction of the parents that the child will learn his native language in the schoolyard, and that the Armenian language, specifically, is not needed beyond the boundaries of the republic.

[Correspondent] That has turned out to be the price of excess centralization and monopolization of all spheres of life of the Soviet state, including also the language policy. In essence, we have proceeded toward a general monolingualism. In any case, this process was sufficiently evident in most of the Soviet republics. The Law on Languages of USSR Peoples discussed recently in the country's supreme legislative organ is called upon specifically to define the general principles of USSR language policy, as well as the inalienable rights of USSR citizens as bearers of the language. However, we have witnessed the lack of synonymy in evaluations of the future Law, and stormy debates around its draft proposal...

[Zakaryan] The contradictory opinions centered primarily around the point on granting Russian the status of the official, all-state language of the USSR. My opinion on this matter is synonymous: By adopting the Law on Languages of USSR Peoples in this variant, we will inevitably come to the same unidirectional "bilingualism", when Russian, which has been legalized as the second state language, will again be in an advantageous position. And the rights of all languages stipulated by the other points of this same law will be nothing more than a fiction. Since with the co-existence of two state languages on the territory of one national formation—and today almost all the republics, with the exception of only three, have acknowledged the state status of their languages—there will be an inevitable rivalry between them. The winner in this rivalry is predetermined, since Russian will act as the state language, and therefore will have a greater sphere of application and rights, while Armenian, for example, will be used only as the republic language. It is understandable that many will prefer to teach their children in Russian, and the sphere of application of the national languages will be limited. In short, we will come full circle.

We must finally define the positions on which we stand. Do we opt for the principles of federation, or do we continue to stand up for the idea of a unitarian system of building our multi-national state, expressed in a definite linguistic policy? In any case, there is every reason to view this infamous point of the draft proposal for the future all-union Law as a sort of limiting factor to the activity of the republic Laws on Language, levelling and devaluating them. In any case, we are very late now in adopting our own, republic, Law on Language, which would be capable of limiting the sphere of influence of the all-state language in any degree, if such a language is indeed adopted. Moreover, much also depends on us. Specifically, our deputies in the USSR Supreme Soviet have not expressed a principle position on this question as has, for example, the Baltic deputy corps, which refused to participate in the voting.

[Correspondent] Thus, what is our Law on Language to be—with consideration for the rather complex—in its social, political and national aspects—situation which has arisen around the continued development of the fates of linguistic cultures in the country?

[Zakaryan] I can only speak about how I myself see the future Law, which, strictly speaking, I tried to express in my draft proposal. Although I will stipulate from the beginning that my proposal provided for the adoption not of a Law, but an entire codex compiled on the principles and scheme of already existing codexes. That is what it is called: The Language Codex of the Armenian SSR.

So, according to the draft, on the territory of the Armenian SSR there may be only one state language—Armenian, and no other language may be recognized as such.

Moreover, the Armenian language is affirmed in the Codex not only as the property of the state, but the entire nation. Thus, national linguistic values are defined, which are subject to protection and defense. First of all these are, specifically, the bearers of the language themselves—residents of the republic as well as representatives of domestic and foreign speakers. Related to this, of course, is also the written word—books, manuscripts, and linguistic monuments; the spoken word—folklore, phonograph records, tape recordings which preserve the most outstanding works of national culture, dialects, the West Armenian branch, old variants of our language, etc. Their ruination and distortion would already be viewed as a state crime.

The Codex affirms the program of the so-called linguistic nationalization which presupposes, first of all, the principles of mandatory application of Armenian in all spheres of linguistic life of the republic; secondly—the protection of the purity of its structure; thirdly—the linguistic qualification for citizenship. The latter presupposes that every citizen of Armenia, regardless of his nationality, must have a mastery of the Armenian language. It provides for the creation of a mechanism of certification by means of special tests. Whoever does not want to study the language will, naturally, be limited in his civil rights. For example, he will not be able to engage in professional activity where the knowledge of the language plays a significant role and, moreover, he will be forced to pay some kind of annual fine or tariff, as is done in a number of countries.

[Correspondent] Then what should we do about ensuring the real right of each person to choose a language? Specifically, we are speaking about the right to choose the language of communication.

[Zakaryan] First of all, the Codex specifically provides for the implementation of a policy of favored status in regard to the culture of each of the small national groups living on the territory of Armenia—the Assyrians, Greeks, Kurds, Jews, Russians, Ukrainians, Azerbaijanis, etc. The protection of their rights is also the concern of the state, according to which the ethnic groups must have the opportunity to open national schools, publish books, texts, etc. In short, they must have the right to fully satisfy their cultural and spiritual needs. Wherever the standards allow, state national schools will be opened. In other cases, the state must facilitate the development of a network of schools financed at the expense of the associations of fellow countrymen themselves.

Yet the principle of non-Armenian schools for children of non-Armenian nationality remains, and I especially insist upon it. It is understandable that Armenians do not send their children to Kurdish or, say, Assyrian schools, but they do send them to Russian schools. By the way, prior to 1926 Russian schools were called schools for Russians and were opened especially for them. Then the name changed, and the Russian school became a school primarily for Armenian children.

The project which I propose provides for the creation of a unified national Armenian school. In this case, what will happen to the so-called "Russian" schools? A certain number of them will operate strictly for Russian children. The rest (and they will be the majority), according to the draft proposal, will register their next set of first graders already into Armenian classes. Thus, the transition to Armenian as the language of instruction will be gradual and as painless as possible—over a period of, say, 10 years. Moreover, in this case there will be a real possibility of re-training the teacher cadres.

It is true that already today voices are speaking out about the infringement of rights of the individual. They speak of the principle of voluntary choice of the language of instruction. Yet the fact that there are no more national schools left in Belorussia is a result of this same voluntary principle to which we are appealing today. Here the law must operate, and let us not forget that every law is to a certain degree both an obligation and a limitation, but it is called upon to defend primarily the one who is more weak and oppressed. Yet in our country, such a linguistic situation has arisen in which the Russian language has suppressed and edged out the use of other languages, even on the territory where they were widespread, in these same national republics, for example. No, we have not yet gone as far as the Belorussian situation with the schools. Yet if we leave everything as it is, then we will undoubtedly find ourselves in a similar situation. Thus, to speak once again about the rights of the individual when we are actually speaking of defending and protecting the language is to be hypocritical.

Of course, there will always be those who are unhappy and protest. However, I think that the spirit of unification will help to avoid large conflicts on this topic. Moreover, they will bear an exclusively social, and not international, character, as is the case in a number of other republics with varied ethnic make-up. In our republic, however, such complications are, fortunately, excluded...

[Barkhudaryan] By the way, while in czarist Russia the peoples of one region (be it the North Caucasus, the Transcaucasus or Central Asia) understood each other's languages, and without passing any specific accelerated courses, today the representatives of certain peoples do not even try to learn the language of that ethnic group on whose territory they live and for whom the native language is still dearer than the "great and mighty", but non-native, language. Moreover, they hold meetings and strikes which, by the way, are not condemned by the center. The impatience of the "Russian-speaking" population is manifested, strange as it may seem, in the more developed democratic republics of the country (Baltic, Moldavia) and does not make itself known in the others, although all of them have adopted adequate Laws on Language.

As for our situation, here it is we ourselves who are largely at fault. Sometime last year on the pages of

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Maya Ganina wrote that they get hundreds of letters daily in Moscow stating that the national schools are being closed in the republics and that, supposedly, it is the Russians who are to blame for this. Furthermore, M. Ganina writes that, perhaps, the Russian clerks do bear a portion of the fault for this, but that the main responsibility, in her opinion, lies with the local leaders who are striving to please the center. And, I believe, it is difficult not to agree with this. Is it not the local "fathers of the homeland" who have left the Armenian schools without attention? Is it not they who have tried to banish the native language from work usage? And all this—with our silent agreement.

The parents who refuse their native language in communicating with their children—did they stop and think that they are instilling in them the psychology of the provincial? This petty bourgeois psychology, by the way, is inherent to all dependent peoples. However, the path to freedom lies through national self-awareness, without the rebirth of which any Law on Language, even one which has the most well-developed mechanism of protection, will remain a fiction. Thus, it depends primarily on us whether we will remain a province or whether we will actually become a sovereign state with our own state language. For now we are pinning our hopes on the Law on Language, on constitutional changes, we are looking for the guilty parties, finding dust specks in "their eyes", while forgetting about our own. So let us begin by cleaning our own stables, and in Avgiyev's, God willing, we will come together.

[Zakaryan] Yes, but for now this has not taken on the force of law, we cannot obligate anyone to "clean the stables". Those who are thinking about this have always done so—but, so to speak, within the framework of their own initiative. I am convinced that public opinion has yet to be finally formulated in the process of all-people's discussion of the draft of the Law on Language developed on the basis of all the existing alternative draft proposals. For now, I repeat, we are inexcusably falling behind. We need the Law on Language right now, because later will be too late. I might add that, aside from all else, it will also provide for a mechanism of introducing it into effect with consideration for specific times, as well as legal answerability for violating its points, which is very important. Because we have already made our mouths sore with talk of a national school, of organizing courses on studying the Armenian language, of publishing the appropriate literature, and of expanding the sphere of application of the native language. Yet, alas, the results have not been so impressive. We need specific effective measures, and only the Law is able to provide them, to outline a circle of rights and responsibilities in the linguistic sphere.

In closing, I would like to note the interrelation with the Russian language. The adoption of the Law certainly does not mean crossing it out of the sphere of application. Moreover, I consider the very formulation of such a question to be incompetent and unjustified. Every person has the right to study any language. Russian will

be studied in our schools at the highest level. Yet we will not confuse bilingual education with the knowledge of two or more languages. The former is harmful, the latter—wonderful. And the more languages we know, the richer we will become. That is an axiom. Just like the fact that the native language cannot be replaced by any other.

FROM THE EDITORS

We asked K. Khtryan, chief of the republic's Ministry of Justice Legislative Administration, to comment on the conversation presented for your attention regarding the question of what the Law on Language should be.

[Khtryan] Undoubtedly, the adoption of the state Law on Language is today for us an urgent necessity. Yet it must provide clear guarantees for persons who have no mastery of the Armenian language so as not to allow infringement on their rights. I believe it is not necessary to explain how important this is. After all, everyone remembers the serious contradictions in the Baltic and in Moldavia which arose specifically on linguistic grounds. Yet in our republic there are today over 200,000 refugees alone, and 95 percent of them do not speak the language...

[Editors] That is, if the Law is incomplete, we may find ourselves faced with new conflicts—although, it is true, they will sooner bear an intra-ethnic character.

[Khtryan] Yes, and in order to avoid them we must provide in the Law a number of basic tenets: Clear guarantees for the foreign-speaking population, clear definition of all articles—so that different renditions do not emerge, and a gradual, step-by-step introduction of the Law into effect. And—the necessary participation of highly trained specialists in its development—linguists as well as jurists. For now, unfortunately, as far as I know, only linguists are working on the drafts. And this is fraught with dilettantism, since the effectiveness of any law depends on the level of draft law work, and on the one who participates in it. For example, the Estonian Law on Language adopted in January of 1989 provides for practically all instances which may lead to any misunderstandings. Everything is stipulated—down to specifics. For example, according to it, the "status of Estonian as the state language does not infringe on the civil rights of those persons whose native language is some other language. Protecting the Estonian language at the state level, the Estonian SSR recognizes the inalienable right of citizens of any nationality to develop their native language and culture, as well as the equality of all citizens before the law, regardless of their native language". Recognizing Estonian as the language of domestic business dealings in Estonia, their Law nevertheless guarantees the private individual the right to conduct his affairs and to communicate in institutions of state authority and state management, at enterprises and in organizations of the Estonian SSR, also in Russian. I may also cite the following example from this same Estonian Law: In the sphere of consumer services and trade, the serving party is obligated to use the language

selected by the person being served within the limits of requirements concerning the mastery of languages. Moreover, the creation of obstacles in the selection of a language by a private individual, the manifestation of neglect to the language of communication which he selects, is prohibited and punishable in the cases determined by legislation, etc. At the same time, the specific time periods for introduction of the Law into effect are strictly stipulated, and a list of the specialties and duties is given for which requirements are established on the mastery of languages. We might add that the Estonian Law (in my opinion, almost irreproachable) has taken on its current form in the process of rather fervent discussions, which as a result have smoothed out numerous controversial points and sharp angles. We will not repeat someone else's mistakes. For example, does the state have the moral right to force a parent to send his child to a school with a certain language of instruction? Of course not. It is another matter that it must create such conditions in order to elevate the level of the national school to the required height, to ensure priority of development of the native language, culture, etc.

Yes, Armenian children must go to an Armenian school. Yes, it is amoral, living in Armenia and occupying certain official positions, not to know the Armenian language. Yet this does not mean that tomorrow we must close all the Russian schools and levy fines against the foreign-speaking population. We must consider the real prerequisites for the implementation of linguistic policy: The creation of a broad mass network of courses, a translation base, and the step-by-step development of the national school. And for this we need time—and rather lengthy time at that. Only with consideration of these requirements will the Law work. Only will then will it prove to be effective and useful to society.

Armenian Foreign Affairs Minister Views Iranian, Turkish Reaction to Caucasus Violence

90US0578A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian
8 Feb 90 p 4

[Armenpress report of interview with A. Mkrtchyan, Armenian SSR minister of foreign affairs: "Foreign Responses to the Events in the Transcaucasus"; time, place not given]

[Text] In view of the events in the Transcaucasus, an ARMENPRESS correspondent addressed A. Mkrtchyan, Armenian SSR minister of foreign affairs.

[Correspondent] The latest events in the Transcaucasus have become the subject of broad discussion in the mass information media, by the public in foreign countries, and in certain cases, among individual official representatives of foreign states. How could the general tendency of the foreign press publications and the utterances of foreign state figures be characterized?

[Mkrtchyan] Indeed, the events of the last 2 years in the Transcaucasus, information and reports about them continually occupy the pages of the international press,

including the most influential and authoritative publications. During the period of the exacerbation of the situation in the region, such as, for example, during the recent pogroms of Armenians in Baku, the imposition of a state of emergency in Azerbaijan, NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], and the Gorisskiy Rayon of the Armenian SSR, reports on these events occupied the front pages of leading foreign newspapers, and the television of many countries showed various taped stories with commentary. I would like to note that the reports on the events in the Transcaucasus, especially from Armenia and Artsakh, have, on the whole, a restrained, and I would say, objective nature. This concerns both the demands of the Nagorno-Karabakh population for self-determination, and the periodic blockades of NKAO and Armenia on the part of Azerbaijan, and the pogroms in Sumgait, Baku, and other cities of the neighboring republic. The havoc and violation of the Soviet-Iranian border in a sector of Azerbaijan, and the armed skirmishes in the border regions of the two neighboring republics were widely highlighted in the foreign mass information media.

It should be said that the events in the regions are being constantly and widely highlighted by the foreign Armenian press as well. Solidarity is expressed in numerous publications; the hope is expressed that the issue of NKAO must be resolved not by means of confrontation, but by means of a search for solutions satisfying the right of Nagorno-Karabakh's population to self-determination.

As far as the reaction of foreign official circles is concerned, it should be said that since the very beginning of the events, an attitude toward the essence of what is happening in the Transcaucasus has been expressed on various occasions in one form or another about the problems of Nagorno-Karabakh in the legislative organs of certain countries, by certain international organizations, as well by figures known in certain political circles. The republic press has already reported on the documents adopted by the United States Congress on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. Statements in connection with the latest events that have occurred in Baku were recently made by the European Parliament, and a number of political figures, including President George Bush, and the legislators of various countries. In many statements, the violence against the Armenian population of Baku is condemned, and weighed appeals are being made for the adoption of the measures necessary for a just regulation of this protracted conflict.

[Correspondent] How can the reaction to the events occurring in the Transcaucasus be characterized on the part of the border countries—Iran and Turkey—with which the Soviet border in many sectors has been destroyed at the urging of the Azerbaijani People's Front?

[Mkrtyan] Characteristic for both Iran and Turkey is the fact that the sharp reaction in those countries to the events in the Transcaucasus began after the introduction

into Baku of Soviet Army subdivisions. In the early days of destruction and outrages on the Azerbaijani sector of the Soviet-Iranian border, certain Iranian press organs, in the statements of individual religious figures, expressed support for the actions of the fanatics, qualifying them as the progress of "Muslim revolutionaries," the "rebirth of Soviet Muslims." It should be said that this topic and other similar versions are to this day exaggerated in a number of press organs and by individual figures.

As far as official Tehran is concerned, there is observed here a definite critical position toward the extremist actions of the Azerbaijani People's Front, a vision of the danger of their adventuristic separatist aspirations on the quite extensive border with Iran. A reflection of such an approach is the statement published in the newspaper RESALAT, which in particular states that the "international nature of Islam does not assume the effacement of state borders. When we say that Islam knows no borders, it does not mean that it is permitted to enter an alien home."

Immediately after the declaration of a state of emergency and the introduction of troops in Baku, rallies and demonstrations of an anti-Soviet nature took place in a number of cities in Turkey, continuing until now. Here are some of the slogans typical of those rallies and demonstrations: "Onward, gray wolves, to Baku!"; "Turkestan is being born"; "The Victory will be for Islam" and others. During the demonstrations, accusations are hurled at the Armenians, whose fault it is, supposedly, that such tension has emerged in Baku, and that clashes between the Soviet Army and the Azerbaijani People's Front have occurred. The Soviet Army and Government are accused of massive repressions. Participating in this anti-Soviet campaign are both certain members of the Turkish Parliament, including former Turkish Prime Minister [S. Demirel], and representatives of various organizations, the party of Turkish fascists of [A. Tyurkesh], and others.

The speech of Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mesut Yilmaz, in parliament on 23 January of this year calls attention to itself. The head of Turkey's foreign policy department hurled groundless accusations at the Armenian SSR, and evaluated the declaration of the state of emergency as the result of political "pressure, provocation, and force." In light of this and certain other groundless assertions contained in the parliament speech of the Turkish foreign minister, I would like to note that they are in contradiction to the actual state of affairs in the region, as well as the previous statements of the Turkish side concerning the strictly internal nature of the conflict in the Transcaucasus.

Aftermath of December Dzhalilabad Unrest Reported

90US0537A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
12 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Z. Dzhapparov, BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY special correspondent, Dzhalilabad: "Confrontation, Which May Lead to an Impasse in the Resolution of Problems"]

[Text] Several years ago the name of this rayon, which was well-known throughout the country, appeared in the press almost all the time. Sketches and stories about the vine-growers and the animal-breeders were published, and leading specialists wrote articles about the successes of the Dzhailabadskiy Rayon workers. But not too long ago the calm which used to reign here was replaced by open dissatisfaction. People began to talk more and more about violations of social justice; they began to demand improvement in the situation with regard to commerce and the law-enforcement organs; they were upset by the old work methods of the party, soviet and economic organs. Perestroyka was being felt more in words than in deeds, they thought. In the last year alone two first secretaries of the party raykom were replaced here.

All during December 1989 there was social tension in Dzhailabad, meetings and rallies were being held. After the former first secretary of the party raykom, A.B. Godzhamanov, left his position at the demand of the public, meetings continued to be held daily at Lenin Square in the rayon center, and passions became heated. The 22 December plenum of the party raykom, at which Kh.S. Aliyev was chosen first secretary, exacerbated the situation in the rayon even more. The movement of Sovtransavto vehicles was halted by the rally participants. A crime-producing situation developed. But there was worse to come. On the morning of 29 December, as the Azerbaijan SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MIA] reported, a marauding crowd, after moving women and adolescents to the front, raided the premises of the Rayon Department of Internal Affairs [RDIA] and the party raykom. The bulletin contains reports of residents who suffered and of bodily injuries received by police (militia) workers. People in both categories were hospitalized.

The next morning I left immediately for Dzhailabad. From the bus window I could see vine-growers busy working in the vineyards of the First of May Sovkhoz. The rural landscape gave way to the production buildings of the wine-making plant and the administrative buildings of the agro-industrial complex. And then there was the gateway to the rayon, marked by a tea house in the form of an enormous pear. Above the tea house is a pompous symbol, which personifies, in the opinion of the former first secretary of the party raykom from the era of stagnation, I.M. Kurbanov, the prosperity and good customs of his fellow citizens.

The bus stopped not far from the bus station at a stop where Sovtransavto vehicles had been only recently. Now there is not a single vehicle. Only ashes from the night-time bonfires recalled the blockade of the state-owned company's vehicles.

The owner of a private car (a little Zhiguli), who gave me a lift into the rayon center, said: "Just look at it!" It was a terrible sight. To the left of the road a twisted bus rested on flat tires, and not far from the party raykom

building the remains of three Ikarus buses were smoldering. Off to the side a bit lay three overturned cars; four burned-out PAZ buses had been turned into a heap of scrap metal. The party raykom building was unrecognizable; the windows were knocked out, and the window frames and doors were broken. Scraps of paper were all over. Flower beds were trampled, and a cafeteria and summer house were destroyed. The windows at the Children's Convalescent Center were also knocked out. This sad picture was only the epilog to the dramatic events which happened here on the morning of 29 December 1989.

On Saturdays the party raykom building has the usual work-day atmosphere but today there are no party workers. In their place are the curious who have come to look at the damaged building. And in the square another rally is being held. Once again overheated speakers, who make no effort to hold emotion in check, are recounting yesterday's events.

M. Bakhrayev, leader of the rayon division of the People's Front, presented information about the December events. The orator began with a story about the crudeness of E.S. Agayev, former first secretary of the party raykom, and he analyzed the work of another secretary, A.B. Godzhamanov, who did not consider it possible to replace a number of economic managers in the rayon or to bring order to commerce. He talked about past rallies at which demands had been made for the rayon party leader to be elected on an alternative basis. He also expressed disagreement with the decisions of the 22 December party raykom plenum, which chose Kh.S. Aliyev as first secretary of the party raykom.

For the position of raykom first secretary the informal organizations proposed an alternative candidate, Nagi Nagiyev, candidate of economic sciences and head of a chemical association.

From what was said it was obvious that the positions of the higher party organs, of the People's Front and of those communists who are part of the latter, did not coincide on the issue of the candidate for the first secretary of the party raykom. Opposition emerged. But even this conflict situation can be resolved peacefully without resorting to violence. Eyewitnesses themselves talked about the reasons for the dramatic events of late December in Dzhailabad.

In the early morning of 29 December, at 4 am in the square, the tents of those meeting there were taken down when, as the republic's MIA reported, alcoholic beverages, stabbing and cutting implements were discovered. At the same time arrests of those disturbing the peace began, along with arrests of People's Front representatives and meeting participants. The arrested included Telman Askerov.

"Early in the morning," he said, "12 policemen (militiamen) burst into my apartment, and in the presence of my children and without presenting any warrant for my

arrest, they took me away to the RDMI, where they beat me up in an attempt to get a confession from me."

"In the morning I was on my way to work as usual," said B. Sadykhov, a worker. "Policemen stopped me and asked me why I was wearing a beard. Without waiting for an answer, they struck me on the arm with a club, put me in a car and took me to the police station."

At the rally the speaker condemned the actions of the police squads and the order to use weapons.

On the morning of 31 December, accompanied by arriving employees of the Azerbaijan SSR MIA, I inspected the building of the Dzhalilabad RDIA, which had suffered during the disorders. An emotional crowd had burst in, beat up the guard, penetrated the building, knocked out the monitoring equipment and only then moved on the party raykom.

"At a certain moment," says Ya. Gasanov, deputy head of the political section of RDIA, "the situation became unmanageable. Out of 32 offices, half were wrecked; investigation materials were stolen, and typewriters were put out of commission. Ten staff members received injuries, and they are now patients in the Masally and Pushkino hospitals."

An MIA representative reported that on 31 December the injured policemen numbered 68, including many police students. Three policemen were in serious condition.

During the cold morning of the last day of the old year people began to gather on RDIA property; they entered into dialog with the MIA representatives who had come here. They asked questions, and they clarified certain facts. They included students from a vocational technical school, middle-aged people, teachers and physicians. In the same place MIA specialists were compiling statements and descriptions of the vehicles which had been damaged.

From here I went to the central rayon hospital, where the head doctor, S. Aliyev, provided some information on the condition of the patients.

"As of today, 38 people have come to us. There are no women. They took four injured people to Baku, including one with a serious bullet wound in the area of the stomach."

On the last day of the old year I met with many people.

"All this could have been avoided," RIK [rayon ispolkom] worker I. Gasanov told me, "if it hadn't been for the hurried night-time arrests." During that morning they arrested A. Dzhananov, S. Magerramov, and twice they went to M. Bakhramov's apartment but they did not manage to find him. And then rumors began to fly around the entire city that once again it was 1937, the year of mass repressions. Panic started. The relatives and friends of the people arrested began to come out of their apartments and into the street, and others joined them.

Thus a crowd began to grow near the buildings of the neighborhood beyond the arch. Its path was blocked by students from the police school, who began to squeeze people toward the nearby buildings. Shots fired into the air were heard, but they did not bring the crowd to its senses either. In another part of the city, beyond the communications center, the chain of police detachments was broken, and people attacked the RDIA. The most terrible thing took place later, near the party raykom building. Stones were thrown at the police, and bottles containing an incendiary mixture from which fire burst out were thrown at buses. The police did not withstand the onslaught and retreated.

In the editorial office of the ENI GYUN newspaper, despite the fact that it was Saturday, I met with the deputy editor, A. Agayev, and another staff member, who had actually watched events unfolding from the windows of the editorial office.

"Something has been written about this in the newspaper?" I asked.

"So far there has been nothing. But there definitely will be material about it. The newspaper must not keep silent."

On Sunday the staff of the party raykom came in. I knew many by sight or by name. Their faces were marked with grief, sadness and the stress of what they had experienced. The crowd did not spare even the first secretary, Kh. Aliyev. Someone's evil hand had struck the 58-year old party leader on the head. Some other raykom staff members also suffered, and party documents disappeared from safes.

Members of the party raykom buro and apparatus employees went to the rayispolkom building. They discussed the serious problem of how to proceed with work and how to restore trust in the party raykom.

At 12 o'clock on 30 December 1989 a deputy group immediately withdrew from the work of the republic's Supreme Soviet session and met with Dzhalilabad residents in the municipal House of Culture.

Before publishing these notes I once again visited Dzhalilabad. Residential buildings, administrative buildings, streets and squares, gardens and other public areas were covered with snow. Workers were putting in new glass at the party raykom building. At the raykom I met with Nagi Nagiyev, whom the 8 January 1990 session of the rayon soviet of people's deputies had entrusted with fulfillment—on a temporary basis—of the duties of RIK chairman. In conversation with me he lodged a protest against the non-objective coverage by the republic's presss and television of the December 1989 events in Dzhalilabad. And what is the situation in the rayon today?

"With regard to the emergency situation at the end of last year," says N. Nagiyev, "the rayon department of the

People's Front has created a temporary organizing committee of the people's movement. The people's patrols and other voluntary detachments are maintaining public order in the city. Stores are in operation, as are public eating places, hospitals and transportation. At the sovkhozes and kolkhozes, agronomists and economists are working in place of the leaders who have left the farms temporarily.

Today the square once again has people in it. A rally is taking place. What are the people upset about?

This meeting gathered to condemn the criminal actions of the poet Abbasagi Guseynov, leader of what in Dzhalilabad is called the Mankurt-Front. This morning about 100 people gathered on the square, declaring their society to be "Geyrat." Representatives of the People's Front also came to listen to them. As a result of arguments, a skirmish took place between them. Again, shots were heard over the square. But this time it all ended without casualties.

Among other news which I had not expected was the resignation of staff members from the rayon newspaper YENI GYUN. I arrived at the editorial office, and there on the door was a large lock. During a meeting with me the deputy editor, A. Agayev, told me the following:

"On the morning of 3 January two unfamiliar people from the People's Front walked in. In the form of an ultimatum they demanded that I and other members of the editorial staff hand over our powers. But we did not give in and continued to work on publishing the second issue of the newspaper for this year. The next day 10 people came to the editorial office and with threats they forced me and five editorial colleagues—F. Aliyev and S. Mustafayev from the agro-industrial department; proof-reader D. Agayev; photojournalist A. Geydarov and senior secretary F. Sultanov—to write out statements of resignation. The provisional editor, B. Guseynov, is a librarian and a member of the People's Front of Azerbaijan."

I became interested in the future fate of the newspaper. In the RIK they told me that from now on YENI GYUN would come out once a week.

Today life in Dzhalilabad is getting back to normal; the apparatus of the party raykom is functioning, and ties are being maintained with the primary party organizations. The new head of the RDIA, M. Bagirov, who comes from Dzhalilabad, has taken up his duties. He will have to make personnel changes and help carry out an investigation of the tragic events of last year. In short, the communists and workers of the rayon have many problems to resolve in the new year.

The alarming days and nights of the December disturbances have passed. But even now the shots fired into the air above the square, the stones thrown at the police squads, the fire, the flames and the sound of broken glass at the party raykom building are still fresh in many people's memories. Who is guilty? Who will be punished

for what was done? This question must be answered by the investigative organs, which are already conducting an investigation in Dzhalilabad, Masally and Pushkino.

This material was prepared by the author on the basis of meetings and conversations with eyewitnesses to the events. It is possible that some aspects of what happened have not been portrayed. Further, it is too early to make any judgements. And they are hardly within the author's powers to make. Only one thing can be said with certainty: what happened in Dzhalilabad was very far from democracy. No problems can be solved by confrontation and violation of the law. For they lead only to an impasse.

Azerbaijanis, Armenians in Georgia Respond to Baku Events

90US0512A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
24 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with S. Suleymanov, V. Bayburt: "Let Wisdom Prevail;" date and place not given]

[Text] Our next-door neighbors are experiencing a tragedy. Shots ring out, blood flows, and thousands of people are forced to flee their homes. Henceforth they have the terrible—but familiar to our ears—status, of refugees. The severity of the inter-ethnic conflict has reached the "crisis" stage.

Where is the way out of the situation which has taken shape! How can the devilish machine be stopped, which crushes the people's lives under its wheels, leaving behind bitterness, death, orphans and enmity! What role is the mass information media to play in this extreme situation? This was the subject of our conversation with the editors of the republic newspapers SOVET GYURDZHUSTANY and KHORURDAIN VRASTAN.

Suleyman Suleymanov, editor of the newspaper SOVET GYURDZHUSTANY:

"In Marneulskiy Rayon there is a mountain village called Khodzhorin. Representatives of 17 nationalities live in it. But the majority of the populace consists of Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Some of them have inter-married—they have common blood, children in common, and common joys and sorrows. I don't even want to think about the possibility that a blank wall of enmity might be raised between them. This cannot be; this must not be permitted! The bitterness that has flowed throughout the two republics need not come here as well.

"In recent days, in the regions of Georgia where Azerbaijanis have settled densely, many sorrowful meetings have taken place in memory of the fallen. I was present at one of them, in Gardabani. Nearly 10,000 people were assembled. And here, just imagine, with such a crowd of people, there was not even a hint of an incident, and not a single word was spoken that might have aggravated the situation, that might have brought about conflict.

Accordingly, one can control an extraordinary situation, and organize measures in such a way that there would not be any undesirable consequences. That is beyond a doubt to the credit of the local party and soviet leaders, and to the representatives of the Popular Front of Georgia.

"At that same meeting an appeal was made to the population, calling for wisdom, restraint and calm. One of the points in the appeal was, that we are in solidarity with the statement of Armenians living in Tbilisi, that by their actions and deeds they would not cause new problems on the lands which at one time had belonged to both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. It has recently experienced a tragedy, and it must be protected from further suffering.

"One thing is clear—there can be no victors in inter-ethnic strife. Bitterness will follow on the heels of everyone who is taken up in its orbit. I am confident, however, that one can find a way out, even from a critical situation. But first of all one must curb one's emotions, and calm one's passions. We are constantly appealing for this in the pages of our newspaper. One need not dish up hasty analyses of the events taking place; one need not rush into print with thoughtless words. You see, right now I am speaking with you and I have myself under control at all times; I would not say anything that might offend one side or the other. Ethnic relationships are like glass. If you accidentally strike it at a critical spot, it will shatter into fragments. Even the most solid glass.

"Our two editions of the newspaper—the Armenian and the Azerbaijani—share the same floor. When misfortune occurs, I catch anxious glances—will it not have an effect on our relations? No, it has not and will not affect us. Our collectives are united by that which was the pride of our forebears and that which our contemporaries must not lose—friendship and mutual respect."

Van Bayburt, editor of the newspaper KHOWURDAIN VRASTAN: "No one could have imagined that such a thing could happen under socialism. Under any other system, but not under socialism.

"And nevertheless it did take place. Neighbor fell upon neighbor. And blood flowed. To kill people because of their national origin? Is that really possible in a civilized society? Would such savagery be allowed in the Dark Ages?

"I don't remember exactly who said it; perhaps it was Goethe: that a judge who is incapable of punishing becomes an accomplice to the crime. Those who stubbornly fed the flames of hatred between the people are the guilty parties, and they must be found out and punished. Of course, this should have been done when the very first spark appeared. And it must be done all the more so now, that the spark has burst into flames. The events must be carefully analyzed and the roots of the crime must be laid bare. Otherwise there will be no peace between the Azerbaijani and Armenian people.

"Friends and acquaintances often ask me—will this tragedy not spill over into Georgia, where numerous representatives of both peoples dwell? One can understand their uneasiness—misfortune is right next to us; and if the door opens by mistake?

"In the 16 January issue of our newspaper, when the tragedy had just begun to pick up speed, an appeal was published over the signature of the Armenian Cultural-Philanthropic Society of Georgia and other regional organizations, calling for vigilance; not to submit to provocations, and to keep the peace. Public figures in Yerevan made the very same appeal, including members of the board of the Samvel Gevorkyan Armenian National Movement. 'Armenians,' it appealed to its fellow-countrymen living in Georgia, 'Do not put your Georgian brothers on the spot; do not permit the republic to be drawn into the disaster that has touched us.'

"We are obliged to do everything possible, everything that is within our power, to surround the blazing fire with a solid ring of stone, and not allow it to spread. And we must extinguish the fire completely. I am confident that a man, if he is truly a man, will remain one in any situation; even in an extreme situation.

Belorussian Activists Counter 'Classic' Approach to History

90UN0906A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 10 Jan 90 pp 3, 4

[Article by Prof. A. Zalesskiy, Doctor of Historical Sciences: "False Milestones, Or How BNF Activists See Belorussian History"]

[Text] Activists of the so-called Belorussian People's Front (BNF) show their attitude to the history of Belorussia not only in the program and statute of their un sanctioned organization but also in numerous articles and interviews in the press, at meetings and at rallies.

In the area of ideology and on such issues as education, science, culture, ethics and morality, the founders of the BNF in their draft program reject the class approach and such concepts as progressive and reactionary.

As to the BNF program, it calls for an end of "politicizing" of school training and education, calls the teaching of social sciences at institutions of higher learning "too dry" and demands "independence" for scholars (from whom?) and freedom for history from an alleged "ideological slant". All this taken together alienates the historical science from the goal of building a socialist society in our country.

Most typical in this respect is the article by M.A. Tkachev, deputy chairman of BNF parliament, titled "Writers, Historians and 'Inspectors'", since it is written by a doctor of historical sciences and covers a number of events from earliest history to the present.

I would like to discuss two important points. The first is the role of the Polotsk principality during the age of Kiev Russia and emergence of the Belorussian nation. M.A. Tkachev particularly attacks a concept that has been generally accepted by the Soviet historical science, which postulates that in the 9th-12th centuries all local Eastern Slavic principalities were part of the Ancient Kiev Russian State inhabited by the single Ancient Russian ethnic group.

The BNF program claims that Belorussian statehood dates back from the Polotsk and Turov principalities. This claim is in turn borrowed from V.M. Ignatovskiy, who considered the Polotsk period the first period of Belorussian history. It is not surprising therefore that BNF activists support this version, even though it does not correspond to historical reality since in the 9th-12th centuries there were no separate ethnic groups, be it Belorussian, Russian, Great Russian or Ukrainian. But, most important, it is done not to extend the period of Belorussian statehood and raise the prestige of Belorussia, but mainly to prove that Belorussians have nothing to do with Russians even in their origin.

The second, perhaps even more important point on which M.A. Tkachev disagrees with the Soviet historical science is his analysis of the process of reunification of Belorussia and Russia. While categorically denying that that event was progressive, M.A. Tkachev depicts the Russian state in a very negative light, "proving" that the Belorussian people did not wish to be reunited with Russia. As proof he claims that as part of the Polish Lithuanian kingdom Belorussians were not subject to national, religious or social oppression. That capitalist and landed gentry-dominated state was allegedly a harmless, equal federation. To make his point, Tkachev says nothing about the fact that a six year-long national liberation war was waged against the kingdom in 1648-1654, headed by the Ukrainian leader Bogdan Khmelnitskiy, in which Belorussians, too, took part. In 1654, the Ukraine voluntarily joined the Russian state. Belorussia failed to do so at the time.

Attempts to idealize the socio-political system of the grand duchy of Lithuania and even of the Polish Lithuanian kingdom are plain in the BNF statute, which calls the permanent leadership body of the people's front a soym, or a seim. What was it in that medieval organ of nobility's freedoms that attracted the BNFs? It is a known fact that those freedoms, which effectively decentralized the state, played a negative part in the demise of the kingdom itself. The appeal of various parliaments for BNF leaders will be more comprehensible if we recall that their statute contains a paragraph stating that the BNF is not subordinate to any other organization or agency. This is how people's front leaders want to transplant feudal traditions of nobility's freedoms onto present-day reality.

M.A. Tkachev further argues that there was no reason or legal justification for Belorussia to become part of Russia since "the Russian people, itself unfree, could not bring liberty to the Belorussian people." But the Russian people

was not made up exclusively of Benkendorf, Pobedonostsev, Purishkevich, Rasputin, Muravyev the Hangman and the murderer Kurilov. The Russian people did not consist only of peasants and the working class. The Russian people produced Radishchev, the Decembrists, Belinskiy, Herzen, Chernyshevskiy, Dobrolyubov, revolutionary populists and such Bolshevik leaders as V.I. Lenin. During that period Russia experienced several stages of revolutionary struggle. The Russian people was a potent progressive and revolutionary force: it not only freed itself but also rallied other peoples for their common liberation.

As to Belorussia, while in the Russian Empire it was not at least subjected to polonization or denationalization. The Russian-Belorussian bilingualism (the language of Russian administrators and of the local Belorussian population) was quite accessible to both administrators and local inhabitants thanks to the proximity of the two languages. This was an important reason why local intelligentsia and administrators drawn from the ranks of Belorussian population swelled massively and why the people were able to reach the general level of culture prevailing at the time. In Belorussia, writers such as Dunin-Martsinkevich, Frantishek Bogushevich, Yanka Kupala and Yakub Kolas, scholars such as ethnographer Ye.R. Romanov and the pillar of linguistics Academician Ye.F. Karskiy, began to emerge. The national liberation movement appeared in Belorussia. All this took place with the support of the progressive and revolutionary forces of the Russian people. The Bolshevik party included such sons of the Belorussian people as A.G. Chervyakov and D.F. Zhilunovich (Tishka Garnyy).

All this largely ensured broad participation by the Belorussian people in the three revolutions and in the struggle for its social and national liberation and the emergence of Belorussian soviet socialist statehood.

The BNF program lumps together events of different periods and different social and political significance. For instance, part one of the program, which treats revolutionary traditions, lumps together the three Russian revolutions without making a distinction between the bourgeois-democratic revolutions and the Great October Socialist Revolution. It also praises the puppet of foreign invaders, the bourgeois Belorussian People's Republic, which was declared in March 1918 on the occupied territory.

Elsewhere, the program discusses the Belorussian renaissance of 1905-1930 without making any distinction between attempts to develop Belorussian culture in the absence of national statehood under capitalism and the spectacular burst of growth of socialist, truly popular culture in the sovereign Soviet Belorussia after the October Revolution.

BNF activists—historians, artists and journalists—categorically deny the existence of Belorussian nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s. And yet, in science and culture, there were many former activists of nationalist counter-revolution who during the Civil War had waged

an armed struggle against the Soviet state. Some of them had been amnestied in 1923 and, while not committing any new crimes, continued to disseminate their nationalist views. Many were unjustly repressed in the 1930s and were cleared by the 20th CPSU Congress. However, nationalist anti-Russian works published by them are preserved in libraries and archives, causing serious harm to our society. Those works should not be subject to any amnesty or rehabilitation.

Historical facts show that, along with the rapid development of socialist culture in the late 1920s, an entire system of antisocialist and anti-Russian lies was developed. Their core direction was provided by the racial and anthropological "theories" of Smolich and Lastovskiy, their inventions claiming that Russians are a mix of Finns and Mongols (A. Smolich), or that Russians are Mongols who adopted the Slavic language (V. Lastovskiy).

Those pseudoscientific lies attracted some linguists, geographers, ethnographers and historians. They all tried to contrast Belorussians with Russians, and "prove" that Belorussians are allegedly superior to Russians in their history and culture. Oblivious to this fact, BNF activists warmly praise V. Lastovskiy, A. Smolich, Ya. Lesik and other nationalist figures both in the press and by other means as exceptionally diligent scholars contributing to Belorussian culture. Some articles even repeat their incorrect views, presenting them as achievements of Belorussian scholarship in the 1920s.

A special place in spreading Belorussian nationalism in the 1920s belongs to historian V.M. Ignatovskiy, who at the time held high positions. His four books devoted to Belorussian history from ancient times to the second decade of this century are literally filled with nationalist, anti-Russian and anti-Marxist distortions. I have already mentioned some of them. Not being able to cover this issue in sufficient detail here, I must refer interested readers to my article and to the article by R.R. Kryuchka, candidate of historical sciences, published in the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences newspaper ZA PEREDOVYU NAUKU, August 26 and October 21, 1988, respectively, which point out the main distortions of Belorussian history by V.M. Ignatovskiy. I will add only one fact.

V.M. Ignatovskiy caused great harm to Soviet Belorussia when he promoted to all key positions both in the Institute of Belorussian Culture and in the Belorussian Academy of Sciences major ideologists of Belorussian nationalism who had been amnestied in 1923 for their participation in the armed struggle against Soviet power during the Civil War. The low point was reached in late 1928, when the Academy of Sciences was being formed and V.M. Ignatovskiy, its first president, appointed as its permanent secretary (now chief scientific secretary) V.Yu. Lastovskiy, who had served as prime minister of the Belorussian People's Republic "government" for three years and had returned from emigration in 1927. At the same time, first vice-president of the academy became S.M. Nekrashevich,

one of the organizers of counterrevolutionary Belorussian nationalist forces in the south of the Ukraine, which was then occupied by foreign interventionists and the Whites. These decisions by V.M. Ignatovskiy insulted the Belorussian patriotic intelligentsia, which by that time already had enough educated people to fill all managerial posts in the academy.

The part of the BNF program devoted to the language expresses a negative attitude to the Belorussian SSR Soviet of People's Commissars resolution dated August 26, 1933, "On Changing and Simplifying Belorussian Orthography". But it seems that the authors of the program, while presenting themselves as "defenders" of the Belorussian language, did not even read the text of the resolution. They not only got the date of the resolution wrong, but distorted its title, informing the readers of the program that the resolution was called "On Reforming Belorussian Orthography". But this is not the main point. The main point is that that resolution can not be viewed in a uniformly negative light, as it is done in the BNF program.

BNF supporters have even laid their hands on so sacred an issue for the Belorussian people as the struggle against the German fascist invaders. They began to look for "good deeds" in the actions of the Belorussian national fascists who were assisting Hitlerite occupiers in pillaging and exterminating the population. And one author of a samizdat publication even began to praise the Hitlerite occupiers for their alleged good attitude to Belorussian culture.

No less strange is the desire of some people associated with the BNF to "enrich and multiply" the achievements of Belorussian culture by independently "rehabilitating" some collaborators of the Great Patriotic War period. One must really follow the BNF into rejecting the class analysis of historical events in order to see poets Natalya Arsenyeva and Larisa Geniyush not just as abettors of Hitlerite fascism but quite charming servants of the muse who fell victim of tragic circumstances.

What is the attitude of BNF activists to the part of modern history which reaches our own days? One can see in various parts of the BNF program that statements and indirect references to socialism they contain have nothing to do with the existing socialism and its practical implementation in the Soviet Union. One leader of the People's Front sees socialism only in the fact that "all men are equal before God" and that "all men are brothers".

The BNF program does not recognize the leading role of the CPSU in our society. Yet, the Congress of the People's Deputies not only affirmed the article on the leading role of the CPSU but called it the ruling party, the political vanguard of society and its consolidating force, as well as the guarantor of perestroika. The congress also noted that only the CPSU can direct the movement to attain the dreams of the people.

This is how the demand of the BNF program to restore "the integrity of scholarship in Belorussian history" is being carried out. These are the main points in the

history of Belorussia on which the views of BNF activists diverges radically from the precepts of the Marxist-Leninist historical science. There are too many of such points. In essence, they falsely mark the entire historical path of the Belorussian people.

Editorial Note: As we publish the polemical article by A. Zalesskiy, we would like to remind our readers once more that the editors do not necessarily share the views of the authors of various articles. Everyone has the right to his own opinion, as assumed by the principles of

pluralism. We invite readers to take part in the debate on the subject this article raises.

Estonian Migration Figures, Government Limit Compared

18150127A *Tallinn RAHVA HAAL* in Estonian
8 Dec 89 p 4

[Unattributed table of figures: "Mobility of Population Into and Out of the Republic"]

[Text]

Year	Arrivals	Departures	Net Growth	Government Limit
1960	29,957	29,437	520	—
1961	26,177	20,825	5,352	—
1962	28,251	22,610	5,641	—
1963	28,318	21,164	7,154	—
1964	29,604	22,628	6,976	—
1965	29,303	23,199	6,104	—
1966	30,039	26,016	4,023	—
1967	29,951	26,112	3,839	—
1968	37,349	29,425	4,924	—
1969	42,126	30,858	11,268	—
1970	41,364	30,094	11,270	—
1971	39,674	29,857	9,817	—
1972	35,304	28,350	6,954	—
1973	36,018	29,073	6,945	—
1974	35,229	31,480	3,749	—
1975	34,270	30,967	3,303	—
1976	33,308	28,510	4,798	1,489
1977	34,521	26,387	8,134	5,299
1978	32,196	26,883	5,313	1,630
1979	31,091	26,193	4,898	4,228
1980	31,517	24,880	6,637	1,812
1981	20,034	13,348	6,686	4,526
1982	19,183	13,341	5,842	2,490
1983	17,546	12,923	4,623	3,013
1984	16,814	12,064	4,750	2,740
1985	17,098	11,681	5,417	2,838
1986	19,162	14,405	4,757	1,420
1987	19,499	14,363	5,136	780
1988	11,995	10,798	1,197	—
1989	10,720	10,235	485	—
10 months	847,618	678,106	169,512	32,265

From the editorial staff: The reader may ask, what is included in the concept of "government limit." We have obtained an explanation from the Planning Committee:

government limit refers to workers who came to Estonia at the behest of some enterprise with the permission of the Council of Ministers.

Estonian Independence Debated

90UN0608A Tallinn *KOMMUNIST ESTONII*
in Russian No 11, Nov 89 pp 72-78

[Article by A. Lang: "Fragments of a Difficult Dialog"]

[Text] This dialog, the more substantive excerpts from which our magazine is presenting for its readers' consideration, actually did take place.

As the complex and contradictory processes of perestroika have accumulated, political pluralism has been rooting itself in Estonian society. Political views and aspirations at times are sharply polarized. There is no unanimity of views even among politically like-minded people, including in the Communist Party of Estonia, to say nothing of the profound divergences in the outlooks of, say, Communists and members of the Party of National Independence, followers of Intermovement, and the People's Front of Estonia. Diverse platforms and programs of citizens associations pursuing diverse goals have appeared.

All this finds reflection in people's statements, in arguments where disagreement, by force of the as yet low political culture, spills over yet again, unfortunately, into personal enmity and even into hostile actions. But when the participants' level of education and culture is higher, it is opinions, fortunately, and not people that clash.

I admit, I was more than a little amazed when a close acquaintance of mine with whom I have discussed all sorts of global and local problems many times calmly and confidentially announced to me at one of our recent meetings: "I read your article in No 5 of *Kommunist Estonii* and it infuriated me so much that I couldn't close my eyes all night. It turns out you're one of those Communists who toys with the idea of concluding a union agreement while at the same time making every effort to prolong and legislate the occupation of Estonia that has already gone on for half a century!"

That was how this difficult, but carefully correct argument between a Communist and a member of the PNNE [Estonian National Independence Party] began. Naturally, each one of us knew beforehand who belonged to which party. I'm not at liberty to publish the name of my opponent, but I feel the general nature of our dialogue makes it possible for me to present the public with our more substantive theses and arguments. We shall designate the opponents "Communist" and "Independent."

[Communist] You've made a serious accusation. But let us try to reason calmly. Occupation is a terrible word, and under no circumstances do I wish to vindicate or legislate it, as if I were some kind of quisling. On the basis of the article you have no right to accuse me of that. In it I merely discussed the prospects for untangling the taut knot of problems connected with the events of 1940 in Estonia, and of untangling them in such a way as to

guarantee the Estonian people the right to self-determination, to secure our state sovereignty, of untangling it in a real, proper way acceptable to everyone who finds himself inside that knot: the Estonian people, the central authorities representing the republic of the USSR, as well as the other nationalities who have settled in Estonia over the years for various reasons and who, as we know, number more than half a million.

As I recall, in that article I wrote more or less the following: first of all, the highest state level of the USSR must declare the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact invalid and condemn the annexationist policy pursued on the basis of that pact in 1939 and 1940 with respect to the Estonian Republic and its forcible annexation to the Soviet Union. Then I deemed an inevitability the Soviet Union's recognition of the state sovereignty of the Estonian SSR, after which it would be possible to provide for the continuation of its many years' collaboration with the other republics on the basis of a union accord. In addition I wrote that in the state-legal respect, the issue of the Estonian SSR's inclusion in the USSR could be resolved only by means of a referendum. So that I don't see how I could be accused of trying to vindicate and legislate the occupation.

[Independent] As for the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, this you have set out quite precisely. But in the name of truth I have to point out that the first to express it was not your party but the PNNE's predecessor, the MRP-AEG [Estonian Group for the Publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact], which you held a rather dim view of at that time. But why is it that now, when the Estonian Communist Party has also put the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in proper perspective, Communists, including you, do not want to restore justice by resurrecting the sovereign Estonia destroyed in 1940 but instead harp on some dubious "sovereignty" within the context of the USSR? In its program my party proclaims honestly and candidly: our goal is a free, independent Estonian democratic republic.

[Communist] In my discussions of the present-day and anticipated future status of Estonia, I tried to take as my point of departure not only past experience, current realities, and the interests of those factions influencing development but also what real power each faction actually wields.

In evaluating the crucial events of 1939-1940, which determined the fate of Estonia, we agree on one thing: the decisive role in them was played by the military and political aggression of the Stalinist leadership of the Soviet Union with respect to the Estonian people, at the base of which lay the criminal Molotov-Ribbentrop deal. I'm deeply convinced that until this fact is given its proper due by the revitalizing political leadership of the Soviet Union, until we are given an honest account of that fact's fateful role, and until it is condemned, no kind of satisfactory political solution of that abnormal situation in which Estonia found itself in 1940 is possible. Estonian Communists are also going to have to recognize

the hard word "occupation," although it might be more correct to speak of annexation and incorporation. Just as honestly we must recognize all the crimes against humanity committed with respect to our people, as we are the economic and social development impasse into which Estonia wandered during the years of the Stalinist totalitarian regime and the subsequent stagnation. The current KPE [Communist Party of Estonia] leadership has done just that.

On the other hand, so it seems to me, in politics it is extremely important to avoid a one-sided view of the events of past years. Although the Estonian SSR was born and joined the USSR not on the basis of a free expression of the people's will, it nevertheless has existed for nearly half a century now. It is another matter what objective evaluation we can give to the results of this nearly half-century of development. Here unquestionably there are both pluses and minuses. It is incorrect, in my opinion, to accentuate only the latter, as has become fashionable in recent times. After all, the people have created much that is worthwhile.

Indisputable is the fact that today in Estonia there is a new economy functioning on different principles, a new political system and state power functioning within it which since recently has been considered to reflect the will of the people. In the Estonian Republic there were quite a few men of labor who aspired to a more just, socialist social order. I submit that even now, despite all the disappointments experienced, the greater portion of the population of Estonia recognizes the possibility of continuing down the path of socialist development based on an economic mechanism with a multiplicity of forms of property and on the power of the people founded on democracy and parliamentarism.

The restoration of the Estonian Republic in the form in which it ceased its historic existence is, in my opinion, unrealistic. A solution needs to be sought based on present-day reality. As part of the latter I consider the following circumstance important: our economy is so intimately linked with the economic life of the Soviet Union as a whole that it can function only if those links are preserved.

[Independent] I don't like how you Communists are always frightening the people with the idea that a sovereign Estonia would be utterly incapable of existing economically outside the framework of the Soviet Union. Nonsense! The Estonian Republic did it, moreover under it people lived better than they do now with their "intimate links with the other fraternal republics." How, for example, can such small states as Iceland, Switzerland, and Finland administer themselves economically, and moreover, while guaranteeing their people a much higher standard of living than we have? A sovereign Estonia could carry on trade with the Soviet Union with the same success and on the same scale as today, with the sole difference that the conditions for it would not be dictated from Moscow but would be approved by the government of Estonia as well. What do you say to that?

[Communist] I say that economic cooperation must indeed be built on the principles of equality between partners and mutual profit. Our current connections with the various economic regions and entities of the USSR took shape under conditions of a super-centralized administrative-command system and do not correspond to objective economic laws. With the implementation of republic self-financing on the basis of a sovereign Estonia they will have to be restructured from the standpoint of efficiency and fairness, which will more than likely take some time. But the preservation of these economic ties has vital significance both for us and for all our current partners.

In Moscow, evidently, there is serious alarm that if the Baltic republics actually secede from the USSR with the consequent if only partial break in the standing production, supply, and trade links, then that could have a sufficiently painful effect on the economy of the country, which even so finds itself in a difficult crisis. In conditions of such profound specialization and cooperation as exist today in the USSR, the dropping out of even one link in the economic chain could provoke the most serious chain reaction. A prolonged strike in just one city—Stepanakert—has already served as an extremely harsh lesson.

In Estonia a series of defense industry enterprises operate whose production, obviously, will not be of the slightest interest for a sovereign Estonia, but from the point of view of the Soviet Union's functioning defense system these enterprises are essential. Their further activity on what would then be the territory of a "foreign state" would be unthinkable. We in Estonia must constantly bear in mind that for the time being we have almost nothing to trade on the Western market, and insofar as that is true our opportunities of buying anything there for hard currency are highly limited. You aren't going to get very far on foreign loans either. Consequently, in the current situation Estonia's economy simply must have the extensive market of the Soviet Union, where we can be sure of placing our as yet not very high-quality goods and where for those rubles we can still obtain the necessary raw materials and goods. I am not very knowledgeable about economics, of course, but judging within the limits of my knowledge, I have come to the conclusion that from an economic standpoint—given properly established relations, naturally— inclusion in the Soviet Union has to be to our advantage.

[Independent] You're entitled to your opinion, but I still think that a sovereign Estonia is perfectly capable of arranging its economic ties sensibly.

Why, according to your plans, must a Soviet army of occupation remain in Estonia? Where in the conditions for inclusion in the Soviet Union is the guarantee that one fine day force will not be applied against us again, as has already happened? The presence of a foreign military force renders that danger utterly real.

[Communist] I think that it is incorrect and unfair to call the military subdivisions stationed here an army of occupation. Can you really call the Russian, Latvian, Georgian, whatever other nationality, or an officer of the

united army of the union government completing his military service on the territory of the republic an occupier? Can you call the worker of another nationality who has come here for various reasons an occupier? For people of the new generation, not connected in any way with the events of 1940, statements like that are incomprehensible and insulting. They serve to harm mutual understanding among peoples. It is another matter how we view the military aspect of that question. Of course, a sovereign Estonia would also have to have its army. But the army of an independent Estonia was unable to defend us against the Stalinist occupation in 1940, and it would be equally unable to do so in our day. Another extremely important reality is the fact that in the modern world, where there remains great mistrust in the relations between states of different sociopolitical systems and military blocs, any violation of the military balance is unacceptable for both sides.

The Estonian SSR is a component part of the USSR's unitary defense system. In my opinion, right now any reshaping of that system would be unacceptable to the General Staff of the Soviet Union. After all, one or several republics seceding from the Soviet Union would entail a precipitous withdrawal from their territory of military units responsible for concrete strategic tasks. Should Estonia achieve full independence, that would prove a very serious point. Your party demands the withdrawal of the "army of occupation"; mine feels that this issue can find a mutually acceptable resolution on the basis of Estonia's status as a sovereign union republic. The future union accord will necessarily have to take into consideration the present defense interests of the Soviet Union as a whole. Any other policy, in my view, does not stand on firm ground.

As for your question about guarantees, I must note that we didn't have those guarantees in 1940 during the existence of the sovereign Estonian Republic, and we don't, unfortunately, have them now, nor will we in the future until the Soviet Union, as a result of perestroika, becomes a democratic, parliamentary-style, stable, law-governed state.

[Independent] Born in 1918, the sovereign Estonian Republic was able not only to create its own army but also to resist the huge Red Army, which attempted to snuff out its independence. I believe that now, too, the independent Estonia we create will be able to organize the defense of its borders. But you keep harping on the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and its economic and military alliance with its great neighbor to the east. So that we remain in opposing camps.

Now, explain to me why in your article you comment disparagingly about the citizen committees created at the initiative of the PNNE and about the other movements that have joined us? We are trying to create the organs essential for realizing the sacred right of the Estonian people to self-determination, whereas you Communists treat us the way the Intermovement people do!

[Communist] I did not make any disparaging remarks about those committees, although I do hold an entirely different opinion than your party does about their role in the restoration of the historical truth about the events of 1940. You do not recognize the political system and current organs of power now in place in Estonia. In your program you proclaim: the congress of Estonia, which will be convened as a result of the movement for committees of citizens of the former Estonian Republic, will adopt a resolution to elect a national assembly, which, in its turn, will adopt the constitution of the Estonian Republic and other preeminent legislative acts stemming from the constitution of bourgeois Estonia. According to your plan, the congress and national assembly, as the solely empowered representative organs of the people, will independently decide the issue of Estonia's future. In this you leave no place for our present organs of power.

I am convinced that we have no right to decide Estonia's future on the basis of the 1938 constitution without taking into account everyone who today influences the forces of the functioning power structures, as well as the central authority of the USSR, without a realistic and sensible coordination of their interests.

To clarify my position, I refer to several fundamental points. At the basis of everything must be the will of the people, and naturally, the right of the Estonian people to self-determination belongs only to the Estonians. However, in deciding how to clarify the will of the people, which, we are convinced, is far from unanimous, the positions of the members of the KPE and the PNNE diverge sharply. Without question we need an effective political mechanism and an effective organ of power. Only then does it seem possible to reach maximal unanimity by democratic, parliamentary means and then to legislate the inevitable pluralism of hopes and aspirations. I do not see the 1938 constitution of Estonia and citizens committees in the role of such a mechanism but rather our current political system with its real, functioning organs of state power and administration and political forces.

You want to make the congress of Estonia, created as a result of the movement for citizens committees, into the sole organ of state power empowered to decide the issue of Estonia's future. Meanwhile, only people of specific political views and aspirations belong to this movement. I think that the highest organ of power, expressing and implementing the will of the people, can only be a state parliament created on the basis of a democratic election law. As yet we do not have such a law. It can come to pass only in the present-day—and in your opinion illegal—Supreme Soviet. Yes, it must be confessed, its current members were not elected democratically. Nevertheless, this "illegal" organ of power was able to realize the will of the people when on 16 November of this past year it passed a document of great political significance—the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Estonian SSR, which

in the unusual and critical situation that had come about then was considered crucial by all political forces of Estonia.

The new organ of power in Estonia, freely and democratically elected, would have to have absolute power to put the will of the people into effect. It would have to elaborate on a solid legal basis a new constitution in accordance with the will of the people and fixing the fundamental principles of our state order and economic system. With respect to the question of inclusion or noninclusion in the USSR, then in accordance with generally recognized state-legal norms, that issue can be decided only by referendum. Bringing about the latter also requires a legal basis, the creation of which our Supreme Soviet has already addressed. Preparations for the referendum must guarantee conditions for the absolutely free and objective expression of the various positions and their responsible elaboration, and that is possible only under a stable state authority.

Formation of a congress and national assembly of Estonia by only a portion of the citizenry, as proposed in the PNNE program, is, I am convinced, an anti-democratic enterprise. Just such an antidemocratic path was taken up by Intermovement, which threatens its own "election law," the creation of so-called alternative organs of power—soviet of workers' deputies elected only from production collectives. That is why I share the opinion of the KPE leadership according to which both political extremes—both the PNNE and Intermovement, insofar as both aspire to power without taking other political forces into account—are dangerous for the future of Estonia.

In debating with you, as a member of PNNE and a good friend, in the hope that our relations will never become hostile, I permit myself to speak more sharply than in the article that served as the impetus for our conversation: if your party, by creating citizens' committees, were to collect the desired 500,000 signatures (which I personally do not believe it could), convene a congress of Estonia, and proclaim it the highest organ of state power solely empowered to decide the future of Estonia, then if I were current president of the republic Arnold Ryuytel I would disperse that congress, declaring all its decisions null and void for having been carried out without considering the will of the whole people. From the position of the future Estonian people, these decisions would even have been dangerous, since they would not have been accepted either by the central authority of the Soviet Union or by the international community. In so doing I tell you frankly I would do this not as a member of the party now in power—to its advantage and to the detriment of its political opponent—but inspired by an inalienable principle: no one party, no one movement, must acquire the opportunity to usurp power. I would act in exactly the same way toward Intermovement's "alternative organs of power." The grave consequences of individual parties seizing power are well known in history. The optimal way of bringing the will of the people to life and implementing popular rule are parliamentary

representative organs chosen by the people in direct elections. A representative organ comprising supporters of one single party is not suitable for this.

On the other hand, as a member of the party that has hitherto considered only a single-party system proper, I sincerely express my personal point of view: as far as I'm concerned, the PNNE, Intermovement, and other political forces could act perfectly legally as recognized political parties. I submit that at least in Estonia the people have matured sufficiently politically to be able to make a conscious decision as to which party's program and actions to support.

The KPE has presented the people with its program of action for delivering Estonia from today's state of crisis. The PNNE has its own program, as do Intermovement, the Popular Front, the "Greens," the Agrarian Union. Which program should be believed, supported, and followed—that is for the people to decide.

Ossetians Protest Worsening Situation

90US0513A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
25 Jan 90 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Meeting in the Editors' Office"]

[Text] By the end of the working day yesterday a large group of people from the South Ossetian village of Kheiti came to our newspaper office. They left their families, houses, some of them left behind little babies and old parents, and they all darted away to the city to stage a protest in the reception room of ZARYA VOSTOKA. The newspaper employees, naturally, could not view them with indifference. For that reason they conducted a spontaneous press-conference.

"It is no accident that we came to the office of the republican newspaper ZARYA VOSTOKA," said one of the participants in the action. "It is especially important that your newspaper reflect truthfully all that is happening in South Ossetia, because it is in your pages that information is provided both for the non-Georgian population of the republic and for people outside the republic. And here is the point of the matter: Many people consider the situation in South Ossetia stabilized, however, this is not quite correct. True, they are not shooting any more. There is no, or almost no picketing as there was in the first days of the ethnic crisis. But all this does not mean that our life has become normal. It has come to the point where we stand guard by our children's beds throughout the night. At any moment we are ready to grab them and run. But where can we run? And such conditions are unbearable for everyone—Georgians, Ossets, Russians, Armenians, Jews—for all nationalities."

"Me too," says a woman from the village of Kheiti, joining the conversation. "I study in Tskhinvali and I cannot go outside without an escort later than 5 p.m.

There are some patrols in some places but we do not rely on their help all that much. But the press is keeping silent including your paper too."

We reacted to this with surprise: ZARYA VOSTOKA did cover the events in South Ossetia and published letters from there written both by the local residents and our journalists. The response to our reaction was:

"You cannot convince us of it," said the Kheiti residents. "Or, rather, we are not in a position to decide since we have not gotten any newspapers for months. They just stopped delivering them. And newspapers are the least of our worries! The old people who live in Zemo-Achabeti have not seen their retirement pensions for over a month now."

The most surprising fact is that some Ossets claim that they want to join North Ossetia where the local residents do not even speak their language. Then we will see how they will be able to preserve their culture. Nobody but Georgians would show such concern for another nationality and for the preservation of its language and culture.

Later the residents of Kheiti were joined by representatives of various informal groups. They put forward the following demands: to close the Rokskiy tunnel, to reconsider the status of South Ossetia and to achieve a fully stabilized situation on its territory. The action in the newspaper offices is going on.

Sobchak Interviewed on Findings of Tbilisi Events Commission

*90US0425A Moscow OGONEK in Russian
No 2 6-13 Jan 90 pp 30-33*

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Anatoliy Sobchak by OGONEK correspondent Vladimir Glotov: "When Troops Come out onto the Square"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, one of the most difficult situations—by which I am not alone to be troubled—is when it becomes possible to use the armed forces against one's own people. What political problem arises in this respect?

[Sobchak] In my opinion, it is the problem of creating a political system and appropriate state, legal and legislative structures. This may appear a purely theoretical issue, but in reality, as seen in the example of the Tbilisi events, it vitally concerns everyone of us.

The relationship between the people and the authorities—what can be more important? When society is in crisis, this problem assumes a special significance and is most often embodied in the crisis of power, with the authorities losing the trust of the people.

[Correspondent] Can we say that we are now experiencing a crisis of power?

[Sobchak] Yes. Moreover, it is occurring not only on a general level, when the masses of the population no

longer trust the main institutions of power, but on an everyday level as well, when people no longer feel protected by the authorities. Strictly speaking, why do we need a state? Primarily, to protect us, our person and property, against unlawful depredations of other individuals. Is there not a crisis on this level now? Disorders erupt in one region of the country after another. Violence against individuals and theft of property all too frequently go unpunished.

[Correspondent] One would think that the state wields such enormous power. It is a mighty machine of suppression capable of dealing with anything and anybody challenging it. What is this power directed against?

[Sobchak] In a crisis situation, some of those in power turn their efforts to protecting themselves. But changes in our country are irreversible. No matter how hard the authorities try to shield themselves by violence, their efforts will be fruitless. Processes of political, economic and spiritual renewal in our society are long overdue and demand resolution. In this issue, tarrying equals death.

[Correspondent] Let us return to the Tbilisi events in this light.

[Sobchak] In the history of our state, there have already been examples—plenty of them—of violence directed not against individuals but against entire classes and social groups. Millions were killed, even though it was often done under the guise of legality.

[Correspondent] With the accompaniment of ideological fanfare and drums.

[Sobchak] Of course. The mighty machine of oppression was in action. Still, indignation occasionally exploded and had to be suppressed with the help of the military.

[Correspondent] What do you mean?

[Sobchak] Think of disturbances among Astrakhan workers in the early years of our state. Or events in Novocherkassk in 1962. The Tbilisi events belong to the same category.

[Correspondent] Do you place Tbilisi events in the same category? Does it mean that you see the main cause of those events in something other than an ethnic conflict?

[Sobchak] The Tbilisi tragedy generally had no ethnic roots. Of course, there were plenty of slogans at the rallies that could be interpreted as statements of ethnic intolerance and hate. But we have established with absolute certainty that in those days there was not a single incident in the republic of an ethnically motivated crime, case of violence or assault. Georgia has always had quiet interethnic relations. For centuries, hundreds of thousands Armenians, Abkhazians and other ethnic groups have lived there side by side and conflicts erupting practically next door seemed to pass Georgia by. Due to their national character and central location on the Caucasus, Georgians have always had a high level of ethnic tolerance.

[Correspondent] What was then the cause?

[Sobchak] Normal processes of democratization, the desire to be independent and the wish to restore the true sovereignty of the republic. Naturally, these processes had special features in Georgia. First of all, it was the general distrust for the authorities, both party and state. We have talked with representatives of many different social groups and none had a single good word for the leadership. All described those in power as dishonest men who had no right to be where they were, were incapable of governing the republic, did not represent the interests of their people and were mere conduits of "Moscow policies" without any independence. This attitude had surfaced before, during events of November 1988, when constitutional amendments were being debated and when, according to witnesses, the situation was even more tense: the events involved even greater numbers of people and society was in turmoil, with hundreds of thousands coming out into the street. Only intervention by Gorbachev, who made a special appeal to the Georgian people, the arrival of Shevardnadze, the active role of the Georgian intelligentsia and a number of other political measures saved the day.

There is another aspect of the situation which is special for Georgia. It is the amazing inability of the Georgian leadership to understand their own people. Growing resistance only made the leaders of the republic want to suppress the popular movement by force.

[Correspondent] Excuse me, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, do you not think that the inability of the Georgian leadership to understand their people and to express its interests was not typical of the Georgian leadership alone. Power that is above the people is, in my opinion, above the people in its essence. Probably the Baltic alone shows now a trend toward unity.

[Sobchak] In the Baltic, the leadership also faced the choice and understood that if it continued to blindly resist its people it would be rejected by the people.

[Correspondent] Then, whom did the Georgian government represent?

[Sobchak] The administrative command system. Staffed based on a nomenklatura principle and comprised of far-from-best representatives of their people, they lived well at the expense of the people. All accused them of being corrupt, of having corrupt relatives and of engaging in indecent behavior. Naturally, this made the situation more tense.

"...such actions as voluntary self-isolation on the part of the republic leadership, inadequate, sometimes panic-driven, assessment of the situation and inability to positively impact the situation by political means were among the causes leading in the end to the tragic events of April 9, 1989, in Tbilisi."

(Quoted from the findings of the USSR People's Deputies Soviet Commissions for Investigating Events of April 9, 1989, in Tbilisi.)

When we looked at all stages of the conflict, we were amazed to see that the only entity making any decisions and taking any actions was the Georgian CP Buro. It was as though there were no party organizations or communists. As the conflict developed, they found themselves outside it.

[Correspondent] Do you want to say that party members joined the people?

[Sobchak] No, this was not so. Apparently, a large number of communists sympathized with the people, but none spoke out at the rally or tried to change the situation. Patiashvili's attempt to go on television was, in the general opinion, a failure. Neither the leadership nor ordinary party members found words that went from the heart, ones people would believe. This happened because of fear and lack of skill.

[Correspondent] Did it not show that the authorities were bankrupt?

[Sobchak] It did, as did other things. It may be hard to believe but it is true: while the rally was being dispersed, the entire leadership of the republic was at its workplace and watched from the windows of the House of Government its own people being massacred. They did not do anything and did not interfere. It was in their power to stop the troops once they saw what was going on. When Patiashvili learned about the victims, he said: "We are finished!"

He is an emotionally honest man; at least, he acknowledged the facts, and to me he is closer as a human being than some others; he seems to be more decent. But even he did not make any attempt to stop or change the course of events.

[Correspondent] What went on there? Why did the top leader of the republic, a man who was, as you say, emotionally honest, behave himself as though his hands were tied, watching from the window as his own people were being literally slaughtered and sighing, yet being restrained by something? What was it that kept his hands tied?

[Sobchak] This is a serious problem. Perhaps the most serious one and the cause of that crisis of power we have been talking about.

[Correspondent] Maybe a person's personal qualities and conscience can not resist the faceless force?

[Sobchak] No, there is something else. I would call it lack of inner independence. We have raised a generation of people (and not only among party and economic managers), who lack inner independence and have lost moral standards and taboos: how far they could go to obey orders and to satisfy the exigencies of their career.

[Correspondent] What is it, general military-like behavior?

[Sobchak] Or else, a generation of people without moral taboos. In critical situations, such individuals are unable to make moral decisions and go bankrupt, or become spiritually ruined. This happens because they have a habit to obey. The entire system was geared to keep subordinates from making independent decisions. Initiative was a punishable offense.

[Correspondent] Even initiative to save the people. And what about the behavior of General Rodionov?

[Sobchak] He was in command of the operation and bears personal responsibility for what went on. The tragedy of that man is that he, a good military officer, understood that troops should not be used in this situation and could foresee the consequences. Let me add that he did resist, but lacked inner independence to say no.

As recently as on April 6 and 7, when the republic leadership insisted on imposing a curfew, he said no, because he believed that it was not a business for soldiers and should be resolved peacefully.

[Correspondent] Why are you so certain?

[Sobchak] We met and talked many times.

[Correspondent] Just the two of you, alone?

[Sobchak] Both alone and with other people present. I understood his conduct well. The general could have maintained a strictly formal stance. He had orders from the minister of defense to use troops only to protect sites and not to use them for any other purpose. The orders did not call for using troops to disperse rallies.

[Correspondent] So, did Rodionov show initiative?

[Sobchak] No. He resisted until the Georgian CP Buro, and later the republic party active, decided to disperse the rally. Only then did Rodionov assume command and carry out that operation. At that point, he as a man did not have enough inner independence to say: "No, comrades, this is not a business for soldiers and I will not order a policing operation. I am a soldier, and this is not the purpose of the army. I have my orders from the minister of defense. You have Internal Ministry troops and the police and you yourselves can do what you think is proper. I will do only what I was told to do."

But he did not do it. He did not have enough independence even to stick to his orders.

Because it was the decision of the Georgian CP Buro, of which he is a member, and there had been a decision by the central authorities, which he knew.

"The decision to send units of Internal Ministry, Soviet Army and special police troops to Georgia was made on the directive of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense (Comrade Moiseyev, M.A.) and on orders of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Comrade Shilov,

I.F.), after a meeting at the CPSU Central Committee on April 7, 1989, chaired by Comrade Ligachev, Ye.K. Since it involved not just troop movements but in fact actions introducing elements of the state of emergency in Tbilisi, including controls over movement in and out of the city and protection of important public and political buildings and other sites, we must admit that the above-mentioned decisions were taken in gross violation of the law."

(From the findings of the commission)

[Correspondent] Was it double bookkeeping yet again? One hands ordered to provide protection for buildings while the other, quietly, to go all out?

[Sobchak] I can not say that the other hand gave a quiet order, because in Moscow, at the Central Committee meeting, the decision was made to send troops to quell possible disorders and to use them at the discretion of the local authorities. That was exactly the formula that was worked out: when using troops, one must act according to situation, at one's discretion. When the Georgian CP Buro, having drawn its conclusions on what was going on, decided to use force and to disperse the rally, General Rodionov, instead of refusing to order this operation, assumed command of it.

[Correspondent] Excuse me, I do not understand. Was it that several individuals in Moscow—several Politburo members, Central Committee secretaries, the deputy minister of internal affairs, the head of the KGB and the minister of defense—effectively decided to transfer the command of the troops to the Georgian leaders?

[Sobchak] Effectively, yes.

[Correspondent] To transfer it from the union level to the republic?

[Sobchak] That transfer, of course, was not totally without control. Kochetov, first deputy minister of defense; representatives of the CPSU Central Committee and several officials including Lobko, Selivanov and Buyanov were sent to Georgia. The latter were heads of sectors and departments of the CPSU Central Committee, highly positioned and powerful party officials.

[Correspondent] So, some measure of central control remained?

[Sobchak] Yes, and there was a constant flow of information to the center. But the right to make decisions was indeed transferred to the republic. Yet, there is a glitch here: the CPSU Central Committee does not have this right, either.

[Correspondent] What do you mean?

"...the decision to dispatch Internal Ministry, special police and Soviet Army units to Georgia was made with the consent of the above-mentioned meetings of the CPSU Central Committee on April 7 and 8. This was contrary to

existing legislation according to which the right to make such decisions rests not with the party but with appropriate government organs."

(From the findings of the commission)

[Sobchak] Yes, it is true. The group that gathered in Moscow had no right to make such a decision. No party organ has the right to do so, not the Politburo and not even the party congress. They could only make a political decision that must be reflected in decisions of state organs. The meeting chaired by Ligachev, which made the fateful decision to aid the republic with troops, did not even represent the Politburo but only a group of people (even though they were high officials) gathering in the absence of the president of the country, who was then in England, and without the head of state, even though Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov was then in Moscow. Do you see what happened? This is the most dangerous situation of all.

[Correspondent] I think that this fact alone put Rodionov in a false position. He did not have to carry out the decision of a group of people who had no right to make that decision, is it not so?

[Sobchak] He did not, if he stood firmly on the position of the law.

[Correspondent] What was his motivation then?

[Sobchak] You must understand that his position was rather difficult. Do not forget that next to him was the first deputy minister of defense who was watching his every move. It was Army General Kochetov, a man of great authority, as you realize. He could step in at any moment if Rodionov made a wrong move. He could inform Moscow or send troops from other regions of the country, something Rodionov could not do as his authority was limited by the boundaries of the Trans-Caucasus military district where he was the commanding officer. The situation in the district was difficult and most of his troops were—and still are—in Azerbaijan and Armenia, where the situation is even more explosive. Rodionov had no reserves. That was why troops had to be called from all parts of the country, including OMONs, police special purpose units (from Voronezh and Perm), and Gorkiy Superior Police School students.

[Correspondent] Were they put under Rodionov's command?

[Sobchak] Yes, since he assumed overall command. But even having become the head of the operation, Rodionov still had many opportunities to prevent the tragic denouement. If only he did not conduct it as a military operation. If only he understood that the operation was being conducted against his own people. I said this at the Congress.

Imagine the troops entering the square. Why at night? What for? Anything can happen in night darkness. It

would have been better in daytime, when one at least could see clearly. The outcome could have been different.

[Correspondent] Why at night, then?

[Sobchak] Because at night fewer people stayed in the square and, from the military point of view, it was thought to be easier to clear it, arresting some and sending others to the hospital, as a friend of ours likes to say.

When they reached the square they realized that there were 10,000 people in it, not just 200; in other words, the situation was totally different. It would seem that the plan of action should have been changed, or at least the operation should have been delayed. You understand, do you not, that there is a difference between just 200 people and 10,000? But the square was cleared in record time, in 21 minutes.

[Correspondent] What?

[Sobchak] Yes, in 21 minutes. Moreover, if you remember, it was a tiny space crowded with a huge number of people. And yet, it was cleared in 21 minutes. Had only military commanders thought of giving the soldiers more time. What was their hurry? Were they in enemy territory?

[Correspondent] It was a military operation.

[Sobchak] This is the point. They should have stopped and called on citizens to disperse. They should have waited as long as it took until the crowd dispersed. Of course, there were extremists, too, among the 10,000 present, but I can assure you there were few of them. Some would have stayed, but thousands would have gone home. People have an instinct for self-preservation and sense the danger: the troops had already come out and stood right there, and their shields, clubs and all other outward attributes of force and power bespoke of what was in the offing. Armored personnel carriers had passed. Everything was clear.

[Correspondent] Does this mean that the speed and the forced tempo were Rodionov's decision? Or rather, a military tradition?

[Sobchak] Yes, the military decisiveness. No coddling. Use the iron fist. When the operation was already under way, Rodionov sent in paratroopers, even though he did not have the right to do so according to the order of the minister of defense. He sent them into the thick of the conflict. Some men had been surrounded. "Why? What for?" we asked. The military people explained: "The front line of the Internal Ministry troops was broken through."

[Correspondent] What terminology!

[Sobchak] Yes, war is war. Demonstrators broke through on the right side to escape the trap. Generals Yefimov

and Rodionov explained that the fear that the demonstrators "would get behind the lines" forced them to send the paratroopers into the breech. What did they mean, behind the lines? Was it a battle with an enemy army? A rally was being dispersed on the streets of a Soviet city and people wanted to get out of the crowd: the soldiers should have stood aside. They should have let them leave the square, i.e., do what was being asked of them to do. Instead, the paratroopers were sent in to close the breech, even though they had no shields, no clubs, no helmets and no bulletproof vests, and their weapons had been taken away from them. (Had they had weapons, there would have been hundreds of victims.) Faced with dogged resistance—when people were herded into a very small space and had no place to go since they were surrounded—the paratroopers took up their trench tools and used them both to defend themselves and as assault weapons. Moreover, we should keep in mind that those were no ordinary paratroopers but ones who had come out of Afghanistan only a month before.

[Correspondent] They were people who were not used to standing on ceremony.

[Sobchak] Yes, those guys were not used to being treated roughly. The resistance of the Georgians was truly dogged. It was a free-for-all. There could have been many more victims. When people saw what was going on, they took to their heels. As a result, there were 19 dead and hundreds wounded. More than 2,000 immediately reported various types of injuries, and that number includes both soldiers and police.

We studied piles of documents and spoke with witnesses drawn from all sides: with ordinary participants of the events, clergymen, ambulance drivers, policemen, servicemen of all units who were in the square and firefighters. We have a pretty clear picture. But the film by the KGB made the strongest impression.

[Correspondent] How was it made?

[Sobchak] KGB employees were filming it for their own purposes, such as to identify troublemakers and extremists. It was filmed during the day and at night from the top floor of the House of Artists, which was directly opposite, on the other side of the square.

[Correspondent] Did they know that those events were about to occur?

[Sobchak] Of course not, they were just doing their job. We talked with their film crews.

[Correspondent] Was that film helpful to you?

[Sobchak] Yes, we saw how it all happened. The Congress decided that the film should be shown on Central Television and I hope that the decision will be implemented. Deputies voted, moreover, that the film be shown before my report. It was not, but I will insist on it being shown.

[Correspondent] The film leaves no doubts about what happened in Tbilisi. What is one to make of the position of the military procurator's office?

[Sobchak] I will talk about our dispute with the military procurator later, but let me stress here that I have no doubt that the rally was peaceful, though antigovernment in character. Indeed, there were many antigovernment slogans and much was being said about the need to replace the Georgian government which did not have the trust of the people. A new government was even being formed and some people were mentioned as new ministers. Everything suggested that it was nothing if not a peaceful rally: the passive forms of protest such as hunger strikes (in which hundreds of people took part) and the rally itself, consisting of prayer, seven minutes of silence, lighted candles and, just before the troops moved in, feverish joy, music, dances and singing of folk songs.

[Correspondent] Why were there 10,000 people in the square instead of 200 or 300?

[Sobchak] That day, April 8, the military, with the blessing of the Georgian CP Central Committee (we could not establish who in particular), had tried intimidation. Three columns of infantry carriers passed by and assault helicopters flew low over the city. The city was given to understand that the troops were on alert and that they would act. The hope was that it would calm the people down. But the reaction was the opposite. One must have no knowledge of one's own people to expect to frighten Georgians by such means. Now everybody knew that force would be used. Everybody knew about it since the decision was made on April 8 at the meeting of party employees, in the presence of hundreds of people. The news spread instantly that there would be attempts to disperse the rally. The troops gathered 400 meters from the rally site, on the Lenin Square. People went there, looked and came back saying: "The troops are ready." That was why there were 10,000 people there.

We asked many people why there were so many women, teenagers and old people. Because people came to the square to protect the hunger strikers and the young people, having decided that the more there were of them the less likelihood there was that force would be used.

Practically the entire Georgian intelligentsia was in the square: actors, writers, artists, famous academics and party employees, too.

[Correspondent] Is it true that, as some claim, many died in a stampede?

[Sobchak] The victims, with the exception of two people, had no bruises. Nor were there internal injuries or broken bones. Recall that there were hundreds of hunger strikers on the steps, and none was killed. For this, we must thank the police who protected them from the start. Why was it that on the steps, in a crowd, nobody was killed? Because people died at the site of the battle, where the troops went into actions.

The claim that the cause of death was a stampede (that people were trampled to death) or, as the military procurator asserted, because Georgian men allegedly hid behind women, is totally wrong.

"The personal responsibility for the abuses and mistakes which led to the tragic consequences lies with generals Kochetov, K.A.; Rodionov, I.N., and Yefimov, Yu.T."

(From the findings of the commission)

These past months I have been in shock from what I heard and saw. It is now one of the main goals of my activity to do everything possible to create legal mechanisms and state structures which would completely eliminate something like this from our life.

[Correspondent] In this regard, what did you think of the appearance at the Congress of another speaker, i.e., the military procurator?

[Sobchak] From the very start of the congress, strange things began to happen. Articles appeared casting doubt on the conclusions of the commission which had not yet been made public. In his notorious article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on December 15, Vasilyev, deputy chief military prosecutor, claimed that I had released the findings of the commission on Leningrad television. This was not so and everyone who saw that broadcast knows that I said the opposite, that I could not talk about the results of the investigation. I only stated that I thought the Tbilisi events were a crime against humanity. But to make such a statement there was no need to appoint a parliamentary commission: it was clear from the start. I also showed some of the documentary footage and explained what was going on. See for yourselves, I suggested. A good thing about the documentary footage was that it had a timer which excluded the possibility of editorial sleight of hand. The date, the hour, the minute and the second are all on the screen. The film clarifies everything beyond the shadow of doubt.

[Correspondent] What were other strange things occurring at the Congress?

[Sobchak] There were handouts every day describing the events in Tbilisi as though there were some people who were trying to besmirch the army and to drive a wedge between it and the people. The handouts questioned the reliability of the "Sobchak Commission".

The trick is as old as the world itself. Whenever some party official, even at a raykom level, is caught red-handed, he immediately equates himself with the party and says: "This is an attack on the party." This is the same thing. We show how the decisions were made and how incompetently they were carried out by military commanders who must now answer for their actions, whereas they immediately equate themselves with the army and say: "This is an attack on the army."

It would be a grave mistake to think that the Tbilisi events drive a wedge between the army and the people.

What does the army have to do with it? At issue here is the responsibility of specific politicians, government officials and military officers. The soldiers who were involved faced a concrete set of circumstances.

[Correspondent] We do not put the blame on the soldiers and officers who fought in Afghanistan, even though we condemn that war.

[Sobchak] Incidentally, the same general model was used in sending troops to Afghanistan. Four people, feeling no need to call a meeting of the Politburo or the docile Supreme Soviet Presidium, decided all by themselves. Why bother calling meetings? Our leadership cared not a hoot for the law or for the Constitution. Only now do the first inklings that the law must be obeyed and that people must answer before the law start to emerge. Some of our highly placed party officials began to realize that only when they were summoned for explanations by the commission. This was unprecedented. Some unknown persons, of whom only yesterday no one had heard, were asking questions and demanding answers.

There used to be a family-like system for solving problems. No minutes were kept. No documentary records of the decision-making process survive. We drew our conclusions about the CPSU Central Committee meeting on April 7 and 8 exclusively on the basis of what we were told by the participants of those meetings. But it is impossible to verify what really went on.

[Correspondent] There was no stenographer either?

[Sobchak] No.

[Correspondent] Maybe they did not release the records to you?

[Sobchak] No, we checked. This was the so-called working meeting, when decisions are made but no records are kept.

[Correspondent] Earlier, it had been Afghanistan, now it was Georgia. It is a method, a style of work.

[Sobchak] This style must be combatted. For every participant of such meetings, the idea itself must be stemmed in him that a group of people can get together (even if they are Politburo members) and decide to send troops abroad, or somewhere inside the country, to suppress our own people.

[Correspondent] Let us come back to the strange things that occurred at the Congress, those posters and hand-outs.

[Sobchak] They were printed professionally, in full color. I kept some and I can show them to you. Once, someone told me: "Go over there. An admiral is distributing handouts." I came up and said: "Comrade Admiral, I heard you were distributing some handouts about the Tbilisi events. Would you give one to me?"

The admiral looked at me (he obviously knew that I was the chairman of the commission) and said: "No, no, I did not distribute anything to anybody." I said: "But I was told you did." And he said: "No, someone gave it to me at the entrance."

I felt sorry for the admiral's navy honor.

Then, so-called deputies' statements began to appear. The nearer the time when the issue were to be raised drew, the more of those statements emerged. They were printed in advance and passed in the auditorium to collect signatures.

They stated that the commission did not have full information and that its conclusions were not objective, and called for the military procurator to be heard, too.

In this situation I felt that it was necessary for me to meet the people in the military procurator's office. We invited the chief military prosecutor, his deputy, General Vasilyev, and investigators Bagrayev and Matus who had appeared on Leningrad television. The conversation lasted for almost five hours.

In the end, several disagreements emerged.

For instance, they claimed that groups of special guerilla fighters were active in the square, and that they had been trained in advance.

[Correspondent] What do you mean, guerilla fighters?

[Sobchak] Speaking legally, terrorists. People who specially prepare to commit terrorist acts. Such rumors had been heard before. We found no such evidence.

I told Comrade Vasilyev that if there were such groups and they knew who they were (the procurator had said: "We know their names"), I assumed they had indicted those terrorists or at least opened criminal cases against them.

He said no.

How about that? They knew who the terrorists were and let them go? They were thus encouraging terrorist activities. Could it be possible?

I said: "Keep it in mind, if tomorrow you don't open cases against those people and do not charge anyone (and as it turned out the military procurator's office had not started proceedings against anyone by the time the issue was raised at the Congress), this will mean that all your assertions are built on sand, even though you employ dozens of investigators, and if this business comes to nothing and your allegations are not proven, you too will have to answer."

"It is important to note that military and political officers, instructing servicemen involved in the operation, gave distorted information on the rally's participants and their aims."

(From the findings of the commission)

The military procurator's office will be held responsible for giving false information to the Congress of People's Deputies and to the public if the case comes to nothing. They will be responsible for an official lie, for an attempt to mislead the Congress and thus obstruct the political decision-making process.

[Correspondent] Are you not encouraging them to frame people?

[Sobchak] They could invent a case, of course. But we have courts. There will be lawyers in court to scrupulously check every proof provided by the prosecution and every assertion made by the procurator.

The second disagreement we had with the military procurator's office was that they claimed that the rally participants in the square used homemade explosive and incendiary devices. We found no such things either.

They also asserted that calls to kill communists had been heard. What was their evidence of this? It turned out that it was provided by a group of tourists who were passing by, saw slogans in Georgian and asked an old Georgian what they said. Allegedly, that man replied: "Kill Communists!" Naturally, they did not produce either the old Georgian or those slogans.

Yet, after the battle, there were plenty of slogans left in the square. But nothing like that. It did not appear on the KGB footage, either.

[Correspondent] I should think that KGB cameramen would have done their best to get such a slogan on camera.

[Sobchak] Yes, they would have done their damnest had such a slogan existed.

There was also a disagreement on causes of deaths. Independent experts, professors and academicians called by us concluded that the cause of death for the majority of the victims was the combined effect of a stampede and inhalation of chemical agents (gases "Bird Cherry" and CS). Traces of gas were found in all victims.

"...the commission notes with particular concern attempts by the high command of the Internal Ministry troops to conceal the fact that poisonous agents were used.

"The use of the special gas 'Bird Cherry' was admitted by them on April 13, 1989, but only under the weight of incontrovertible evidence.

"Subsequently, they gradually admitted the use of various modified versions 'Bird Cherry' and CS.

"For a long time, representatives of the Soviet Army command denied the use of small infantry trench tools."

(From the findings of the commission)

Finally, there were differences in judgement. The military thought that everything was done properly. The action had to be stopped using military force. We felt,

however, that neither the course of the rally nor its character warranted military intervention.

[Correspondent] So, you found out that there would be another speaker, noticed handouts and posters being distributed and deputies' signatures collected, felt that something was afoot and decided to meet the military procurator...

[Sobchak] The fact that there was another speaker from the military procurator's office was against parliamentary practice. The Congress thus expressed its lack of confidence in its own commission. I did not want to be criticized or hear criticism against any member of the commission that we were afraid or were trying to hide something. We said we did not mind another speaker. But we reminded everyone who our commission consisted of, that it included Army General Govorov, deputy minister of defense; Lieutenant General Golyakov, deputy chairman of the veterans' committee; Lieutenant General Gazanko, an academician, a well-known personality and former director of the institute of space medicine, and Lieutenant General Miroshin, director of the Kazakh SSR KGB. You see, the most difficult task of the commission was to bring together forces that seemed so far apart. It included soldiers, scientists, writers, public figures and members of people's fronts. The latter were new people with different points of view, from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Moscow. It seemed impossible to bring those people together. But that was my goal. I derive greatest satisfaction from the fact that we were able to reach an agreement.

We all signed the final document.

[Correspondent] Even the generals?

[Sobchak] Yes. Together with people's front representatives who started their work on the commission by protesting the imperial nature of our state. In the beginning, there was literally a polar difference between some opinions.

[Correspondent] What did bring you together then?

[Sobchak] The facts. Before them retreated emotions and pressures many of us felt. The members of the commission behaved honorably. I formed close friendships with many members of the commission, including Oleg Georgiyevich Gazenko, Boris Lvovich Vasiliev and Nusrat Abishevich Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Kazakh CP Central Committee, a progressive, intelligent man who would never act against his conscience. And what about the Metropolitan Pitirim or Academician Likhachev!

[Correspondent] Were they also on the commission?

[Sobchak] Yes, and they participated actively in its work. And what about Sagdeev! I can not mention everyone, but they were all respected people. The commission even included some Afghan veterans. They were pure, intelligent kids and they found it difficult to sit next to famous

scientists. At first they were shy but later also made a contribution, and a weighty one, too.

[Correspondent] The difficulty of the situation for them was not only in the disparate intelligence or educational levels but also because different human qualities came into contact. It would be hard to show oneself worthy of respect with Academician Likhachev, since any deviation, any insincerity, however minor, that in other circumstances would have passed unnoticed, probably became obvious there, measured against the scale of conscience of such people.

[Sobchak] I recall myself feeling the pressure of that powerful scale, too. I was once approached by reporters who wanted to take a picture of several deputies from Leningrad, especially ones who were on our commission. I went to Dmitriy Sergeyevich and told him about it. He did not say anything, just looked at me in a special way and I felt very embarrassed, for his look was so expressive.

[Correspondent] Let us return to the Congress. What conclusions can you draw from your sad tale? What are you thinking about, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich?

[Sobchak] We are thinking what kind of a mechanism we should develop to make and carry out political decisions so that the army is never used against our people.

[Correspondent] Is this the purpose of your activity, as you see it?

[Sobchak] We must create a system of state organs and a legal mechanism of decision-making that would eradicate this possibility.

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Cultural Figures Appeal to Armenians, Azerbaijanis

90US0541A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 26 Jan 90 p 1

[Appeal by Tengiz Abuladze, other USSR cultural figures: "We Believe in Your Reason: To the People and Cultural Figures of Azerbaijan and Armenia"]

[Text] A misfortune has struck our common house. We, cultural figures, are shaken by the tragic events. It is peacetime, yet blood flows in the streets of cities and towns, shots are fired and old people, women and children suffer. In the name of what?

Common sense militates against these events. We call on you to understand that mutual hatred will bring neither happiness nor peace, nor prosperity. It only sows, as it always has, the venomous seeds of anger and hatred, the most barren ones on the tilled soil.

The events of the recent days echo with pain in the hearts of the Soviet people. There is no limit, no boundary for

that pain and for that compassion. The words stick in the throat when one realizes that all of this has already been seen, man has lived through it and cursed it. Can we go back to it?

We call on you, workers and peasants, teachers and doctors, to stop, to dissuade a friend, to restrain a neighbor. Who profits from the blood? Why are you being prodded to commit fratricide? Ethnic hatred and mutual violence, no matter under what pretext they are committed, never bring happiness or hope. The dignity of a nation is primarily in its moral values, ethical foundations and respect for the freedom and dignity of every nationality.

History has decreed that Azerbaijanis and Armenians lived on the same fertile land irrigated by the righteous sweat of many generations. There probably is not a single major writer, artist or musician in the country who does not love the Caucasus, the home of fiery freedom and natural beauty. The great feeling of mutual enrichment can be eclipsed for a time, but never destroyed for long, or erased from the memory of the people. We mean the great ties between your two peoples. Today's peace is fragile and require constant care; it is intertwined and indivisible. Every crack threatens to grow into an abyss, and it is all the more difficult to throw a bridge over it the deeper and more precipitous it is. Think of the burden you have placed on your children and grandchildren, for sooner or later they will have to rebuild the common home. We are certain that sobriety will return to you, as will the calm for the rebellious souls.

Now the crucial moment in the life of every people is upon you, when not only history but the future, too, is looking at you. We count on your reason, and on brave deeds which can stop the bloody madness. Enough grief, enough hatred and desperation.

We call on you, our friends, cultural figures. We can see your faces and hear your voices and hope that this appeal will reach the heart of everyone of you. The word of the artist is respected by the people if it is steeped in faith and wisdom; it not only brings hope but also heals. Today, humanism is not an abstract notion; it is life itself calling on us to love our neighbor and reconcile with one another. We have a chance to show the spiritual and moral height of our calling, and we must take advantage of it, bearing the good of the country in mind.

We believe in you as great Pushkin believed in human reason when he spoke of nations casting aside their disputes and joining together in one family. That family shares in misfortunes and rejoices with one joy.

We say that reason and man will win, and we stand with you in this path.

Tengiz Abuladze, Chingiz Aytmatov, Mikhail Anikushin, Vasil Bykov, Oles Gonchar, Mustay Karim, Alim Keshokov, Leonid Leonov, Dmitriy Likhachev, Eduardas Mezhelaitis, Evgeniy Nesterenko, Yelena Obraztsova, Boris Piotrovskiy, Valentin Rasputin, Svyatoslav Rikhter,

Yevgeniy Svetlanov, Georgiy Sviridov, Innokentiy Smok-tunovskiy, Galina Ulanova, Boris Ugarov, Alfred Shnitke and Andrey Eshpay.

Roundtable Discussion on Interethnic Relations

90US0467A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jan 90 pp 1-2

[Roundtable discussion conducted by KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA: "If Forward, Then, Toward Lenin"]

[Text] At the recently held 17th Plenum of the Kazakh CP Central Committee, which considered the practice of perestroika of the ideological work in the republic, critical comments were expressed to the Northern Kazakh party organization, along with the positive evaluation of its experience.

This discussion was continued soon afterward in Petropavlovsk at a "roundtable session" conducted by KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA.

Private and general problems associated with the improvement of interethnic relations in the region were covered during the discussion. Active participants were Nelli Aleksandrovna Ivanova, party obkom secretary; Aleksandr Nikolayevich Korsunov, editor of the newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA; Kabdush Kaliyevich Kaliyev, docent, Petropavlovsk Pedagogical Institute; Zhibek Turekhanovna Rakhatmetova, party obkom sector head for interethnic relations; Lyudmila Anatolyevna Kapitanova, dean of the Pedagogical Institute; Sergey Aleksandrovich Presnyakov, oblast veterans' council chairman; Vladimir Ivanovich Trusov, head of the party archives, and Lyudmila Vasilyevna Zimina, lecturer.

At a "roundtable" with sharp corners.

And the first question which arose at the session was not simply dictated by the topic itself, but literally rang through the air: This is the 5th year that we are having heated discussions in all spheres of national life, without exception; is it not finally time to make the transition to programming the process which is in fact developing elementally? After all, the truth is always concrete...

[N. Ivanova] Perhaps that is our common shortcoming—not being concrete. Today, we know perfectly well how much bread, meat, and milk must be produced in a 5-year-plan or a year. It does not always work out, but that is another story. In any case, the methodology of planning and forecasting is on a solid foundation. And how, until just recently, did we comprehend the problems of national construction?

We did not comprehend it at all. The very term had been buried in the theoretical cellars of Stalinist socialism: If everything had been "decided," then why do something else...

Frankly speaking, life today has caught us off guard. We thought in our own way, and life created in its own way. And they turned out to be so far removed from one

another, party dogma from real life. Now that is understood. Just like the fact that it is not only in the really major region, like a republic or an oblast, that specific problems exist. They exist even in the ordinary rayon, the ordinary village, in every place where the population is represented by this or that nationality. Nothing should be allowed to form ranks in size order here—Iosif Vissarionovich tried that, and it turned into a barracks. And because of those reasons, socialism turned into something like a barracks. In no case is it worth going to extremes. Economic and social concerns in party policy will never recede to the background. However, the issues of national construction are becoming a priority today not only in strictly ideological work.

Why am I accentuating specific problems? Of the 600,000 population in the oblast, about 63 percent are Russians, 18 percent Kazakhs, 7 percent Ukrainians, 6.8 percent Germans, and 3 percent Tatars. One percent each, Belorussians, Poles, Bashkirs, and so on. In total, 90 nations and nationalities.

In times long past, such a disparate ethnic conglomerate was called international. As to why, no one knows; there is complete oblivion of the very concept, who is who. Today, the view of things is different. We already speak of different categories, disclaiming the vulgar interpretation of the concept of the "international composition of the population." First of all, it is not inter- but multinational, which is not the same thing. Secondly, we must be concrete: A primarily Kazakh population lives in Timiryazevskiy, Dzhambulskiy, Sergeyevskiy, and Leninskiy rayons; a German population lives in Moskovskiy, Bishkulskiy, Bulayevskiy rayons, and a Tatar population lives in Petropavlovsk and Malyutskiy Rayon. In other words, a precise demographic map has been compiled.

[N. Korsunov] It was never any difficulty to have such information...

[N. Ivanova] On the "information" level, of course not. Yet in studying the population structure, we studied the history of the people itself, its culture, traditions, the level of its development today, the fundamental problems subject to resolution.

That is the sort of "demographic map" we speak of. There are on it, of course, heaps of "blank spots," but the matter has been started.

The special commission on national and interethnic relations is coordinating all this work. Only now, unfortunately, is there being created in the CP oblast committee a specialized sector which will take up the resolution of the entire range of problems in its competence. Incidentally, analogous centers have been created in the soviets, the trade union, and the Komsomol.

[Chairman] Before the recorder was turned on, you expressed yourself quite clearly: The truth is always concrete.

[N. Ivanova] If, according to the biblical legend, in the beginning there was the word? We began by creating the center for propaganda of the Leninist nationalities policy. The study and development of concrete recommendations for the resolution of this or that problem is conducted here. After all, why is it that today we have come up against extremely pointed contradictions in interethnic relations? Not as some sort of "single-minded policy," more likely as dull indifference, yet objectively, it worked out that the priorities of certain ethnic communities were formed to the detriment of others. As if there were simply no other way possible. Hence, the losses, which we have borne one way or another. The native languages of the Kazakhs, the Germans, the Ukrainians, the Tatars, the Poles, and the Bashkirs are disappearing. Dull indifference has in fact led us to a nationality crisis, and has sown mistrust among people. And that is why the first thing with which we began, the creation of a climate of the most favorable conditions for any ethnic community, promoting the development of its languages, cultural traditions, the formation of a national intelligentsia, which has disappeared from the peoples with low populations, has opened up into an "international composition of the population." And what kind of people is it that does not have an intelligentsia? A number disappearing, receding into non-existence. Of course, it does not want to become such a number, and it is reborn in an accessible form. And then from the tribune and in the newspapers we paste on them the names that come into our head from who knows where; some are extremism, others, mass emigration, still others, social apathy...

What, however, is already being done?

The club "Kazak tili" has been created at the base of the center for propaganda of the Leninist national policy; it is directed by K. Kaliyev, candidate of historical sciences. The "Vozrozhdenie" society of Soviet Germans has been formed, and a Tatar-Bashkir association is in active operation.

They turn their main attention to the study and propaganda of native languages, folk traditions, and national culture. But there is no cliche here. The Tatar community, for example, came to the conclusion that the organization of special classes for languages study has no practical meaning. Therefore it is going to be taught in the national club on an optional basis, simultaneously with the history of that people, its cultural traditions.

Naturally, who is going to assert that multi-language literature in our libraries, or the creation of folkloric-choreography collectives is a matter of the second order. But at the same time, we must approach the resolution of nationalities problems from the other side as well. Until recently, there were 37 populated points in the oblast doomed to disappear. And when they carry out such a sentence...

What national schools are there, what language, who concerned himself with this situation? Life itself had come into desolation.

We have adopted a program for the rebirth of such villages [sela] and villages [auly]. We are building there the needed cultural-utilization facilities, schools. For example, in Leninskiy Rayon, Kazakh schools have been created in two of the auls slated to disappear. One of them has two pupils; the other, five. However, this does not bother us. We must speak of the principles. It is not expedient to open new schools for the time being; even an approximation of the necessary contingent cannot be gathered. And the children are at opposite ends of the city. How are they to get there? A special bus was allocated; it picks up the children, and then takes them home later. Had there always been such an approach to the matter, many of the complications in national life today would not have arisen.

[K. Kaliyev] Nevertheless, for the time being, only two of all the previous Kazakh schools have been restored.

[L. Zimina] The situation has come together in different ways in the rayons. For example, in Sergeyevskiy Rayon, only 40 percent of the Kazakhs are instructed in their native language. And this is not because people or forces unknown are in opposition. Can you imagine that there is an acute shortage of Kazakh-language teachers in the sovereign republic? Where are they going to be enlisted, from what realm or state? What kind of perestroika is it in our ministry's system, which can in no way steer its cumbersome ship into the channel of needed changes?

[K. Kaliyev] I think that a number of causes are operating here. And not least among them is national nihilism. Today, 25-30-year-old Kazakhs no longer know their native language; the stereotype of inertia is having its effect.

[L. Kapitanova] The thought expressed by Lyudmila Vasilyevna is worth pursuing. It seems to me that it is particularly important. Having understood the developing situation, we opened a department of the Kazakh language in our pedagogical institute. But what became of this? There are no academic programs or methodological developments. There is 1 textbook for every 25 people. Of the three instructors working in the department, only one is a specialist in the area of the literary language. It is completely natural that in the Kazakh groups, the instruction should be in the Kazakh language. Yet there is no one to do it. On more than one occasion, specialists from Alma-Ata have been invited, with their housing guaranteed. This bore no results. The oblast party committee raised this issue with the Ministry of Public Education, with just as much success.

[Chairman] Well, is that our national patriotism, when there is a lot of talk, loud talk, but as soon as we get to real matters, to practical work, nobody wants to "go to the people," nobody wants to help? Apparently, it is much simpler to hurl lightning bolts and thunder claps in some sort of abstraction. For some reason, everybody

wants to be the rider, and nobody wants to be the horse. From what realm or state are we actually going to enlist the specialists? How will the Kazakh people itself understand its intelligentsia? And not just the Kazakh people...

On innumerable occasions, on an official level and in private conversations, I have had to hear that the "nationals" have ceased to take an interest in their native languages; Russian satisfies them completely. And they cite the examples of the Koreans, the Germans, the Crimean Tatars, the Ukrainians, and the Poles. As an argument, they put the Kazakhs in first place in this sad list. And it is quite understandable why: If the native inhabitant of the sovereign republic shows no interest, who else will? That same old philosophy of stagnation.

But this year: There was a competition among the Kazakhs who "do not wish to study" their native language to matriculate in the recently-opened department of the Petropavlosk pedagogical institute, which is generally still little-known; the ratio was four applications per single acceptance. That is quite a convincing argument.

[K. Kaliyev] People have begun to think of prestigious professions, of a service career; hence the orientation toward life. For example, a dairymaid told me frankly that she wanted to see her children educated, so that they could get into to a VUZ and take up a worthy position in society, a completely natural aspiration. But she is convinced that her children will study in a Russian school. The Kazakh language will only get you as far as your own threshold...

[N. Ivanova] We have really gotten into this problem, have understood its complexity for the first time. It is not just a matter of creating the conditions necessary to master a language. We must think about the renaissance of the entire national life, above all. Only then will the fear not arise about what threshold you get to with what language. Three Kazakh schools have been opened this year alone. And there are a total of 47 of them already, plus 22 with parallel classes. In addition, there is a boarding school with intensive language study. By the year 2000, the number of Kazakh schools, not counting the mixed ones, will grow by about 20 more. It is hardly worth defining the more distant prospects; life itself makes its own corrections. But the problem of problems is cadre training. We will get the first graduates from the institute and the pedagogical college only 4 years from now, and even that will be a very limited quantity.

And how to do it until then? And how after that, if there are only 20-30 graduates, a drop in the bucket...

[L. Zimina] A Kazakh school has been created in a village in Bostandyk Bishkylskiy Rayon. But after all, it does not have a single specialist, a single professional. And that is not an exception, not the worst case. What and how will we teach, what language? Does not the threat arise that Kazakh children, upon completing school, will know neither language thoroughly?

[K. Kaliyev] This has been formed historically. There cannot be a leap here.

[N. Ivanova] Historically, everything was exactly the opposite. We studied most carefully the documents preserved for us in the archives of the Akmolinsk guberniya. Particularly, the practice of national construction which was implemented during V.I. Lenin's lifetime, and which continued by inertia for some time after his death, until the Stalinist apparatus controlled all the party and state organs.

[V. Trusov] I managed to find the annual report of the subdepartment of national minorities under the Akmolinsk guberniya committee of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)]—this structural subdivision in the composition of the party organs was eliminated in 1930, the first Stalinist ring, after which rose a wave of anti-national repressions. Yet until the very end of the twenties, things had been quite different. Special sections under the party committees, from the uyezd committees to the VKP(b) Central Committee conducted most serious organizational work among the low-population nationalities, concerning themselves with the problems of their education, culture, etc. National construction was paid the utmost attention.

The annual report of which I speak (1926) informs us that Akmolinsk had "36 German colonies and 40 farms; 6 Tatar villages, and 3 Estonian towns." One year earlier, that is, in 1925, here there was a total of 3 national village soviets, and now there are already 16. Among these are 12 German soviets, 2 Tatar and 2 Estonian soviets.

One more year later: "As the result of the guberniya ispolkom's measures for the apportionment of homogeneous administrative units, there exist in the guberniya at present 38 national soviets, of which there are: 36 German; 2 Tatar; 2 Estonian; 6 Mordovian; 1 Chuvash, and 2 Belorussian."

All the nuances and peculiarities have been considered. The Germans are living compactly in Petropavlovsk and Akmolinsk uyezds; the Mordovians and Chuvash in Kokchetavsk uyezd. It is planned to apportion one rayon with a purely Ukrainian population, and one with a predominantly Ukrainian population.

But here is perhaps what is most important: "The guberniya ispolkom plans to allocate to the national minority soviets independent budgets, which will, to a significant extent, ease their opportunity to implement immediate needs of the cultural and economic services."

Some 60 years later, we are speaking about the same thing: national soviets and rayons, independent budgets, and a great many other things.

[Chairman] To freeze, for a half-century, the national life of practically all Soviet peoples without exception, basically undermining the foundation of centuries-old culture

of some of them, destroying the culture of others altogether. This must be understood in order to get to the essence of the phenomenon which explains the causes of the exacerbated national contradictions. And if we discuss this in a healthy manner, they are not the primary cause of the "anatagonism" among these or those ethnic communities. That is the categorical unacceptance of the theory of "merging," reducing unique cultures to a common denominator, the standardization of a single life style for all.

After all, if we look at the years of which Vladimir Ivanovich Trusov spoke, the national village soviet, possessed of a certain fullness of powers and financial independence, decided for itself in a democratic gathering what sort of school it wanted to have, which teachers to invite, and how much to pay them, and in what language the business correspondence would be conducted.

[A. Korsunov] It is likely that many of us have had to hear a certain very old "theory." It seems there will come a time at which if not all mankind, then in any case our union will start to speak in a single language. That is, the idea of "merging" is not disappearing. And perhaps it is not so very absurd if it is viewed from the positions of the very distant future? Everything passes, everything changes, including languages. Who today can read a book in Old Russian without having had special training? The dialectic of development is such that a new quality always emerges. And could there be found any eccentric who would protest that our modern language does not bear a striking resemblance to the language of our distant predecessors? Hardly.

Languages do not only change; in this or that historical situation, they disappear altogether: Everything that has a beginning also has an end. Yet when an honorable old man dies, we grieve quietly, understanding this to be a natural given, like bidding farewell forever; when a young man dies, we protest inwardly, we suffer from the absurdity taking place. And if a man is killed?

The system generated by Stalinism killed languages, although perhaps that is too sharply stated. Hence the energetic protest which people express. The discussion which has taken place now is forcing us all to look upon things in a new way, to penetrate more deeply into the nature of a linguistic phenomenon. After all, it is the self-expression of a nation, not just a medium of communication.

[S. Presnyakov] Aleksandr Nikolayevich has interpreted the situation in a fully artistic manner, but I, alas, have no such method, being a strict pragmatist...

Vladimir Ivanovich Trusov and the chairman of our session have already noted how the development of national construction began in the first 10 years after the revolution. But they touched upon only one side of the

matter: How to preserve and move forward the unrepeatable uniqueness of ethnic groups. However, it is impermissible not to speak of how to draw them closer, to make them more like one another.

Such a need did not arise only yesterday, nor after October of 1917. It was understood even by Khan Ablay, in his anticipation of the tendency for developing relations with his northern neighbor. Everyone in his court was required to have mastered a second language—Russian, Chinese, or Arabic. Analogous requirements presented themselves in the twenties even under the "Soviet court": People were not accepted for party work without knowing the Kazakh language.

In general, it should be said that in those years, issues of national life were given the greatest attention. For example, there were in operation the clubs "Kirghiz worker," and the "Ui kyz" ("House for Girls"), which disseminated the culture and tradition of the people. This elicited a certain interest among the population speaking other languages, and brought people together. Today, there is no need for any such thing, but in the twenties, even a statistical inventory of mixed marriages was kept. As a sign of attention, however, that made sense. Priority for advancing in service was given to people who knew two languages. I feel that this was as correct then as it is today.

[N. Trusov] Imagine that our archives in the Kazakh language had not yet been worked over. And after all, they were collected across the entirety of an enormous guberniya, from Petropavlovsk to what is today Karaganda. What is in the archives, what sort of information? Here it is, the reality of not having a tongue. The most valuable documents have remained without any interest whatsoever being shown in them. It is as if an entire layer of life of the aul communists had been erased from existence.

[S. Presnyakov] Yes, that is an argument, although it is hard to understand why the party apparatus staffers still do not know the Kazakh language sufficiently well to work freely with those "erased" documents. Apparently, there had been no need for that. Yet now the need has arisen...

Of course, harmony is needed in everything surrounding man. Yet all the same, national life in all its totality is a "speaking material," and an extremely delicate one at that. I think that an excursus into our deep and recent history is quite incidental today. Why, actually, not consider the village national soviets a completely natural matter, as has already been the case? For example, in that self-same Peterfeld, Rublevka, and Ledenevo, where the Germans live clustered together.

[K. Kaliyev] Such a decision would correspond completely to the spirit of the current concept of the principles of nationality policy. No sort of sedition should be suspected here. The community must receive the right to decide its strictly internal problems for itself, on a broad

democratic basis. Let the people live not in the way prescribed for them, but the way they themselves feel is necessary.

[S. Presnyakov] This has meaning not only for our low-population peoples living in the North Kazakhstan Oblast, but for the Kazakhs, for example, who have been dispersed by the diaspora throughout almost the entirety of Western Siberia. The native language is taught in some places there, particularly in Polovinnyy Rayon of Tyumen Oblast where, according to my data, there are three national schools. Kazakh classes have been started in other regions. But unfortunately, there is no sort of logical system. And we have concerned ourselves very little with our compatriots living beyond the republic's borders. Some time ago, even before perestroika, the Tyumen CPSU obkom requested assistance in preparing a documentary film on the life of the Siberian Kazakhs there, in order to show it on local television. This would have cost the Petropavlovsk studio no effort. Yet the republic ideological institutes for some reason opposed it. And to this day, it is not known why.

In other cases, we have sent to Siberia's Kazakh villages concert brigades from our philharmonic. They rolled out the red carpet for these brigades...

And the textbook situation is not good. And there is no one to teach specialized subjects—chemistry, physics, mathematics. Teachers from Tataria are enlisted. Why does this problem not alarm our intelligentsia, first and foremost, our Kazakh intelligentsia? Perhaps the organization of the village soviets in the Siberian territories could get this problem moving?

[N. Ivanova] There is indeed no system here. The life of the low-population peoples, including that of the Siberian Kazakhs, is very undefined. Yet our own initiative must manifest itself all the more actively here. For example, the Petropavlovsk studio has organized regular TV broadcasts in the Tatar language, and they have become extremely popular; even Orenburg has ordered the materials. The demand for German, Belorussian, Polish, and Kazakh literature has increased.

[L. Zimina] Until recently, initiative was quite easily ordered, and it was hard to convince a person of the opposite case. There are representatives of 90 different ethnic groups in the oblast, which have on more than one occasion raised the long-since urgent issues of national life. And in responding to us, they say: You are intentionally exaggerating these matters; after all, everything had been working well until you started to delve into these problems. But we must speak frankly all the same: Linguistic and other aspects of national life maintain the tension, and are the chief irritants. A meeting was recently held of the party organization secretaries of the rural professional and technical colleges and technical schools at which the question was raised during the discussion: Was the Law on Languages in the Kazakh SSR adopted prematurely?...

Very interesting thoughts, proposals, and original arguments were expressed. But it is not a draft law under discussion. They were speaking of a Law which must be executed. This is a misfortune, to reduce everything to talk.

[K. Kaliyev] A great misfortune. For how many years now have we been talking about the formation of a national working class. The cause is barely moving here. Yet there is no way we can open even a single Kazakh-language professional and technical college in the oblast. How then are we going to train professional workers?

[Chairman] By what means do the party committee, soviet, trade union, and Komsomol organs study the national problematics of low-population peoples, among whom there are already indigenous inhabitants? After all, it frequently happens that the subdivisions specially created for these purposes have a quite simplified understanding of their task, and are more likely conducting "national accounting" in order to create approximate equilibrium in the apparatus of government. This is, of course, easier than studying the profound processes of the lives of the peoples with their specific peculiarities. Is this not why we are marking time, not risking the adoption of exhaustive measures at whose foundation would lie an objective picture of real life. Or is such a point of view incorrect?

[L. Zimina] I do not have at my disposal the information for such broad generalizations. Obviously, each region has its own methodology, built on the basis of concrete situations. For example, we have such an approach: Research the phenomenon from the very beginning. No task-orientation, no statistics. An objective cross-section of the vital realities, nothing more. Then everything opens up...

Recently, one of our groups went to Beloglinka, to the German "colony," as they used to say. And it noted some quite unpleasant things there: In the 8-year school, there is no German language study, neither the native language, nor the foreign one. The school's director explained this as the local population's devotion to English. The argument: Young people had married Russians; they "do not know and do not wish to know" their mother tongue.

This is not the first time we have had to hear such things. Yet the raykom ideological department head and I went to see people, in their families, in order to understand the phenomenon of non-acceptance of what was originally the basis of any sort of national culture. But quite a different thing became clear: It is not a matter of nihilism, but of the ideology which has been handed down as "an inheritance" from one generation to the next since Stalinist times, when many Germans were simply ashamed of their origin. So the situation is much more difficult than simply "removing" English from school instruction. The language must be made genuinely native for any person.

Nevertheless, I cannot say that we have any sort of complete concept of all aspects of the life of the low-population peoples. Yet the foundation for such study has been laid. For example, we recently organized a radio broadcast about the Gypsies. And we came to the sad conclusion that we know nothing about this people on any level. How do they live, do they all have work, is the law on universal education being fulfilled, or are their children semi-literate? It is not the usual way, but in order to get to the bottom of the situation, we established contact with "Gypsy barons," as their leaders call themselves. The information is much more rich and convincing than formal statistics. And on its basis, we may genuinely reprogram further work.

[Zh. Rakhmetova] It has already been said here that essentially in our region, the Kazakhs are in a minority as are certain other peoples. Hence the specifics of the ideological work among them. Lyudmila Vasilyevna emphasized a very important aspect: There can be absolutely no talk of any sort of "nihilism." That is far-fetched. The phenomenon's causes lie entirely elsewhere: People had been ceasing and final ceased to take pride in their national affiliation, which for many years had been considered with a bad tone. So the linguistic problems of the matter are already secondary. Just as the all the more frequently repeated incidents of national conceit—the direct result of self-awareness developing too wildly, like a childhood illness.

We are most seriously concerned with the situation which has developed in interethnic relations. Yet frankly speaking, the ideological work here is being done with routine methods. The culture of any contact, including that among peoples, is indoctrinated in the family. And what is happening in the family? Where is there a professional ideologue to refute an absurd rumor or fantasy at times simply dangerous with its consequences? Especially in sections, in small villages where unemployment, poor living conditions, and a low level of education are most frequent. The position of the mother, who frequently has a quite misinterpreted concept of interethnic relations, is automatically perceived by the children, and they grow up with it. This is the start of the many negatives with which we must later struggle incessantly. So the main object of our ideological activity must be the family. It is the family which inculcates both native and international culture. Here, everything must be started again from the beginning.

[N. Ivanova] Just like many other things. There is no way to understand our problems today if we do not look carefully at how they were resolved in the Leninist version of which Vladimir Ivanovich spoke. Here, for example, is an excerpt from the resolution of the Akmolinsk guberniya ispolkom: "Directing our attention to the fact that without the presence of the appropriately trained Kazakh staffers, any sort of successful conduct of forming roots is impossible, considering also the insufficiency of the sum released from the local budget for this purpose, and a number of the deficits which have taken place and which are taking place in the existing

courses for the training and retraining of Kazakh staffers, it is to be considered necessary that..."

The guberniya ispolkom obligated all economic and cooperative organizations to allocate special resources for training cadres from the native populations, to expand the network of courses for the Europeans to study the Kazakh language, providing them with teachers and educational materials. And concretely, 60 years later, today: "In certifying among the European officials that an attitude of obvious underestimation of the importance of the Kazakh language to them, direct their attention to the need for overcoming such an attitude toward the study of the Kazakh language, and consequently to the need for the study of its final aspects."

That is why they say, the new is the well-forgotten old. But what good is there here, to forget about the fate of a people for half a century...

[Chairman] Marx wrote that the idea invariably disgraced itself as soon as it got away from the interest.

We had the interest and it remains. The internationalization of thought, of the very way of life, and the creation of civilized relations among peoples regardless of their ethnic affiliation. Yet with the end of the twenties there also ended the stage of the Leninist strategy of national construction. Unity became uniformity; the traditional form of existence became uniform. The system created by the Stalinist party leadership stamped only one fashion in its ideological workshops.

Here this model—not for national construction, but for national ruination—genuinely disgraced itself, generating the most pointed ethnic contradictions. That is why here, in such a delicate sphere of social existence, there is a need for the most fundamental perestroika, with consideration of the Leninist practice of the twenties. The priceless experience set aside in archival documents has not wound up in various modes of "special preservation" by accident, for it was in principle contradiction with the concept of Stalinism.

Founded upon the decisions of the 19th Party Congress, the September CPSU Central Committee Plenum developed a number of important trends determining the basic aspects of our national life. Yet this is but a general plan for development, characterizing the principles of national construction only in general terms. Now, however, a completely concrete draft law is needed, a politically and economically calculated program of practical actions, elevated to the rank of a law.

How can such a delicate, complex multi-national and multi-linguistic economy be restructured in formulating the task only in general terms...

Latvian Front's 5-Stage Program to Independence Viewed

*90UN0968A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 5, 29 Jan-4 Feb 90 p 6*

[Report by Izvestiya correspondent Irina Litvinova: "The Five Stages Proposed by Popular Front of Latvia Deputy Chairman Ivars Godmanis"]

[Text] Ivars Godmanis has set out his point of view in the NFL [Popular Front of Lithuania] publication ATMODA. In his opinion, the following five stages comprise a basic program for the Popular Front. The first step is to achieve victory in the elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet, which are to take place in Latvia on 18 March. If this task is successfully accomplished, then the next actions, in the author's opinion, are as follows: "We should delegate a group of deputies to go to Moscow to negotiate with the Kremlin leadership, we should send another delegate group to the West in order to enlist support and create a lobby for us. Some of the informal organizations, for example, the Movement for the National Independence of Latvia, consider a republic citizens' congress a priority, but I. Godmanis feels that neither Moscow nor the West will sit down at the negotiations table with their representatives.

The actions of the yet-to-be elected deputies have already been predetermined. They will have to get the Supreme Soviet to recognize as illegal all the "undertakings," as the author writes, of 1940. This decision will have to be directed to the International Court at the Hague and to various international organizations. He gives his justification for this step and his prognosis for its consequences: Moscow will not accept our decision. The West will view the situation as a conflict between two democratically elected representative organs—our Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Thus, the problem can be looked on not only from a historical standpoint but also from that of an ongoing conflict situation.

The next step is to annul the army deputy mandates. Then there should be a referendum, because, as I. Godmanis believes, the Supreme Soviet's decision must be confirmed by a referendum's results. It is recommended that two be held: one general, and one national.

Thus the program nears completion: the activities in the West of the deputies of the newly elected Supreme Soviet, passage of the decisions on 1940, both referendums, negotiations in Moscow. The final point is the "convocation of a Constituent Assembly, which will announce elections. This does not mean, however, that we should rush into elections before complete independence is attained."

The readers who have been calling in to IZVESTIYA consider it a good thing that they are finally being told about the parliamentary path to independence, which up until now has only been declared. However, it is unclear to them—and even I would not be able to respond

precisely, I admit—what kind of elections a Constituent Assembly would hold. And what would happen to the results of the elections just held for the local soviets and those slated for 18 March?

Officials Promise More Jobs for Uzbekistan's Fergana Oblast

90US0523A Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian
11 Jan 90 p 1

[UzTAG report from Fergana: "Fergana Oblast Villages and Rayon Centers Create New Working Places"]

[Text] **The problem of finding jobs for the people must be solved on the basis of...a network of small and medium-sized enterprises, branches, and shops in small towns and rural localities.**—(from the Uzbek CP preelection platform)

The number of workers in enterprises of the Fergana consumer goods industrial and trade association will more than double during the next five-year plan.

"Such an increase in employment," said its general director, K. Salakhadtinov, "will be achieved mainly on account of retooling, expansion, increasing the number of shifts, and construction of new small enterprises in the countryside."

This year already, with the assistance of local authorities, the association has acquired a number of buildings where small shops and branches have begun to operate. In Yazvan, the former building of the children's hospital has been given over to garment production and the hospital has moved to the better suited former building of the rayon party committee. One hundred and twenty

persons are already at work in the new premises. Enterprises are also being opened and rebuilt in other villages [kishlaki] as well. It is planned to create an additional 1,900 working places next year alone.

The construction of new enterprises for the production of goods is proceeding at full tilt. A combine for the manufacture of knitted sportswear will be set up in Kuba and will employ 1,200 workers. When construction is completed in 1993, it will produce more than 20 million rubles worth of products annually. Production of woollen yarn products is being set up in Altyryk, where 250 persons will be employed. The experimental worsted goods mill in the same place is being expanded and the increase in its capacity will make it possible not only to provide work for 250 persons in its shops, but also to sharply increase the number of persons working at home—to 800.

In Altyryk Rayon, local industry is planning to open yet another labor-intensive enterprise in 1994—a silk combine which rather than cocoons will utilize low-grade raw material—so-called "karapacha". There will be more than 1000 workers here. In the settlement of Shorsu, in Uzbekistsanskiy Rayon, it is planned to launch a pig iron foundry and to triple the capacity of the existing brick works. In the high mountain Khushe sovkhoz in Rishtanskiy Rayon a cocoon-reeling factory, employing 300 workers, is being put into operation.

New enterprises will grow up in Dangara in Frunze Rayon, in Yaipana, and other population points. Altogether during this five-year period, 14 small and middle-sized enterprises will be opened within the oblast. Together with expansion of existing enterprises, this will provide an opportunity not only to employ an additional 7000 persons and to double the number of home workers, but also almost to double the production output, raising its volume to 135 million rubles per year.

Leningrad Prosecutor on Pogrom Rumors

90UN0941B Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 28 Jan 90 p 4

[Interview with Leningrad Prosecutor D M. Verevkin by P. Kotov: "Rumors Spreading Through the Homes..."; place and date not given]

[Text] [begin bold]Against the background of the already customary reports about all kinds of deficits in the January selection of Leningrad newspapers, the publications that have begun to stand out are those that have no deficit of interpretations and assessments pertaining to a fairly delicate subject—interethnic relations. And while newspapers are supposed to be competing and trying to prove the growth of anti-Semitism in the city, the most incredible rumors have begun to spread through Leningrad—right down to the spreading from mouth to mouth of "precise dates" of the supposedly forthcoming Jewish pogroms. And, of course, this was the first question: "Where are the law enforcement organs?"

We asked Leningrad Prosecutor D.M. Verevkin to share with the readers what he knows about this.[end bold]

[Kotov] Dmitriy Mikhaylovich, recently the newspaper SMENA raised before the city prosecutor's office the question of possibly holding the organizers of the 12 January rally at Lenizdat [Publishing House of the Leningrad CPSU Oblast and City Committees] liable for stirring up interethnic discord. Has there been an investigation of this incident?

[Verevkin] Yes, the prosecutor's office conducted a careful investigation of this case and came to the conclusion that there were no grounds for bringing a criminal case under Article 74 of the RSFSR Criminal Code ("Violation of Ethnic and Racial Equality"). It was established that the people who were picketing at the entrance to Lenizdat had no immediate intention of inciting ethnic hostility. Their intentions were limited to a demonstration of their attitude toward the position of the newspaper SMENA and its editor. This is shown by the content of the signs carried by the picketers. So in this case there is no crime. But this certainly does not mean that the participants in the demonstration who made rude and absurd accusations against the newspaper do not deserve moral censure.

Incidentally, my attention was caught by a kind of paradox: The newspaper is accusing the demonstrators of what the demonstrators are accusing the newspaper of! And both sides are demanding a criminal case under the same Article 74.

[Kotov] Is there any kind of real basis for the rumors that are being spread throughout the city? Particularly about the so-called "pogroms"?

[Verevkin] In the first place, let me note that the very fact of the appearance of all kinds of rumors at precisely this time is quite explicable. For there is a complicated situation in the country now, including in the economy,

which Leningraders are also experiencing. And in such a situation the soil for the spreading of all kinds of rumors is as favorable as it can be. Here they have spread throughout the city, frequently snowballing, with the most improbable details. Basically these rumors are conveyed from mouth to mouth without any evil intent but at the same time people forget about the possible consequences—from the creation of a nervous situation to a sense of panic among some citizens. This is why the prosecutor in conjunction with organs of the KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs has been forced to investigate each such case in the most detailed way. We have investigated rumors about "pogroms" too. I can state quite definitely that this is an absolute fabrication which has nothing behind it. Incidentally, the story of the "precise dates of the pogroms" enables us to see one of the ways these rumors are generated—it turns out that someone found these "dates" by looking at certain secret mystical signs in one of the photo montages in the newspaper. So if tomorrow someone does not like, for example, the drawing of the position of the stars in the sky, it is quite possible that the prosecutor will again have to investigate another improbable story.

[Kotov] Dmitriy Mikhaylovich, you seem to have clarified the question of the rumors. But regarding the newspapers—are they spreading it on too thick in their articles about anti-Semitism?

[Verevkin] Of course we do encounter certain manifestations of anti-Semitism. But to pass them off as evidence of some threatening tendency in the city and to fan the panic would be, to put it mildly, irresponsible. I am convinced that the mass media must be more precise in their formulations and more circumspect in their assessments of facts and phenomena, especially now when the situation is fairly unstable.

For our part we shall continue in the future to investigate each case related to manifestations of nationalist chauvinism and we shall ask the newspapers to assist us in doing this. But against the background of discussions of an allegedly ineffective prosecutor we sometimes encounter cases of a failure to understand our tasks. Here is a quite recent example: After the publication on 17 January in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of an article entitled "Chimera" we asked the author to give the prosecutor the documentary entries she had—after all, the article was about the grossest manifestations of anti-Semitism in a Leningrad school. But in response to our request the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA observer, N. Loginova, refused, referring to journalistic ethics. Following this logic, does journalistic ethics close its eyes to the illegal continuation of lawlessness it discovers?

[Kotov] The last question, Dmitriy Mikhaylovich. Are you not afraid that the new members of the Lensoviet, as Ye. Smirnova writes in VECHERNYY LENINGRAD, "might give you a vote of no confidence"—as I understand it, for your passive position with respect to individuals who are fanning interethnic discord?

[Verevkin] I can get a "vote of no confidence" only from the USSR prosecutor general who appointed me to my post. But my main superior is the law. It is with this that I always have to coordinate my actions first of all. But in any case I shall do everything I can through the power of the law not to allow attempts to inflame ethnic discord in Leningrad.

Georgian Justice Officials on Abkhaz Disorder Investigations

90US0497A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 16 Jan 90 p 6

[GRUZINFORM report of statements of N. Shoshiashvili, Georgian SSR first deputy procurator, and A. Taliashvili, republic deputy minister of justice: "Not a Single Criminal Will Get Away Without Answering!"]

[Text] As we know, last year during the tragic events in Kvemo Kartli, Shida Kartli, and Abkhazia, criminal cases were stimulated regarding individuals who had committed illegal acts.

Until now, there has not been complete information as to how the investigation of these cases is proceeding. The republic's society is interested in how the matter of identifying and punishing the participants and organizers of these events stands.

A GRUZINFORM correspondent requested N. Shoshiashvili, Georgian SSR first deputy procurator, and A. Taliashvili, republic deputy minister of justice to describe this. Here is what they related.

[N. Shoshiashvili] It should be taken into consideration that the investigation of the cases concerning these events is associated with a number of additional difficulties, such as, for example, overcoming a certain opposition, the large volume of work in identifying the role of each of the accused, etc. Thus it is impossible to agree with the opinion that, so they say, since the crime is obvious, strictly speaking, there is nothing to investigate here. That is far from the case. Jurists will confirm that it is precisely in crimes of this nature that the investigation usually runs into particular difficulties.

What has the Procuracy done concretely? A total of 47 criminal cases have come out of the events in Kvemo Kartli, 23 of which have already been transferred to the court. Some 41 investigators are working here now.

A total of 116 criminal cases involving 132 people have come out of the tragedy in Abkhazia. Some 74 of them are under guard. It is interesting that 1 out of every 3 of them is an official, and 16 are former senior officials of the Abkhaz internal affairs organs. I can cite the former Ochamchirskiy Rayon Procurator V. Gurdzhua, and the department chief of the extra-departmental guard of that same rayon, militia Major D. Shlarba, both exposed as having re-concealed 1,200 hunting rifles, attacking the store of the Hunters' League, and arming individuals of the Abkhaz nationality with pilfered rifles.

Those brought up on charges are: senior operations line department of the Sukhumi militia station, militia Captain F. Kvaratskheliya, for the murder of a citizen from Kogoniya; senior inspector of the Abkhaz MVD criminal investigation department, militia senior Lieutenant V. Zukhba, for the organization of mass disorders and participation in them; incidentally, found in his official safe, unregistered, were over a half-kilogram of hashish and up to R 7,000; T. Guniya, senior inspector of the cadre department of that same ministry; N. Bganba, deputy director of the "Pitsunda" resort; O. Pkhazariya, secretary of the Ordzhonikidze village soviet, Gudautskiy Rayon, and others. V. Agrba, director of the "Abkhazstroy" automotive transportation enterprise, is accused of unlawful possession of weapons and abuse of an official position.

Five murders were solved; a number of individuals who actively participated in the destruction of the Sukhumi branch of Tbilisi State University, located in the building of Sukhumi School No. 1, and in the organization of attacks on the Georgian population in the park imeni Rustaveli have been held criminally responsible. The case accusing Yu. Palba of murdering V. Vekua is at the stage of court proceedings.

In addition, a specialized brigade of the republic procuracy is specifically studying the role and position of a number of officials in inflaming the national enmity between Georgians and Abkhazians which led to tragic consequences. Sufficiently revealing material has been gathered on certain of them, and the matter of bringing them to criminal justice will be decided in the near future.

A total of 84 criminal cases have come out of the events in South Ossetia, including 2 from an incident inflaming national discord. One of these regards the leader of "Adamon nykhasa," A. Chochiyev. Citizens N. Tegashvili, P. Nikorishvili, N. Samniashvili, V. Tutarashvili, T. Tigihev, V. Driayev, and G. Khorav are under investigation for attempted murder.

The republic procuracy is taking all measures in order that each incident be investigated to the end, that all names be named, and all the guilty be held accountable, regardless of their public position, post held, or national affiliation.

[A. Taliashvili] A total of 79 cases came to the republic court for examination. At present, 25 cases have already been examined by the courts of Abkhazia. Guilty verdicts have been passed on 29 people. There were 3 convicted for inflaming national enmity; 11 for gross violation of public order; 15 for the organization of mass disorders, accompanied by murders, armed attacks, arson, and pogroms, etc. There are 24 cases in progress. Among them are the criminal case of V. Inapshba, accused of the 21 July 1989 murder by firearm of student Akopov and Lieutenant Novikov, who were on duty maintaining public order in Ochamchirskiy Rayon.

Six criminal cases have already been examined in the courts of South Ossetia, including the cases regarding M. Chochiyev, who resisted MVD staffers, and V. Zakharov, who on 29 September 1989 physically and verbally abused truck drivers on their way to work.

There have been 23 criminal cases involving the transgressions committed in Kvemo Kartli handed over to the courts; 19 sentences have already been passed in these cases. Found guilty, and convicted to 6 years of incarceration, according to Article 75 of the Georgian SSR Criminal Code was A. Kerimov, who agitated for national discord; former militia Major U. Aliyev will serve a punishment of 4 years, and driver Amirov will serve 3 years; they were active participants in malicious group hooligan activities aimed at inflaming national discord and entailing serious consequences in Bolnisi in June 1989.

Among those convicted in connection with the events in Kvemo Kartli were also one Georgian and one Armenian.

The republic courts continue to examine this category of cases. N. Shoshiashvili and A. Taliashvili have promised to further inform the public of the course of the investigation and the court proceedings on a regular basis.

Latvian KGB Chief on Rehabilitation, Foreigners, Image

90UN0969A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 5, 29 Jan 89-4 Feb 90 p 7

[Interview with S.V. Zukul, Latvian KGB chief, by TASS correspondents Valeriy Zaytsev and Yuriy Sizov: "Democracy's Shield or Sword? A Conversation with Latvian KGB Chief S. V. Zukul"]

[Text] [TASS] Stanislav Viktorovich, the public life of the republic right now has so many aspects: meetings, assemblies, congresses of the most varied organizations, both radical and not, take place nearly every week. We're already used to that. But there is one thing I cannot get used to: those same radicals, with a persistence worthy of better application, love to compare the work of your committee with the tsar's Okhrana or Hitler's Gestapo—especially on posters during meetings and picketings. At the same time, articles are appearing in the republic and foreign press about the "liberal" apparatus of power of the bourgeois republic, which apparently allowed no repressions whatsoever against the inhabitants of Latvia. Is that so?

[Zukul] The desire to pass off what one wishes were so as what actually is without troubling oneself with proofs is quite a popular method. But let us leave it to the conscience of the people who apply it. What do the archives say? The facts are these.

In only three years, from 1919 to 1922, about 3,000 people were killed for revolutionary activity by field courts-martial of bourgeois Latvia and for "fleeing."

Between 1934 and 1940 the political police arrested and convicted 5,360 people opposed to the existing order in Latvia. We know from the political police's own records that only about 20% of those arrested ever went to court; the rest were held without trial or investigation on the basis of secret service materials in accordance with the so-called Kerenskiy law of 4 August 1917, and after 11 February 1938, in accordance with the law "On Order and Public Safety" signed by President Karl Ulmanis. Now, at the decision of the minister of internal affairs or defense, people deemed a threat to state security can be held without trial up to six months. At the end of that time the decision can be extended without restriction.

As a result of the 1934 coup in Latvia the constitution was repealed, and all political parties and organizations were disbanded; a concentration camp was built in Liyepay and a hard labor prison at the Kantsiyems quarry, on the model of German ones; a law was passed on 22 March 1935, depriving political prisoners of their rights and confiscating their property, as were laws making conditions for political prisoners harsher and increasing their length of sentence.

As for the repressive apparatus, by 1940 it comprised over 46,000 people, of whom over 40,000 were members of the Ayzsarg military organization assigned by law to police functions.

Our opponents do not have much faith in our facts, preferring statistics gathered abroad. But here are the figures cited by the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN in September 1935: for every 100,000 inhabitants of Ireland, 20 were in prison; 30 in England; 50 in France, Norway, and Denmark; 156 (not including the concentration camps) in Germany; and over 200 in Latvia.

These are the facts, you can agree with them or not, but they exist.

[TASS] Comrade chairman, we know that during the years of Stalinist repression thousands of Latvians were arrested and exiled from the republic. What are the organs of state security doing for their rehabilitation?

[Zukul] Here it is essential to clarify that the KGB is taking part in the legal, not the political, rehabilitation. Persons exiled in an extrajudicial procedure, both in 1941 and in 1949, have been rehabilitated by a resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR. Questions of compensation for material loss are being decided by a corresponding resolution of the republic's government. The moral loss inflicted on people, of course, cannot be compensated for. We have to keep in mind that many peoples of the Soviet Union and other countries suffered from the lawless Stalinist period.

Our colleagues have completed a review of the cases of people repressed in an extrajudicial procedure. This work was done on the basis of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 16 January 1989.

Regarding people convicted in 1940 and the postwar years, it must be confessed that this work is proceeding rather slowly, although not due to any fault of ours. On questions of individual rehabilitation or rehabilitation of citizens' relatives a petition must be filed with the Prosecutor's Office of the Latvian SSR, where those petitions are examined and whenever a closer verification of the material is necessary, sent to us. Then they are handed over to the court, which renders its judgment on the evidence.

[TASS] Recently voices have been heard in defense of those inhabitants of Latvia who during the war fought on the side of the fascists. They explain that in 1941 they had to choose the lesser evil—between Hitler and Stalin. Consequently, these people also have the right to be rehabilitated. What are your feelings on this problem?

[Zukul] Who became active collaborators with the Hitlerites from the very first days of the occupation? First and foremost, they were former associates in the political police. For instance, Shtights, the head of the political police's secret service who fled to the West in June 1940 with the secret service's valuable card index. On 1 July 1941, he arrived in Riga with the German forces and became its first prefect and organized mass executions. They were former participants in the "fifth column" formed before the war on the territory of Latvia by the intelligence organs of fascist Germany. The famous "Arays command" left its bloody trail in Latvia, in Pskovskaya and Smolenskaya oblasts, in Belorussia, and in Ukraine. This was the reactionary portion of the former Aysargs—Colonel Veyds, head of the Rizhskiy uezd police, Mayors Khazpers and Lapin'sh, Lieutenant Colonel Dzenitis, commander of all Aysargs' during the occupation, and Boleslav Maykovskis, who directed the executions in Resenkno (after the war he hid in the United States and recently was deported to West Germany, where he is now undergoing criminal investigation).

These are the objective circumstances that characterize the reasons for active activity of the punitive divisions in Latvia during the German occupation.

The lawkeeping police comprised nearly 12,000, the security and SD police nearly 500, and there were another 15,000 in 30 or so police battalions.

Late in the war, out of this contingent, Hitler's intelligence organs enlisted agent-saboteurs to engage in armed banditry at the Soviet Army's rear. In all, according to the calculations of the head of the "Yagdferband SS" Captain G. Yankovs, more than 5,000 agent-saboteurs were trained. And in the early postwar years they headed up more than 500 armed bands, forming their base. More than 3,000 Soviet patriots were their victims.

Here are just a few examples.

In the summer of 1945, in the village of Styglovo in Shkilbanskaya volost, the band of the German saboteur

Supe, nicknamed Tsinit, murdered the peasant Kazimir Slyshan, his wife and three children for refusing to supply them with food.

In May of 1946, the band of the former head of the "SS Yagdferband" intelligence organ Captain Yankovs seized on the highway the divisional inspector of Kuldigskiy uezd, Adam Turums, and his wife Anna, whom they raped and murdered in front of him. Adam's head was slowly sawed off.

In the summer of that same year, in the former Vilyakskiy uezd, in the small village of Ayzgalipas, on the order of his band's ringleader, 24-year-old Alfred Brilts killed his own mother Emiliya Brilts because she wanted her son to get out of the band.

We could continue with this list of evil deeds.

So, would you also have us rehabilitate compatriots like that? But that goes against common sense.

[TASS] Let us return to the realia of the present day. Perestroyka has removed many restrictions, including those on foreigners visiting Soviet Latvia. That is evident even to the naked eye, although, let us be realists, there are guests and guests.

[Zukul] The democracy of Soviet society is making contacts between people more accessible, it is facilitating the development of "people's diplomacy." We welcome this. However, not all travelers come to us with good intentions.

So, Yuris Kazha, who resides in Stockholm, used a trip to Latvia to transmit instructions to the leaders of extremely radical informal associations. In one article in the emigre newspaper VRIVA LATVIYA he wrote that "at the present time for the emigration it would be very important to revive or create anew conspiratorial communications channels with the principal movements in Latvia." Evidently, this is what he came to the republic for in August of this past year when under a false name he boarded a helicopter, made a fly-over, and shot a video of territory off limits to foreigners.

Here's another example. A teacher in the Munster Latvian Gymnasium (West Germany), Peteris Elferts, who reached Riga through cultural channels, made several excursions into rayons closed to foreigners, and in one of them he photographed a guarded military object and participated in picketing. P. Elferts was warned that he was on the territory of a rayon off limits to foreigners, but he ignored the warning. Moreover, he announced in an interview in a local newspaper: "I had to do that."

Because Yu. Kazha and P. Elferts committed crude violations of Soviet laws and regulations concerning foreigners' stays in the USSR, they were prohibited entry into the USSR for five years. A natural decision. I don't think a single country in the world would allow such disregard for its legislation on the part of its guests.

[TASS] Your department, comrade general, evokes very gloomy memories among people of the older generation. But as was announced at the very highest level, there's no going back to the past. What does the committee's activity look like in present-day conditions?

[Zukul] As you yourself understand, the KGB is not the kind of organization to advertise its work methods, even under conditions of perestroika and glasnost. But I do want to dwell on a few aspects in more detail. In some of the mass media in the West a thesis has cropped up that occasionally is repeated among us, that the organs of security hold conservative positions and are hostile to the changes going on in the country. Here some clarification is needed: the organs of the KGB support wholly and fully the process of perestroika. And we find ourselves with a new and important task—to defend that process. We cannot fulfill our functions without society's support and understanding, without its control. An understanding of the tasks, place, and role of the KGB in the life of society will guarantee our support among the people. In connection with the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On intensifying the fight against crime," we face the tasks of uncovering and curtailing illegal hard currency-financial activities, violations of the rules on hard currency operations directed toward undermining the financial and economic system, and in general—the fight against organized crime.

On 29 December 1989, we informed the population of the republic that in the Rizhskiy commercial port, container ships had been detained with contraband, large quantities of scarce raw materials that are not subject to export overseas. The Latvian KGB instituted a criminal case and an investigation is under way. A large ring of individuals from various cities and regions in the country have been implicated in this case. I hope that in the near future we will be able to provide the public with detailed information on this issue.

As for the various informal spontaneous organizations, many of which have already been formed in our republic, I can say briefly—the KGB of the republic supports all forces that facilitate perestroika. It is no accident that a subdivision has been created in our Committee for the defense of the Soviet constitutional order. After all, the task of the KGB consists in protecting public organizations from the influence of foreign intelligence services trying to take advantage of the unconstitutional goals of extremist-oriented elements. In defending perestroika, we are obligated to defend society as well against extremism. After all, such actions could provoke an unwanted exacerbation of the political situation, conflicts with grave consequences. And that is something we cannot allow.

Turkmen KGB Colonel on Local Police, Government Ties to Traffickers

90WD0182A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Article by IZVESTIYA special correspondent V. Kuleshov, Turkmen SSR, under rubric "Details for IZVESTIYA": "In the Dock—A Narcotics Gang"]

[Text] A TASS correspondent reports that, on 9 February, the trial of an organized criminal group that had been engaging in the smuggling and illegal sale of narcotics on the republic's territory came to an end at the TuSSR Supreme Court.

In the dock are 15 persons who, for a number of years, conveyed opium raw materials from Afghanistan, produced narcotics from them, and sold them in the border regions of Turkmenia and Uzbekistan. In exchange, gold and antique Turkmen national ornaments went across the border... Customers from all over the republic flocked to the most remote areas of Turkmenia in order to get to the opium merchants. Automobiles, video equipment, valuables, furs, and weapons were used as payment for the narcotics. Workers at the Turkmen State Security Committee [KGB] were able to record on video tape certain episodes in that exchange. One of the criminals proved to be a former militia worker...

The criminals received from four to ten years of incarceration.

In August-November 1989 the first such trial occurred, when seven smugglers were sentenced. Money and valuables with a total value of 1.3 million rubles were confiscated from them, as well as a large quantity of raw materials for manufacturing opium.

The narcotics merchants have been making their "work" methods more rigid: they have been stocking up on firearms and have been threatening the investigators and the members of their families. Yet another peculiarity is that racketeering is becoming widespread among the narcotics businessmen.

Colonel V. Boyko, chief of the Investigation Department, TuSSR State Security Committee, comments as follows:

"As long ago as 1986 the republic's KGB agencies became interested in one of the channels by which major consignments of narcotics were coming into the republic across the Afghan-Soviet border in the area of Takhta-Bazar. For almost two years the well-organized Ekberov criminal group operated there under the protection of A. Kakabayev, chief of the Takhta-Bazarskiy Rayon militia department. The Ekberov group received by means of smuggling, and then sold to local dealers, more than 50 kilograms of narcotics.

"In December 1988 R. Rakhimov, a resident of the Kerki rayon center, was detained while attempting to complete a smuggling transaction involving the exchange of silver ornaments and coins for narcotics. It turned out that he was closely linked with groups of persons who had been buying up the narcotics coming in from Afghanistan, which groups were in operation in Turkmenia and Uzbekistan. The annual monetary turnover of these 'businessmen' was hundreds of thousands of rubles. Many of them had already appeared in court, and soon—in early March—we shall turn over to the court the files on several more people. These cases also involve

smuggling, currency speculation, the bartering of expensive national ornaments for narcotics...

"Why are we Chekists especially worried about the narcotics 'business'? Because, first of all, the narcotics Mafia, so to speak, has been 'tied to' smuggling, currency speculation, and murders. The criminals are now going so far as to getting rid of people they don't like, including workers in the law-enforcement agencies! The republic's militia workers have been giving us active assistance. But, unfortunately, many of them, it must be stated outright, have also suffered from this.

"An active fight against the narcotics 'business' used to be waged by R. Udal'yan, deputy chief of the Kerkinskiy Rayon militia department. We even wrote a decision recommending to the leadership of the republic's MVD and the Chardzhou Oblast Internal Affairs Administration that they give an incentive award to him for his unselfish work. Unfortunately, they did not give him that incentive award. Instead... they fired him. Then, coming to their senses, they reinstated him. Now Udal'yan, under the pressure of circumstances, intends himself to leave the republic. 'You can leave if you want,' administration chief A. Udalov told him, 'but we won't work with you any more...'

"But it frequently does happen that they 'work with' those who, according to our information, are closely tied to the narcotics Mafia. I am speaking about the militia workers in the Kerkinskiy, Khodzhambasskiy, and Khalachskiy rayon departments. There have also been instances of ties with dealers by workers in the Chardzhou Oblast party apparatus. I recall this episode: a correspondent from the republic's television system was having a conversation in Kerki with one of the criminals, and he tried to shame him by asking, 'How can you poison people and get rich on other people's misfortune?' And the criminal turns out to be the brother of the party raykom secretary..."

Of course, the question is not exhausted by the trial of the group of people who engaged in narcotics "business" and smuggling. It will also have to be ascertained why narcotics merchants and smugglers operated so long with impunity on the territory of the republic. And who had been helping and protecting them.

Use of Military in Central Asian Eradication, Interdiction Efforts

90WD0182B Moscow SOVETSKAYA MILITSIYA
in Russian No 1, Jan 90 pp 42-45

[Article by SOVETSKAYA MILITSIYA special correspondent, Captain of Militia V. Pron, Central Asia, under rubric "Problem in Close-Up": "Narcotics Mania, Narcotics Mafia, Narcotics Business"]

[Text] A telephone call from Uzbekistan cut at the heart like a razor blade: in the Samarkand area a helicopter carrying a group that was fighting the narcotics trade had had an accident. The dead included Lieutenant Colonel A.

Radzhanov, deputy chief of the OUR [Criminal Investigation Department] UVD [Internal Affairs Administration], Samarkand Oblast Ispolkom; Major of Militia S. Naviyev, chief of the IDN of the rayon administration; pilots Senior Lieutenant A. Cherevko and Lieutenant S. Pryankov. And... there was a second's pause at the other end of the line—it would appear that your correspondent had also been on board... Then, an hour later, V. Pron himself called and dictated the following report for this issue.

1. A Witness? Get Rid of Him!

Having found out that, in exchange for a large amount of money, his son had contracted to take care of a secret plantation for "bigtime operators" in the narcotics business, the old peasant had given his son a chance to reconsider: "If you don't change your mind, I will tell the local militia about what you're doing." Soon the dangerous witness was found in a pool of blood...

"Fatal outcomes" among the underground "bigtime operators" in the narcotics business, I was assured at UzSSR MVD, are not really that frequent. But they are also not too infrequent. There have been fatal "settlements of scores" among business people who had not shared the profits. In order to acquire a fabulously expensive "fix" of opium, narcotics addicts decide to engage in robberies and stickups. Recently, for example, "bear hunters" were detained in Uzbekistan; they had cleaned out the government's safes into order to supplement the thieves' "communal" cash box and to purchase narcotics to give as a present to less fortunate "colleagues" who were spending time behind bars. Sexual depravity and sex crimes stretch out in a filthy trail behind the operators in the narcotics business. An unusual kind of business has also appeared: the persons buying up the opium frequently deliver young girls who are narcotics addicts to the people who collect the raw materials for making the narcotics. In addition to performing the duties of women of easy virtue, the sick girls perform housekeeping duties and package the "commodity." In exchange for the services rendered, these girls and other people get the right to buy the narcotics at a lower price.

At USSR MVD, in order to increase the fight against the broadly organized narcotics trade, in April 1989 a temporary department to combat the interregional sale of narcotics was created. Employees of the union ministry went to the republics where plants that contain narcotic substances have been grown since time immemorial, created there several operational groups—outposts, as it were, in the war against narcotics "business"—and actually headed them.

In large cities where the merchants in white death carry out their trade there are also special detachments. Literally on the eve of my departure by air to go to Uzbekistan, I happened to be present during the detention of narcotics dealers. You wouldn't believe the kinds of tricks they used: they switched cars, used disguises, and

changed their identity several times. But everything was in vain. The smooth actions of the employees of the Moscow Criminal Investigation Division, the State Security Committee for Moscow and for Moscow Oblast, and the fighters in the special-purpose detachment invariably forced the inveterate "bigtime operators" to suffer a fiasco.

The underground bosses who trade in opium in the country's southern republics, like their "associates" in the capital, also made an unsuccessful attempt to "switch cars"—to adjust to the new conditions, when the militia literally began to step on their heels. For example, they got the idea of shifting the dates for sowing the opium poppies, and began to grow them in hothouses and basements in the English style. By using these simple measures the criminals hope to put a hood over the militia workers, who had become accustomed to seasonal campaigns against the spreaders of the white death. It is a rare occurrence nowadays to encounter a person bold enough to grow the forbidden crop on his personal plot of land. Secret plots of land, as a rule, are cultivated in the mountainous regions, with the profitable plantations being carefully camouflaged against the outside eye. The valuable plots are guarded by armed local residents who have been hired, like the son of the unfortunate peasant, by the crime organizers in exchange for high compensation.

2. "Reconnaissance" From the Air

But how does one make his way to the plantings that are concealed in the mountains? The only possibility for quickly discovering the secret plots is from the air. But powerful helicopter technology is required. USSR MVD, unfortunately, does not have it at its disposal. Therefore the ministry went cap in hand to the military. After all, a decree issued by USSR Supreme Soviet sets the goal of working together to fight organized crime. But it was not until a month later that the necessary agreement was achieved: six combat helicopters were assigned to help the employees of the Uzbek and Kazakh militia. True, during that time, the group that was headquartered in the Uzbek foothill settlement of Altynsay had discovered and rendered harmless several underground syndicates trading in narcotics. Weapons, large amounts of money, and opium had been confiscated. Plantings of the death-dealing poppies had been destroyed on almost four hectares. The secret plantations were being searched for on... donkeys. The criminals were also carried to the place of the crime on those obstinate animals. Obviously, by no means all the carefully camouflaged plots had been discovered, and the investigative actions had not been completely executed. The only hope lay with military equipment.

Together with Lieutenant Colonel of Militia N. Osipov, deputy chief of the Department to Fight Narcotics Addiction, USSR MVD; Lieutenant Colonel of Militia V. Gordiyenko, chief of UUR, UzSSR MVD; and Major of Militia S. Bibikov, deputy department chief of the

republic ministry, we refine the last details in the forthcoming joint operation with the pilots, first at the headquarters of Turkestan Military District, and the in one of the military air units. The military ask to be shown on the map the sectors in the mountainous areas where the militia employees intend to carry out the planned measures. An awkward situation arises—my traveling companions do not have such maps. The pilots unfold their own maps. Precisely, without any waste efforts, we establish the deployment area of the helicopters and the itineraries they should take. As we prepare to leave, the military delicately ask us to conserve fuel—it has been allocated in excess of the established limits and, they emphasize, there was going to be a new gasoline crisis.

I was advised to spend some time in Altynsay, where several groups of people engaged in the narcotics trade had already been revealed. Of course I agreed: this was the first time in many years that such a crushing blow had been dealt to the underground kings in Surkhan-Darya Oblast. A base for the operations group was located on the edge of a mountain village. And long after midnight that "hacienda," as the small building that was assigned to the operational group for housing is jokingly called here, was the gathering place, after an exhausting work day, for those persons who carried on their shoulders the basic weight of the fight against narcotics addition in this part of the republic: Lieutenant Colonel of Militia P. Revin, operational agent for especially important cases, GUUR, USSR MVD; Lieutenant Colonel of Militia V. Vilenskiy, operational agent, GUUR, USSR MVD; Major of Militia A. Kuldashov, associate of OUR, UVD, Surkhan-Darya Oblast Ispolkom, senior operational agent; Lieutenant of Militia Z. Muzaffarov, operational agent; Major of Militia D. Charyyev, investigator; Junior Lieutenant of Militia U. Saribayev, motion-picture specialist-inspector; and others.

In an irrigation canal the associates, in silence, wash off the day's fatigue and dust. We eat our lunch rapidly and meagerly—whatever we have managed to find: yogurt, pita bread, tomatoes. In the morning, before sunrise, reveille. We breakfast on green tea "without everything": the local comrades have not troubled themselves to organize decent meals for their associates who have been assigned here on temporary duty, even though they have been working diligently since early spring. Things are rather difficult for them. Especially after they have started moving against the numerous well-organized criminal formations: the threats come in as though from a cornucopia. There have even been promises to fire a shotgun at people sleeping in the courtyard. There was nothing left to do but to drag the mattresses into the building: braggadocio doesn't pay here.

3. Information Leak?

Dawn had scarcely broken when an MI-8 landed on the edge of a cotton field. Senior helicopter pilot Captain M. Azrilyan refines the itinerary, the unusual features, and

the tasks of the forthcoming flight. A half-hour later, the helicopter is hovering over the first poppy plantation. Then we discover a second plantation, a third... The pilots select a landing area and they circle over it for a long time, until they are convinced that the tiny spot in the mountains is reliable. The members of the operational group have pressed close to the portholes: it is necessary to be ready for any surprise—armed guardians of the secret plots who earn “a hundred rubles a day” are capable of doing anything. They might even shoot at an uninvited guest. That has already happened.

However, this time the landing occurs without any complications. Down a slope that is strewn with boulders and prickly shrubs, we begin our descent to the plantations that are camouflaged and practically indistinguishable from the land. Without special alpine equipment and clothing, it is no easy matter to make one's way down the slope while wearing militia shoes. It is not until an hour later that we discover the first “garden” that is easily distinguishable from the air. It becomes immediately apparent why the “businessmen” have not set up a warm meeting for us: we can see everywhere the traces of a hurried flight—watering hoses strewn all around in disorder, an empty hammock, a stomped-out camp fire, remains of food, a half-destroyed poppy field. Had there been an information leak? Or betrayal? Well, one way or another, we have to do our job. Taking a deep breath and arming ourselves with sticks, we take care of the poisonous plants that remain.

On the bottom of a deep ravine, with the aid of field glasses we locate another plantation. But descending the sheer crumbly slope without the proper insurance would be foolhardy. On the other hand, making our way by a roundabout route to the hidden fields would take a good two or three hours. During that time it would be possible to destroy on the slopes several more fields. Someone complains aloud that the military did not attach a flame-thrower to the helicopter. The idea hangs in mid-air, inasmuch as it is unacceptable: the powerful flames would also destroy the animals and the beneficial plants, destroying the ecological balance. In this same Chuyskaya Valley, wild hemp attracts not only criminals, but also thousands of birds. For the time being, there seems to be only one way out—biological methods for destroying plants containing narcotics. Scientists have promised to help. But so far this is only in the talking stage...

At the peak of the work, an “Afghaner” comes crashing down on us. The wind brings with it a dense wall of whitish dust. Flights are canceled. The enforced idle time enables us to discontinue any specific measures and to sum up the preliminary results, and to think a bit about the problems of combatting narcotics addiction...

4. The “Altynsay Phenomenon”

It was a complete surprise for many people. Because, essentially speaking, Surkhan-Darya Oblast for a long time and, it would seem, solidly has occupied one of the

last places in the ancient struggle against narcotics business. And yet, within a short period of time, several broadly extended and, apparently, reliably secret criminal groups had been discovered here. Knowing the unbelievable difficulties that have to be overcome by the Altynsay crew, I can only assume that the “unexpected” results were achieved only thanks to the high level of the associates' skill and their superhuman working capability.

But the times are different now. The fabulous profits gained by the wheelers and dealers in the narcotics business enable them to open their purse strings to acquire even the latest achievements of scientific-technical progress. But the militia man, who is acting in the name of and for the welfare of society as a whole, for some reason continues to spend a considerable part of his life in overcoming what are frequently artificial difficulties. It would seem that everyone learned long ago that a present-day militia is required to have everything it needs to carry on an effective struggle against those who do not respect the law. Nevertheless, a considerable number of criminals have been evading criminal responsibility, inasmuch as, practically speaking, there are no instruments or even emergency methodologies that make it possible to give an unambiguous answer as to what species of poppy is being removed. Because that determines whether the violator will pay a fine or end up behind bars.

It would scarcely be worthwhile to talk about the computerization of militia work if I had not seen with my own eyes that we can do it when we want to! I came to this conclusion after spending some time at the republic competition of professional skills among GROVD chiefs, which competition was held last autumn at UzSSR MVD. The subdivision leaders were taking one of the examinations after settling down comfortably in front of the spanking-new displays of personal computers. Lieutenant Colonel of Militia V. Atadzhakov, chief of the political administration, promised that soon the electronic brain will come to the aid also of the militia men who are combatting the narcotics business. True, the associates in the appropriate department only smiled mysteriously at this prospect, and, reaching for their notebooks, demonstrated their capabilities: these are our computers, they said. So electronic equipment is something that will come tomorrow. Today, either in the rayon or even in the oblast, it is impossible to find even a skilled specialist who could give an unambiguous finding as to whether a suspect is or is not in a state of narcotic intoxication.

Or, one might ask, why is it that the associates in the Altynsay operational group who have been unselfishly waging a struggle against the bigtime operators in narcotics business have to subsist on such a “lavish” diet? And what is the situation for those who are left waiting, not just for one day or for two days, in an ambush on remote mountain paths? How can one fail to recall the varied cuisine prepared for the cosmonauts or the participants in some popular trip?

Or take this ironic situation: the entire republic is covered with cotton, but the associates of the operational group do not have clothing that is suitable for mountain conditions.

Understandably, domestic narcotics business has far to go before it can reach the "world standards." In our country, fortunately, there is no all-mighty militant narcotics Mafia, as there is in Colombia. No legislator has yet proposed introducing the death penalty for narcotics dealers, as Philippines president C. Aquino has done. But how long will this idyllic situation pertain? Because, quite recently, our high-spirited racketeers and successful prostitutes have begun to be referred in different terms—the former as "bombers," and the latter as "women of easy virtue." People have tried to convince themselves or assuage themselves by saying, "Things like this don't exist in our society, and they cannot exist." But "things like this" have occurred despite all the best intentions. And the cooperatives had scarcely arisen, when the abscess broke. It is now necessary to throw in detachments of special-purpose militia to suppress the racketeers. Probably the same kind of transformation will also occur with the underground world of narcotics business, to which, I am convinced, the capital acquired by the resourceful bigtime operators in the cooperatives is flowing rapidly. Everyone in the very same pseudocooperatives will begin laundering their filthy dividends. Having wooed the cooperative, narcotics business will give birth to the narcotics Mafia. In addition, the demand for the narcotic weed will scarcely decline. That is the conclusion that was reached by associates at the Department to Combat Narcotics Addiction, UzSSR MVD. In their opinion, by the year 2000 the country might have—unless we take cardinal, emergency measures—a half-million drug addicts.

In the morning, in air force helicopters, we flew out to search for illegal poppy plantations. The combat aircraft with unhooded machineguns jumped around lightly over the runway and then set off on the selected course—to Dzhambul, Andizhan, Chirchik, and to Taskhent and Samarkand oblasts. At practically the last moment before takeoff, I decide to fly to Surkhan-Darya Oblast.

5. Requiem

When a raging "Afghaner" forced our helicopter to remain at its moorings, the tragedy in the Samarkand area was approaching its climax. From the helicopter that was hovering over an opium field, the operational agents could clearly see the guards fleeing in panic from the plantation that had been discovered. Then the engine suddenly began sputtering. The pilots were attempting to level off their wounded aircraft, but it was in vain... Soon that most awful telephone call was made to the editorial office. New sacrifices had been thrown onto the altar of narcotics business.

Comments by the General Staff

At our request KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Plotnikov asked General-Major V. Kuznetsov of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff to comment.

"In principle, the army is meeting the militia half-way. For example, in Turkmen Military District, army helicopter pilots participated in eliminating opium plantations. But, obviously, this is insufficient.

"In general, the interaction between the army and internal affairs agencies in combatting criminal elements is a command of the times. It is necessary to carry out the offensive against crime along a single front.

"And yet the decision to involve troops in operations against, say, the narcotics Mafia can be made only by USSR minister of defense after making inquiries to the administrative agencies of the republics, krays, and oblasts. For example, the decision to send military helicopter pilots to help the militia was received by the Air Forces Chief Staff directly from the chief of the General Staff. So the interaction between the military subdivisions and the militia has not yet been firmly established. The question requires a serious amount of additional work and coordination at the level of the two ministries. But, at the same time, nothing here is insurmountable, because we have developed a system of informing and interacting with MVD agencies in combatting losses and thefts of weapons. And a considerable amount of experience in these matters has even been accumulated in the Far East. Consequently, this kind of interaction can also be set up in the fight against drug addicts and drug pushers."

Ukrainian SSR First Deputy Public Prosecutor on Crime

90UN0948A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
18 Jan 90 p 4

[Unattributed interview with Ukrainian SSR First Deputy Prosecutor M.A. Potebenko: "The Law in Defense of Society and Citizens"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] [PRAVDA UKRAINY] Mikhail Alekseyevich, the passage of 1989 was marked by a broadening of democracy, of glasnost, and by improvement in the political and economic structure of our society. And what was it like for the organs of the republic's procuracy?

[Potebenko] Unconditionally, despite a series of profound problems and crisis phenomena, the past year was a year of fundamental transformations, of the solution of important problems in politics, economics and culture. And also, not in the least degree, in such areas as law and the legal system.

In my view, marked progress was made in the matter of creating a state governed by law.

A number of extremely important legislative acts were passed, including ones directed toward protecting the rights of citizens. Court and legal reform and the principle of the supremacy of the law received further development. Finally, and this is particularly important, society declared a decisive battle against crime. A powerful stimulus to this was given by the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 4 August 1989 concerning a decisive intensification of the battle against crime and the resolution by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies on intensifying the struggle against organized crime.

For us, this was the most difficult and tense year during the entire period of perestroika. For the first time, we ran up against such unprecedented problems as strikes, exacerbation of interethnic conflicts, and mass disorders. And also serious violations in implementation of the legislative program of economic transformations, in democratization of society, and increased violations of law and order and discipline.

All this has demanded from workers of the law enforcement organs, including the procuracy as well, a very strenuous moral and physical effort.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] And nevertheless, at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, they spoke with alarm about the continuing increase in crime within the country. And what is the situation in the Ukraine?

[Potebenko] To put it mildly, bad. During the past year, more than 322,000 crimes were recorded in the republic—32.7 percent more than during 1988. The number of serious crimes increased by one-third and at the same time their mercenary trend clearly grew stronger. More than half of all registered crimes were robberies, hold-ups, and thefts of state, public, and personal property.

An increase in crime was noted in all oblasts. And in Kirovograd, Kharkov, and Kherson oblasts and in the city of Kiev, the number of crimes grew by more than half.

More than 26,000 crimes were committed by juveniles. This is 28.5 percent more than during 1988.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] Recently our newspaper published an article entitled "Tomorrow There Will Be War," which talked about the violence of organized criminal groups and the inadequate opposition to them. What can you say on this score?

[Potebenko] The article is timely; it raises sharply the problems of the struggle against organized crime. Although, in my view, it also did not avoid exaggeration. The situation that has developed in Kiev was shown too dramatically, and the law enforcement organs, on the whole, as being openly helpless. And this is far from being so. During the first 8 months of last year alone, the organs of internal affairs, the KGB, and the procuracy uncovered 245 organized criminal groups which had carried out 2,000 crimes, among them 20 murders. A

total of 337 firearms and money and valuables amounting to more than two million rubles were confiscated from criminals.

Recently in Zaporozhe Oblast an organized crime group was uncovered that consisted of 19 persons and that was also active in Krymskaya, Kherson, and Nikolayev oblasts. Over the course of the past two years this group committed about 50 robberies, hold-ups and thefts. Firearms and other kinds of weapons and narcotics were taken from the criminals. At the present time the participants in the group are under arrest and an investigation is being conducted.

I would also like to advise that during 9 months of last year alone, 653 criminal cases were instituted within the republic that involved extortion—so-called "rackets."

As regards the events that took place in the Dinamo restaurant, concerning which the article mentioned above reported... the procuracy of the city of Kiev and other law enforcement organs are now conducting a careful check based on these facts and its results will be made public.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] What, from your point of view, are the main reasons for the increase in crime?

[Potebenko] It is known that criminality depends upon processes that occur within society as a whole. Its increase is first of all connected with crisis phenomena in economic and social development, which we have unfortunately not succeeded in avoiding during the period of perestroika.

One must also mention the insufficient forethought given, in my view, to certain laws that were approved in haste. Imperfections in them have left loopholes for people with dirty hands.

Take for example the cooperative movement. Whether we want it or not, the development of cooperative activity, with all its positive aspects, has in a number of cases led in practice to unforeseen deformations, to a property stratification within society that is not justified by the results of labor. Many have understood the principle that everything is permitted which is not forbidden by the law as meaning complete permissiveness. In combination with the actual uncontrollability of the cooperatives (particularly the purchasing and trade cooperatives), this has created conditions for various kinds of sharp dealers to engage in dark machinations and thefts.

For example, one Nudyshchuk, who had earlier been convicted for felony theft, was chosen chairman of the Volyn cooperative under the Novovolynsk wood-processing combine. Having obtained a loan at the bank for acquisition of equipment, he misappropriated more than 8000 rubles. He has been sentenced to six years in confinement and his property has been confiscated.

The charter for the Sogdiana public catering cooperative was registered in the Leninskiy Rayon executive committee in Depropetrovsk. However, in fact, it did not exist and was not producing any products. To make up for this, one of its members drew up a number of false documents, on the basis of which he obtained 100,000 rubles from the bank and then disappeared. In this case, investigation has been completed and the case will be examined by the court.

During the two past years, in connection with crude violations of the law that have been committed, more than 400 cooperatives have ceased operation at the demand of public prosecutors.

I by no means want to cast a shadow on civilized cooperative activities. Honest members of cooperatives, doubtlessly, bring much benefit to society. But reality is what it is. And we cannot but take it into consideration.

When speaking about the growth in crime, it is also necessary to acknowledge the fact that its present splash is in many ways also connected with errors and omissions in the activities of law enforcement organs. It also tied to low rates of crime solution, a decline in the professionalism of the investigative apparatus, frequent violations of the principle of the inevitability of punishment for crimes, and also, not infrequently, unjustified leniency by courts toward persons who have committed serious crimes.

And not least important among the reasons for increased criminality is also the legal nihilism that has become widespread in society, the disrespectful and contemptuous attitude of a part of our citizens toward the law and the activities of law enforcement organs.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] Democratization has facilitated the development of civic positions in people and many varied informal associations and organizations have appeared that are striving to act. What kind of role do the law enforcement organs have in this process?

[Potebenko] The present stage of perestroyka is setting broad masses of workers in motion; all of them are taking a more active part in discussion and solution of socioeconomic and political questions. At the same time, we are in the process of overcoming an alienation of the people from the authorities that developed over many years. And this is gratifying, this is to the benefit of perestroyka. Therefore, we must welcome and assist all these public organizations and associations of people which, within the framework of the law, are contributing to perestroyka, to the renewal of society, to overcoming the surge of difficulties and crisis phenomena. The associations, for example, which are fighting to restore the natural environment deserve all kinds of support.

But, I, of course, am categorically opposed to actions by the informal associations which entail direct violation of the law. Indeed, frequently representatives of certain such associations undertake attempts from extremist and, sometimes, even directly anti-socialist positions in order to discredit perestroyka, to create within society an atmosphere of alarm, of chaos, of national hatred. People are justly demanding that, in such cases, law enforcement organs put a decisive stop to violations of the law. And it seems to me that there should not be any lack of clarity in this question.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] You referred approvingly to the activities of environmental defense societies. Well, and the procuracy, is it being sufficiently decisive in combatting those who destroy nature?

[Potebenko] During the first half of 1989, at the demand of public prosecutors, more than 2000 officials were sentenced to disciplinary, administrative, and material penalties and 1600 persons received warnings that violations of the law were impermissible. However, it should be acknowledged that many public prosecutors still are not applying the full force of the law to destroyers of nature. Recently in Cherkassy, at a republic-wide seminar meeting, a fundamental and pointed discussion was held with management workers of procuracy organs precisely about this.

[PRAVDA UKRAINY] Mikhail Alekseyevich, how do you see the main problems facing procuracy in the year that has just started?

[Potebenko] First of all we must fundamentally accelerate the tempo of renewal and improvement of procuracy oversight. We are not satisfied with the slowness of this process. We are very much hoping that a new Law on the USSR Procuracy will be passed this year and, of course, also for fundamental changes in the attitude of each worker toward his obligations. We will achieve a situation where professionally trained, honest, and ideologically steadfast workers, dedicated to their work, are functioning in all units of the procuracy. These are our internal problems, and we are working on them.

The principle problem of the organs of the procuracy during the present stage of perestroyka consists of using legal means to ensure realization of the decisions approved by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and first of all of measures for restoring health to the economy and intensifying the struggle against organized crime, and to ensure the implementation of other legislative acts aimed at helping society overcome our state of crisis.

We are firmly convinced that the law must reliably protect both the interests of society as a whole and also of each citizen, in particular.

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